(Defending-Islam Team note: The following translation is by a non-Muslim, Earl Edgar Elder. We present this translation since there is no other translation available to us. If any of the readers can provide us with a better and more accurate translation, we will remove the present one and upload the new translation)

Commentary on the Creed of Islam

Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazani on the Creed of Najm al-Din al-Nasafi

Preface by al-Taftazani

TO HIS COMMENTARY ON THE ARTICLES OF BELIEF BY AL-NASAFI

In the name of Allah, the Merciful, Compassionate One (al-rahman).

PRAISE BE to Allah, who is unique in the majesty of His essence and the perfection of His attributes, and who is separated from blemishes and marks of defect through the qualities that belong to His great Power. Blessings on His Prophet Muhammad, who has been aided by His forceful arguments and clear proofs, and on his family and his Companions, guides and protectors of the path of Reality.

To continue: The basis of the science of laws and judgments and the foundation of the rules concerning the articles of Islamic Belief is the science of the unity of the Deity and His attributes, entitled al-Kalam, which is devoid of the darkness of doubts and the obscurities of fancies.

The brief treatise known as the "Articles of Belief (al-'aqaid) is by the painstaking Imam, 'Umar al-Nasafi, the example of the learned of Islam and the star of our faith and religion. May Allah raise his rank in the abode of Peace. It includes under the headings of this branch of knowledge the most striking gems and pearls of great value which are the fundamental standards of our religion. Running through the text [of the creed] these [gems and pearls] are jewels and precious stones of certainty, yet at the same time the acme of conciseness and instruction and the last word in good order and arrangement.

I have tried to explain the brief treatise so as to give the details of its general principles and clarify the intricacies of the subject, to straighten out the involved things and reveal those that are concealed, while at the same time keeping the record concise, clearly calling attention to its purpose. The verification of the problems is a result of the statement of them. The detailed application of the proofs is an effect of their presentation. The interpretation of the doctrines comes after proper introduction. The values of the work are manifold in spite of its conciseness. I achieved this end by ridding my commentary of tautology and wearisomeness, and by striking the happy medium between brevity and tediousness. Allah is the guide to the path of those who are led, and of Him we seek preservation from error and guidance to the goal. He is my sufficiency, and excellent is the Guardian.

Chapter I

THE REAL ESSENCES OF THINGS

The People of Reality say that the real essences of things exist in reality and that the knowledge of them is verifiable as real in contradiction to the Sophists.

KNOW THAT of the legal judgments (al-ahkam al-shariya) there are some which are connected with practice and are called derived (far'iya) and practical ('amaliya) and there are others which are connected with dogma and are called fundamental (asliya) and doctrinal (itiqadlya). The science connected with the first is called the science of canon laws and judgments because these things are not comprehended except from the canon law (al-shar'), and it is only to these that the understanding turns when the [term] judgment is mentioned without further definition. And the science connected with the second is the science of the unity (al-tawhid) and attributes

(al'sifat) of the Deity, since this [subject of unity] is its most noted investigation and its noblest object.

The earliest of the Companions (al-sahaba) and their Followers (al-tabi'in) - Allah be pleased with them all- because the articles of their belief were pure through the blessing of their association with the Prophet- on him be peace; because the period in which they lived was near to his time; because there were few occasions of attack and disagreement and because they were able to go back to absolutely reliable authority; well, because of all these things they dispensed with putting down in writing the material of the two sciences and with dividing it into divisions and sections, and they also dispensed with the statement of their investigations in these two sciences both as to developments and fundamentals.

This condition continued until controversies arose among the Muslims, pride prevailed among the leaders of the faith (al-din), and there appeared a clashing of opinions and a tendency to innovations (al-bida') and to personal desires (al-ahwa). There was a multiplicity of legal decisions (al-fatawi) and of occasions from which cases arose, and much referring to the Learned (al-'ulama) in important matters. So they busied themselves with speculation and deduction, with attempting to arrive at a correct opinion and to elicit meaning from the texts, with the establishing of rules and fundamentals, with the arrangement of [the material related to them in] divisions and sections, with the multiplying of proofs to problems and stating the matters in which there were ambiguities and their explanations, with determining the conventional usages and the technical terms, and with pointing out the [various] ways of proceeding and the differences. They gave the name of al-fiqh to that which pertained to the science of the practical judgments derived from their detailed proofs, and "the fundamentals of al-fiqh" to the science of the terms of the proofs taken together as a whole in proving the judgments; and the science of the articles of Belief as they come straight from their proofs they called al-kalam.

The reasons for this are (I) because the subject of its investigations was their saying, "The discourse (al-kalam) about such-and-such"; (2) because the problem of [the meaning of the term] Speech [predicated of Allah] was the most celebrated of its investigations, the most strongly disputed, and the subject of the most controversy, so much so that some of the leaders killed many of these People of Reality (ahl al-haqq) because they failed to admit the creation of the Qur'an; (3) because it imparts ability in speech in verifying legal matters and in compelling adversaries to submit just as logic (al-mantiq) imparts ability in philosophy; (4) because it is the first of the sciences which can be known and learned by speech only, so this term [speech] was applied to this science, and then it was exclusively used for it and not applied to any other science for sake of distinction; (5) because it can be verified only by discussion and interchange of speech from two sides, whereas others are sometimes verified by meditation and the perusal of books; (6) because it is the most disputatious and controversial of the sciences, so speech was greatly needed for conversing with those of opposite view and for refuting them; (7) because of the cogency of its arguments it has become, so to speak, "the speech" (al-kalam) to the exclusion of all other sciences, just as is said of the stronger of two discourses, "This is 'the discourse' "; (8) and because it is based on decisive proofs (adilla qat'iya), most of which are supported by proofs to be believed on authority (al-sam'iya) it is consequently the strongest in its influence on and penetration into the heart. So it is called al-kalam as though derived from al-kalm that is, "the wound." This is the [understanding of the term] kalam [in the mind] of the ancients (al-qudama').

Most of the controversies about al-kalam occurred among the different Islamic sects, especially the Mu'tazilites (al-Mu'tazila) because they were the first sect which laid the foundation for both that which contradicts the plain teaching of the Approved Way (al-sunna) and that which the

Community (al-jama'a) of the Companions (al-sahaba) the approval of Allah on them all followed in the matter of the articles of Belief. That [beginning of the Mu'tazilites] happened when Wasil b. 'Ata', their leader, withdrew from the circle of al-Hasan al-Basri- Allah have mercy on him- asserting that the one who committed a great sin was neither a Believer nor an Unbeliever and maintaining that he was in an intermediate position.

Al-Hasan said, "He has withdrawn from us," so they were called al-Mu'tazila (the Withdrawers). But they called themselves the Maintainers of Justice and the Divine Unity (ashab al-adl wa al-tawhid) because they said that the reward of the obedient and the punishment of the disobedient are incumbent on Allah, and they denied that He has eternal attributes. Subsequently they went deep into the science of al-kalam and added the fringes of the Philosophers to many of their principles.

Their school of thought spread among the people until al-Shaykh Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari said to his teacher, Abu 'Ali al-Jubba'i, "What have you to say about three brothers, one of whom died obedient, another disobedient, and the third in infancy?" He answered, "The first will be rewarded with the Garden (al-janna), the second will be punished with the Fire (al-nar) and the third will neither be rewarded nor punished." Al-Ash'ari answered, "And what if the third should say, 'Lord, why didst Thou make me die in infancy, and not detain me until I grew up and believed on Thee, and obeyed and thus entered the Garden?' What would the Lord- the Exalted- say then?" He answered, "The Lord would say, 'I knew that if thou shouldst grow up thou wouldst disobey and enter the Fire, so it was better for thee to die in infancy.'" Al-Ash'ari said, "And if the second should say, 'Lord, why didst Thou not cause me to die in infancy so that I should not disobey and enter the Fire?' What would the Lord say then?" Al-Jubba'i was confounded and al-Ash'ari abandoned his school of thought. He and his followers worked from that time at refuting the Mu'tazilite view and maintaining that which the Approved Way had handed down and that which the community did. Hence they are called the People of the Approved Way and the Community (ahl al-sunna wa 'l-jamaa).

Then when philosophy was translated into Arabic and the followers of Islam plunged (khada) into it, they attempted to refute the Philosophers on the points in which they differed from the canon law (al-shari'a). So they mixed up with kalam much of philosophy in order to understand thoroughly the goals of philosophy and so to be put into a position to show the unreality of it. This went on until they included in kalam most of physics and metaphysics and plunged into mathematics until theology was hardly to be distinguished from philosophy had it not been that it included "things to be believed on authority" (al-sam'iyat) . This is the kalam of the Later

Theologians (al-muta'akhkhirun).

In general kalam is the most noble of the sciences, first, because it is the foundation of the legal judgments and the chief of the religious sciences; second, because its subject matter is the articles of Belief of Islam; third, because its aim is the attaining of the happiness of this life and the next; and fourth, because its proofs are the decisive arguments most of which are aided by evidences that are based on authority.

As to what has been reported of the Fathers of the first generations (al-salaf) of Islam concerning their attack against kalam and their prohibition of it, that was only directed against the religious zealot and the one who had failed to attain certainty, and against the one who purposed to destroy the articles of Belief of the Muslims and the one who plunged needlessly into the obscurities of those who claimed to be philosophers. Otherwise how can one conceive the prohibition of the foundation upon which our obligations rest and the basis of laws regarding practice?

Furthermore the basis of kalam is that there is deduced from the existence of originated things (al-muhdathat) the existence of the Maker (al-sani), His unity, His attributes and His actions, and from these things all the rest of the things which are to be believed on authority. For this reason it was suitable to begin the treatise by calling attention to the existence of that which is observed of substances and accidents and to verify the knowledge concerning both of them, that thereby one might attain the understanding of that which is the most important goal of all.

Therefore al-Nasafi said,

The People of Reality (ahl al-haqq) say/Reality is the judgment which corresponds with the actual fact. It is applied in a general sense to propositions, to articles of Belief, to religions, and to different schools of practice (al-madhahib) with reference to their inclusion of reality. Its opposite is the unreal (al-batil). But as for the term truth (al-sidq), it is especially applied to propositions; its opposite is falsehood (al-kadhib). The distinction that may be made between these two pairs of contrast is that in the case of reality (al-haqq) the correspondence is seen from the standpoint of the actual fact, and in the case of truth (al-sidq), from the standpoint of judgment. And the meaning of the expression "the truth of a judgment" is the agreement of the judgment with the actual fact, and the meaning of the expression "the reality of a judgment" is the agreement of the actual fact with the judgment.

that the real essences of things exist in reality/The real essence (al-haqiqa) of a thing and its quiddity (al-mahiya) are that which constitutes the identity of a thing (ma bihi 'l shay' huwa huwa), as is exemplified by the application of the term "rational (natiq) animal" to man in contrast to the application of the terms "laughing animal" and "writing animal"; in which case it is possible to conceive of man as not being described by the terms "laughing" and "writing," inasmuch as they [laughing and writing] are accidents. And it may be said further that that which constitutes the identity of a thing is, with respect to its being verified as having external reality, a real essence; and with respect to its being individualized, it is a certain particular thing (huwiya), but without respect to either of these it is a quiddity.

Thus in our opinion the term shay' (a thing) is identical with the term al-mawjud (that which exists); and the terms al-thubut (real existence), al-tahaqquq (being verified as having real existence), al-wujud (existence) and al-kawn (coming-into-existence) are synonymous, and the meaning of them is immediately perceived (badihi al-tasawwur).

But if it is objected that such a logical statement as that the real essences of things exist in reality is tautological in the same way as our stating that really existent things exist in reality, to this we answer that what is meant thereby is that what we believe to be the real essences of things and designate by certain terms such as "man," "horse/' "sky," and "earth" is something existing in the things themselves. It is analogous to the statement that the necessarily existent being (wajib al-wujud) is existent. This statement conveys some useful information; in fact it may have to be demonstrated by argument. It is not like the statement that the really existent things exist in reality, nor is it like the statement that I am Abu'l-Najm and my poetry is my poetry, in which case the statement is self-evident [and hence conveys no useful information].

And the verification of this is to be found in the fact that a thing may have different aspects, in consequence of which when something is predicated of it the judgment may be useful when the thing is seen in one aspect, and useless when it is seen in another. In the case of man, for instance, when taken with respect to his being a body of some sort, to predicate of him animality conveys useful information, but, when taken with respect to his being a rational animal, then to predicate animality of him is tautological.

and that the knowledge of them/that is, of the real essences, both of that which they are perceived to be (tasawwur) and of that which is affirmed of them or of their modes

is verifiable as real/Some say that what this statement refers to is undoubtedly the knowledge of the reality of the existence of the essences, for to know the essences themselves as a whole is impossible. In reply to this it may be said that the reference here is to the genus, in refutation of those who say that there is no real existence to any of the essences and also of those who say that there can be no knowledge of the fact whether an essence has real existence or has no real existence.

in contradiction to the Sophists (al-Sufasta'iya)/For some of them deny the real essences of things and maintain that they are fancies (awham) and vain imaginations (khayalat). These are the Obstinate (al-inadiya). Others deny the real existence of essences, maintaining that essences only follow from what one happens to believe, so that if we believe a thing to be a substance

(jawhar) it is a substance, but if we believe it to be an accident it is an accident; or if we believe a thing to be eternal (qadim) it is eternal, but if we believe it to be originated (hadith) it is originated. These are the Opinioners (al-indiya). Still others deny that there can be any knowledge of whether a thing has real existence or not. They assert that they are in doubt and that they are in doubt even of their doubt, and so on. These are the Agnostics (al-la-adriya).

As for us, however, to prove our point of view we first convince ourselves, either by sense perception or by demonstration, of the necessity of establishing that certain things have real existence. Then from this premise we argue that if the negation of those things is not proven, then the real existence of those things has been established. But if, on the other hand, the negation has been proven, then, inasmuch as that negation by virtue of its being a species of judgment is one of the real essences it necessarily follows, again, that something of real essence has been established and that it is not proper to negate it absolutely. It is evident that this argument applies to the Obstinate only.

[As for the Opinioners and the Agnostics], they say, with regard to those types of knowledge described as necessary (al-daruriyat) that (a) some of them are sense perceptions (al-hissiyat), but that sense perception may sometimes err, as in the case of the squint-eyed who sees one to be two, and of the bilious who finds the sweet bitter, and (b) some of them are immediate perceptions (al-badihiyat) but that these are subject to differences of opinion and are open to ambiguities for the solving of which there is need of subtle speculation, (c) Another type of necessary knowledge [they say] is that arrived at by means of syllogistic speculations (al-nazariyat) [from major premises which are either sense perceptions or immediate perceptions]; but as for these [they argue] with the unsoundness of these major premises, there necessarily follows the unsoundness of the conclusions. And it is for this reason [they add] that thinking human beings have many differences of opinion [concerning conclusions arrived at by syllogistic speculations].

To these we reply:

(a) The error that may occur in sense perception by reason of particular causes in certain instances does not negate the validity of the sense perception in other instances where the particular causes of the error are not present.

(b) The differences of opinion that may occur with respect to immediate perceptions by reason of one's lack of acquaintance with the subject or of one's difficulty in forming a clear notion of the subject on account of its abstruseness do not destroy the possibility of forming immediate perceptions.

(c) The many differences of opinion that may occur in conclusions arrived at by syllogistic speculation as a result of the unsoundness which may sometimes occur in the act of speculation do not destroy in other instances the validity of conclusions arrived at by syllogistic speculation.

But the truth is that there is no way to enter into discussion with them, especially the Agnostics, because they do not admit anything known by which an unknown is to be established. Rather the only way is to punish them with the Fire, that they may either confess or be consumed in the Fire.

Sufasta is a name given to falsified wisdom and specious knowledge, because sufa means knowledge and wisdom, and asta means the specious and false. And from this is derived al-safsata just as falsafa is derived from faylasufa (philosopher), which means "the lover of wisdom."

Chapter 2

THE CAUSES OF KNOWLEDGE

The causes of knowledge for all creation are three: the sound senses, true narrative, and Reason. The senses are five, namely, hearing, seeing, smelling, taste, and touch, and by each of these senses one is informed concerning that for which it was appointed.

True narrative is of two kinds: one of them is the mutawatir narrative, and it is the narrative established by the tongues of people of whom it is inconceivable that they would agree together on a falsehood. It brings about necessary knowledge such as the knowledge of former kings in past times and of distant countries. The second kind is the narrative of the Messenger aided by an evidentiary miracle, and it brings about deductive knowledge, and the knowledge established by it resembles the knowledge established by necessity in certainty and in fixity.

Then as for Reason: it is a cause of knowledge also; and whatever of it is established by immediate perception is necessary, just as the knowledge that the whole of a thing is greater than the part of it; and whatever is established by deduction is acquired.

Illumination is not one of the causes of the cognition of the soundness of a thing with the People of Reality.

The causes of knowledge/ Knowledge is an attribute of the knowing subject by means of which any object referred to becomes revealed (yatajalla) to him; that is to say, it becomes clear and evident and capable of being described by words, and this regardless of whether that object is something existing (mawjud) or something non-existing (ma'dum). Knowledge includes both the comprehension (al-idrak) by the senses and the comprehension by Reason (al-aql), and this again both of things conceived (al-tasawwurat) and of things asserted (al-tasdiqat), the latter of which may be both certainties (al-yaqiniya) and non-certainties (ghayr al-yaqiniya).

This is in opposition to the view of the Sophists that knowledge is an attribute [of the knowing subject by means of] which [he] makes an affirmative judgment of which the contradictory (al-naqid) cannot be admitted. This definition of theirs, although it includes the comprehension of the senses, provided only that the thing to be perceived is not inaccessible to the senses; and although it also includes the things conceived [by Reason] provided only, as they claim, that the things to be conceived do not have contradictories; yet it does not include the non-certainties of things asserted. So much for their view. Accordingly the revelation of an object to the knower must be taken to mean a complete unveiling (al-inkishaf al-tamm) [which has been identified with knowledge] and therefore precludes opinion (al-zann) so that knowledge with them is to be contrasted with opinion.

for all creation (al-khalq) /that is, for all created beings, whether angels, men or jinn, in contrast to the knowledge of the Creator who is exalted in and through Himself for knowledge belongs to His essence and is not due to any cause whatsoever

are three: the sound senses (al-hawass al-salima), true narrative (al-khabar al-sadiq) and Reason (al-aql)/This is by way of enumerating the particulars (al-istiqra') From the standpoint of classification, if the cause of the knowledge is some other person outside the knower, then it is true narration; [but if the cause of knowledge is within the knower himself] then, if there is an organ distinct from the perceptive faculty (al-mudrik), it is sense perception; otherwise, it is Reason.

Objection may be raised that the efficient cause (al-sabab al-muaththir) in all kinds of knowledge is Allah, since they all exist through His creation and His bringing them into existence without any impression (ta'thir) being made by the sensory faculty, true narration, and Reason. Reason only appears to be a cause, as for instance fire in the case of burning; and as for the senses and narration, the former are only instruments and the latter a method of comprehension.

Further objection may be raised that the ultimate cause (al-sabab al-mufdi) taken as a whole wherein Allah creates within us knowledge according to the customary way (jary al-ada) in order to include the percipient (al-mudrik) such as Reason, the instrument such as the sensory faculty, and the method such as narration is not confined to three things, but there are other things such as sensibility (al-wijdan) surmise (al-hads), experience (al-tajriba) and the speculation (al-nazar) of the Reason, meaning the arrangement of principles and premises (muqaddimat).

To this we reply that this [threefold division given] is according to the method of the Early Theologians, who limited themselves to the aims pursued and shunned the minute precisions of the Philosophers. When these theologians discerned that some of the things perceived came as the result of the use of the external senses, about which there is no doubt, whether in rational beings or non-rational beings, they, therefore, made the senses one of the causes; and since most of the things known about religion are derived from true narrative, they made it another cause. Since they were not positive about the internal senses (al-hawass al-batina) which are called the common sense (al-hiss al-mushtarak) or the estimative faculty (al-wahm) or something else; and because they did not attach much importance to the details of surmises (al-hadsiyat), experiences (al-tajribiyat), immediate perceptions (al-badihiyat) and speculations (al-nazariyat) and because all these go back to Reason, they made Reason a third cause which ultimately arrives at knowledge by merely giving attention to or by drawing to itself a surmise or an experience or the arrangement of premises. So they made Reason the cause of knowledge in that we have hunger and thirst, that the whole is greater than the part, that the light of the moon is derived from the sun, that scammony is a laxative, and that the world is originated, although in some matters Reason is aided by sense perception.

The senses (al-hawass)/The word is the plural of a sense (hassa), meaning the sensory faculty.

are five/meaning that of necessity Reason determines their existence. But the proofs for the internal senses, which the Philosophers maintain, are incomplete according to the fundamentals of Islam.

namely, hearing (al-sam')/ is a faculty (quwa) placed in the nerves spread out in the cavity of the ear hole, by which sounds are perceived. This is by way of connecting with the ear hole the air which has assumed the quality of the sounds, meaning that Allah then creates perception in the soul (al-nafs).

seeing (al-basar)/ It is a faculty placed in the two hollow nerves which meet each other in the brain, thence they separate and go to the two eyes; by this faculty are perceived rays of light, colors, shapes, measures, motions, the beautiful and the ugly, and other things, the perception of which Allah creates in the soul whenever the creature uses this faculty.

smelling (al-shamm)/ It is a faculty placed in the two protruding lumps on the front of the brain, which are like the two nipples of the breasts; by this faculty odors are perceived by way of connecting with the cartilage of the nose the air which has assumed the quality of the odors.

taste (al-dhawq)/ It is a faculty spread out in the nerves situated on the organ of the tongue; by this faculty flavors are perceived through the mixing of the saliva which is in the mouth with the thing tasted, and through its reaching to the nerves.

and touch (al-lams)/ It is a faculty spread out into all the body by which heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and the like are perceived at the time of touching and contact

and by each of these senses/that is, the five senses

one is informed/that is, is given knowledge

concerning that for which it was appointed/that is, that particular sense. This means that Allah has created each one of these senses to perceive certain things peculiar to it, such as hearing for sounds, taste for that which is flavored, and smelling for odors. Nothing is perceived by one sense which is perceived by another sense, but as to whether that is possible or not there is a difference of opinion. However, the correct position is that it is possible, because it is by a purely creative act of Allah without any impression on the part of the senses. So it is not impossible that Allah create after the loss of sight an added perception of sounds, for example. If the question is raised whether the sweetness and heat of a thing are not both together perceived by the tasting faculty, we reply in the negative; rather the sweetness is perceived by taste and the heat by the sense of touch which is present in the mouth and the tongue.

True narrative/that is, that which is in agreement with the fact, for narrative is [a form of] speech in relation to which there is something external with which the relationship agrees, so it is true; or the relationship does not agree with it, and it is then false. So truth and falsehood are descriptives of narrative. They therefore may be used with the sense of giving information about a thing according to what is or what is not. This means [that narration is] the making [of something] known by a complete relationship which agrees or does not agree with the fact, so truth and falsehood are among the attributes applied to the narrator. And for this reason in some books the term "the true" is used as an attribute of "narrative" (al-khabar al-sadiq), and in others it is placed in annexation, "the narrative of the truthful one" (al-khabar al-sadiq).

is of two kinds: one of them is the mutawatir narrative/It is so called because it does not occur just once, but in sequence and continuity.

and it is the narrative established by the tongues of people of whom it is inconceivable that they would agree together/that is, Reason does not permit

their concurring together on a falsehood/The thing that proves it is that knowledge takes place without any doubt.

It/of necessity

brings about necessary knowledge such as the knowledge of former kings in past times and of distant countries/The latter phrase "distant countries" may be joined to "the kings" or to "the times"; the former, namely "the kings," is more likely although further away in position in the sentence.

Here then are two matters to be noted; one of them is that the mutawatir narrative brings about knowledge and that of necessity, for we come of ourselves to the knowledge of the existence of Mecca and Baghdad and that such facts are only gained through narratives. The other matter is that the knowledge derived from such mutawatir narrative is necessary, and that is because it may be obtained by one who is capable of making a deduction and by others as well, even by children who have not yet been brought up to the right way, by the method of the acquisition of knowledge and of arranging the necessary premises. But as for the narrative of the Christians

(al-Nasara) concerning the killing of Jesus, on whom be peace, and that of the Jews (al-Yahud) concerning the perpetuity of the religion of Moses, on whom be peace well, such mutawatir narrative is absurd.

Objection may be raised that the narrative of each individual only gives an opinion (zann), and heaping opinion upon opinion does not bring about certainty, and also that the possibility of each individual's falsehood brings about the possibility of the whole group's falsehood, for it is made up of the same individuals. To this we reply that it often happens that in the grouping together of individual cases there is something in them collectively that was not in them separately, as for instance in the strength of a rope made of hairs.

It may be objected that in the case of necessary types of knowledge there is no irregularity or contradiction; still, we do find in the case of such knowledge that the knowledge that one is half of two is stronger than the affirmation of the existence of Alexander. Furthermore, some of those people who employ Reason in their investigations, such as al-Sumaniya and the

Brahmins (al-Barahima) deny that mutawatir narrative produces knowledge. This argument is inapplicable as an objection, for it is to be admitted that various kinds of necessary knowledge sometimes differ from one another by difference in usage, custom, and practice, and in the occurring to one's mind and conceiving the terms of judgments (atraf al-ahlkam). And there may be a contradiction about mutawatir narrative because of pride and obstinacy just as the Sophists exhibit in contradicting all types of necessary knowledge.

The second kind is the narrative of the Messenger (al-rasul) aided/that is to say, whose message is established

by an evidentiary miracle (al-mu'jiza)/A Messenger is a man sent by Allah to creatures in order to convey His judgments; and the bringing of a book may be stipulated of him, in contrast to a prophet (al-nabi), for "prophet" is a more general term. An evidentiary miracle is something that annuls the customary way of things (khariq lil-'ada), the purpose of which is to demonstrate the truthfulness of the one making the claim to be the Messenger of Allah.

and it/that is, the narrative of the Messenger

brings about deductive (istidlali) knowledge/that is, that which is arrived at by deduction (al-istidlal) , which is by consideration of proof (dalil). Deduction is (1) that thing by the sound consideration of which one is enabled to attain the knowledge of any subject that has been transmitted by narrative. (2) It has also been said to be a [minor] proposition, composed of judgments, which necessarily demands a [major] proposition.

So according to the first definition the proof of the existence of the Maker is the world, and according to the second definition it is our saying that the world is originated and that everything originated has a maker. But their statement that proof is that thing from the knowledge of which the knowledge of something else follows is more suitable to the second definition. But as for its bringing about knowledge, that is because it is absolutely certain that he through whom Allah performs an evidentiary miracle for the purpose of asserting his claim to the office of Messenger is truthful in the judgments which he brings. If he is truthful, then the knowledge concerning the contents of his message absolutely follows.

And as for its being deductive, that is because it depends upon deduction and because it brings to the mind the fact that it is the narrative of the one whose office of Messenger is established by evidentiary miracles. Every narrative of this kind is truthful and its contents are according to fact.

and the knowledge established by it/that is, by the narrative of the Messenger

resembles/ that is, is like

the knowledge established by necessity/ [this means] like the things perceived by the senses, those immediately perceived, and the mutawatir narratives.

in certainty/that is, in the impossibility of predicating the contradictory

and in fixity/that is, in the impossibility of predicating the discontinuance of this knowledge by that which is ambiguous (tashkik al-mushakkik). And it is a kind of knowledge that means the absolute established conviction (itiqad) which agrees with the fact, else otherwise this knowledge would be a matter of ignorance, or of opinion, or of following tradition (taqlid).

If it is objected that this explanation is applicable to the mutawatir only, and therefore goes back to the first section [of true narrative], we reply that the statement is about that narrative which is known to be of the Messenger because it has been heard from his mouth or because that or something else possible has been transmitted of him by tawatur. The individual narrative is not useful for knowledge because there may be some doubt of its being the narrative of the Messenger.

An objection may also be made that since the statement is mutawatir or heard from the lips of the Messenger of Allah, the knowledge which results is then necessary and consequently not deductive, just as in the case of the rest of knowledge obtained by tawatur and sense perception. To this we reply (1) that the necessary knowledge, in the case of the mutawatir narrative which is from the Messenger, is the knowledge that the narrative is the narrative of the Messenger of Allah- may blessing and peace be upon him- because this means "that by which the giving of the narrative has become mutawatir'' (2) In regard to that which is heard from the mouth of the

Messenger- may Allah bless him and give him peace- the necessary knowledge [in this case] is the perception of the verbal expressions and that they are the speech of the Messenger. (3) But the deductive knowledge [in this case] is the knowledge as to its content and the establishing of that which it proved. For example, the statement of the Messenger, "It is incumbent on the claimant to produce proof, and the defendant must take an oath" is known by tawatur to be the statement of the Messenger. This knowledge is necessary. Further it is known from this statement [of the Messenger] that proof devolves on the claimant. [The knowledge of] this [fact] is deductive.

Further objection may be raised that truthful narrative which gives useful knowledge is not confined to these two kinds, but may be narrative coming from Allah or from the Angel or the People of Agreement (al-ijma'), or narrative coupled with that which removes the possibility of falsehood, like the news of the arrival of Zayd as indicated by his people rushing to his house.

To this we answer that what is meant by narrative is a narrative which is a means of knowledge to all creatures by merely being a kind of narrative without regard at all to the contexts which give certainty by the evidence of Reason.

So the narrative coming from Allah or from the Angel is able to impart knowledge in relation to all creation only when it comes to them by way of the Messenger. The same judgment applies to the narrative of the Messenger and to that of the People of Agreement in the case of a mutawatir judgment. Answer may be made that it has no meaning by itself alone but rather by consideration of the proofs which indicate that Agreement is an argument. We then say that likewise the narrative of the Messenger is of the same class and for that reason was classified as deductive.

Then as for Reason (al-aql)/which is a faculty of the soul (al-nafs), by which it is prepared for the reception of things to be known and perceived. That is the meaning of their saying, "It is an innate property (ghariza) which, whenever the instruments of perception are sound, is followed by the necessary types of knowledge." Some people define it as the substance

(al-jawhar) by which the things not perceived by the senses are perceived through means, and by which sense perceptions are perceived through observation.

it is a cause of knowledge also/He made this clear because there is a disagreement about it among the heretics (al-Malahida) and the Sumaniya in regard to all types of speculation, and among some Philosophers in regard to metaphysical speculations, on the basis of numerous differences and the contradiction of opinions. The reply that this is due to the unsoundness of speculation does not preclude the fact that sound speculation on the part of Reason is useful for giving knowledge, although the very thing you mentioned is a deduction by the speculation of Reason. Thus it establishes that which you have denied, so it is contradictory to itself. And if they assert that this means the opposing of the unsound with the unsound, we answer that either it means something and therefore is not unsound, or it does not mean anything at all and therefore there is no opposing [of the unsound with the unsound].

Some may say, "Let us grant that speculation is useful for giving knowledge. Well then, if this knowledge is necessary there is no contradiction about it, for it is just as though we said, 'One is half of two'; and if it is speculative, then it is necessary to establish speculation by speculation and that is circular proof (al-dawr)" To this we reply that sometimes there may be a contradiction about necessary knowledge because of obstinacy or the limitation of perception. The people who use Reason are agreed that the reasoning faculties of men are distinctly different according to the nature created (al-fitra) in them. [This position is reached] by deduction from precedents (al-athar) and by the testimony of narratives (al-akhbar) [from the Prophet]. The speculative type (al-nazari) of knowledge itself may be established by a special speculation which is not expressed in terms of a [general] speculation. An example of this is our saying, "The world is changing, and everything changing is originated." Of necessity that is useful for giving the knowledge that the world was originated. This [necessity] does not rest upon the special character of the speculation, but because it is sound and accompanied by [that which meets] its conditions. So every sound speculation accompanied by that which meets its conditions has a meaning, and in verifying the answer to this objection there is more detail than is fitting to this book.

and whatever of it is established/that is, of knowledge established by Reason

by immediate perception (al-badiha)/ that is, at the first glance without the necessity of thought

is necessary, just as the knowledge that the whole of a thing is greater than the part of it/For after conceiving the meaning of "all" and "part" and "greater" it is seen that this [proposition] does not rest on anything; and whoever hesitates about it so that he asserts that a part of a man, like the hand for example, may sometimes be greater than the whole does not conceive the meaning of "whole" and "part."

and whatever is established by deduction (al-istidlal)/that is, by consideration of proof, whether by deduction from cause to effect, as whenever one sees fire and so knows that it has smoke; or from effect to cause, as whenever one sees smoke and so knows that fire is there. The first process may be specified as "assigning the cause" and the second as "deduction."

is acquired (iktisabi)/that is to say, obtained by acquisition (al-kasb). This is [done by] immediate causality (mubasharat al-asbab) through choice, as in the application of Reason and in speculation on the matters which pertain to deduction, and by inclining the ear, turning about the pupil of the eye, and so forth, in matters which pertain to the senses. So we see that "acquired" is a more general term than "deductive" because deductive knowledge is that which is obtained by consideration of the proof. Everything deductive then is acquired, but not everything acquired is deductive, as for example the use of the faculty of sight which results from purpose and choice.

As for necessary knowledge: it is sometimes contrasted with acquired knowledge and it is then explained as that the obtaining of which is not within the power (maqdur) of [choice apportioned by Allah to] the creature; and sometimes necessary knowledge is contrasted with deductive knowledge and explained as that which results without thought or speculation regarding proof. And so some termed the knowledge resulting from the use of the senses "acquired," that is, resulting from immediate causality through choice; and others termed it "necessary," that is, resulting without the use of deduction.

There does not seem to be a contradiction in the statement of the author of al-Bidaya when he says that originated (al-hadith) knowledge is of two kinds: (1) necessary, which Allah originated in the soul of the creature without his acquisition and choice, like the knowledge of his existence and the change of his states (ahwal); and (2) acquired, which Allah originates in the creature by means of his acquisition, and this is by immediate causality in respect to knowledge, its causes being three: sound senses, truthful narrative, and the speculation of Reason. Then he went on to say that from the speculation of Reason there result two kinds of knowledge: (1) necessary, which comes at the very beginning of speculation without any cogitation (tafakkur), such as the knowledge that the whole is greater than the part; and (2) deductive, in which a kind of cogitation is necessary, as the knowledge of the presence of fire on seeing the smoke.

Illumination (al-ilham)/ it is that which is explained as the casting of an idea into the intellect (al-qalb) by means of overflowing (al-fayd).

is not one of the causes of the cognition (al-ma'rifa) of the soundness of a thing with the People of Reality/This statement was made to answer the objection to confining the causes of knowledge to the above-mentioned three things only. It would have been better if al-Nasafi had said, "One of the causes of the knowledge (al-ilm) of a thing," unless it was that he tried to call attention to the fact that for us knowledge and cognition are the same, not, as some do, making a technical distinction between them by confining knowledge to compounds (al-murakkabat) or to universals (al-kulliyat), and cognition to simple things (al-basait) or to particulars

(al-juz'iyat); otherwise there was no use of his particularizing the statement by saying "the soundness of a thing" [instead of "a thing"].

Then it is clear that he meant that Illumination is not a cause by which knowledge results to creatures in general nor by which it is right for one to force knowledge on another; otherwise there is no doubt that knowledge does result from Illumination. There have been reported statements regarding Illumination in the tradition of the Prophet such as, "My Lord illumined me." And this has been said of many of the Fathers (al-salaf) also.

As for the narrative of a single unprejudiced person and the following of the tradition (taqlid) of one who attempts a legal opinion (al-mujtahid), they are sometimes useful for opinion and sometimes for strong conviction which is enduring. It appears that al-Nasafi meant by knowledge (al-ilm) that which does not include these two things mentioned; otherwise there is no reason for confining the causes of knowledge to the three [causes mentioned].

Chapter 3

THE WORLD

Further, the world in the totality of its parts is a thing originated, since it consists of substances and accidents. A substance is that which has self-subsistence, and it is either a thing compounded, that is, a body; or not compounded, like the atom, which is the part that is not further divided. And the accident is something that does not subsist in itself but is originated in bodies and atoms, such as colors, states of coming into being, tastes, and odors.

Further, the world (al-'alam)/that is, everything except Allah of the existent things (al-mawjudat) by which the Maker is known, is called the world of bodies (al-ajsam), the world of accidents (al-a'rad), the plant world (al-nabat), the animal world (al-hayawan), and so on. The attributes of Allah are excluded [from the things making up the world] because they are not other than His essence, just as they are not the essence itself.

in the totality of its parts/that is, of the heavens and what is in them and the earth and what is on it

is a thing originated (muhdath)/ This means it is something brought from non-existence into existence, meaning that it was once non-existent (ma'dum) and then it existed. This is in opposition to the Philosophers, insofar as they held to the position of the eternity (qidam) of the heavens, including their respective matters (mawadd), forms (suwar), and shapes

(ashkal), and the eternity of the sub-lunar elements (al-anasir) including their respective matters and forms, but these forms are only specific forms, inasmuch as the elements were never without form. Strictly speaking, the Philosophers used the term "being originated" with reference to that which is not Allah, but they used it in the sense of being dependent on something else, not in the sense of being preceded by non-existence.

Then al-Nasafi pointed out the proof for the origin (huduth) of the world by his statement:

since it/that is, the world

consists of substances (a'yan) and accidents (a'rad)/because whatever of it is self-subsistent (qaim bi dhatihi) is a substance, and whatever is not is an accident. Both of them are originated, as we shall show. And the author Allah have mercy on him did not deal with this, because the discussion of it would be very long and inappropriate to this brief treatise of his, seeing that it is confined to problems without their proofs.

A substance is that which/that is, any possible thing

has self-subsistence (qiyam bi dhatihi)/By context this is inferred from their being a part of the world. The meaning of self-subsistence with the Mutakallims is that substance is bounded by itself (yatahayyaz bi nafsihi) ; its being bounded does not follow from the fact that some other thing is bounded, in contrast to the accident, in which case its being bounded follows from the fact that the atom (al-jawhar} is bounded, for the atom is the subject (al-mawdu) or the locus (al-mahall) which gives subsistence to the accident.

The meaning of the existence of the accident in the subject is that its very existence is its existence in the subject, and for that reason it cannot be transferred from the subject. This is in contrast to the existence of a body within a boundary (al-hayyiz), for its very existence and its existence in a boundary are two different things. For that reason a body may be transferred from a boundary. According to the Philosophers the meaning of the subsistence of a thing in its essence is its being independent of the locus in which it subsists, and the meaning of its subsistence in something else is its being specified by it, so that the first becomes something descriptive (na't) and the second something described (man'ut), whether having boundaries, as in the case of the blackness of a body, or not [having boundaries], as in the case of the attributes (sifat) of Allah and the absolutes.

and it/whatever of the world is self-subsistent

is either a thing compounded (murakkab)/ of two or more parts, according to us.

that is, a body (jism)/Some say that there must be three parts so that the three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth may be realized; and others say eight parts, in order that the intersecting of the dimensions at vertical angles may be realized. This is not a dispute over verbal expressions to be used, referring to some technicality [in the matter] that can be settled by saying that each may explain the term technically as he wishes. It is a dispute as to whether or not the conventional idea thus given to body is sufficient if it is compounded of two parts only. The Primitive Theologians (al-awwalun) argued that if one of two bodies exceeds the other by one part, then it is bulkier [ajsam, that is, more of body] than the other. And if the mere compounding [of parts] were not sufficient to constitute corporeality, then the body would not increase in corporeality by the mere addition of a part. This is a matter for consideration, for the form af'al from the noun al-jasama [that is, ajsam as used above] has the meaning of bulk and greatness of amount. It is said that a thing becomes bulky (jasuma), that is, it becomes great, so it is said to be bulky (jasim) and corpulent (jusam). We speak here of body as a name (ism) not as an attribute (sifa).

or not compounded, like the atom (jawhar)/that is, the substance which is not divisible, neither actually, nor in fancy, nor by supposition (fard).

which is the part that is not further divided/He did not say, "it is the atom," but "like the atom," guarding against introducing a restriction; for that which is not compounded is not confined according to Reason to the atom, meaning "the indivisible part" (al-juz alladhi la yatajazza) since it would have been necessary to abolish primary matter (hayuli), form

(sura), Intelligences ('uqul), and the absolute souls (al-nufus al-mujarrada) in order to complete the restriction of the indivisibles to the atom.

According to the Philosophers there is no such thing as the pure atom (al-jawhar al-fard), that is, the indivisible atom. As for the compounding together of the body, they say that it is composed of primary matter (al-hayuli) and form (al-sura) only.

The best proof for establishing the [indivisible] part is that were a real sphere to be placed on a real plane it would make a contact at one indivisible point only, since if it should make a contact with it at two points, there would actually be on the sphere a line, so it would not be a real sphere on a real plane.

The most noted proof [of the pure atom] according to the Early Theologians has two aspects. The first is that if every substance were infinitely divisible the mustard seed would not be smaller than the mountain, since each is made up of infinite parts. But hugeness and smallness consist only in the multiplicity and paucity of parts, but that fact is only conceivable in the finite. The second proof is that the combination (al-ijtima') of the parts of the body into a whole is not due to its own essence, for were that the case the body would not be capable of being separated into parts (al-iftiraq). It is because of this that Allah has the power to create in that body the possibility of being separated into parts which cannot be further divided. Now with reference to this ultimate part, the indivisibility of which is under discussion, if it is possible for it to be further separated into parts it follows that the power of Allah would have to bring it about in order to eliminate the assumption that Allah is powerless, but if it is impossible [for it to be further separated] then the contention as to the existence of an absolute atom is established.

All [of these three proofs] are weak. The first is weak because it only points to the existence of the geometrical point, and that does not necessitate the existence of the indivisible part, for the fact that a geometrical point is said to have position (al-hulul fi mahall) does not mean that it occupies place (hulul al-sarayan) and consequently it does not mean that the indivisibility of the place follows from the indivisibility of the geometrical point.

The second and third are weak because the Philosophers do not say that the body is actually composed of parts that are infinite; but they say that the body admits of an infinite number of divisions and that there is no combination (ijtima) of the parts in it at all. Greatness and smallness are only according to the quantity which subsists in a body. And it is possible for the parts to be separated (iftiraq) to infinity, so the pure atom is not to be postulated. The proofs for denying this are also somewhat weak. For this reason al-Imam al-Razi inclined to be noncommittal on the subject.

If the question is raised whether there is any benefit resulting from this position which is different [from that of the Philosophers], we reply that there is. In establishing the pure atom we escape many of the obscurities of the Philosophers, such as the positing of primary matter (hayuli) and form (sura) which leads to the eternity of the world, the denial of the resurrection of the body, and many of the fundamental laws of measurement (al-handasa), upon which obscurities rests the continual motion of the heavenly spheres; and also the denial of the rending (al-kharq) of them and their being coalesced together again (al-ilti'am).

And the accident is something that does not subsist in itself/ but it subsists in something else by being incident (tabi') to it in having its boundaries (tahayyuz), or by being specialized by it, just as something descriptive is specialized by the thing described, as has already been said. This does not mean that it cannot be thought of apart from the locus as has been fancied by some, for that only applies to some of the accidents.

but is originated in bodies and atoms/ Some say that this is added to give an exact definition and to avoid including the attributes of Allah.

such as colors/The original colors are said to be black and white; others have said that they are red, green and yellow, the rest being compounded from them.

states of coming into being (akwan)/ which are: combination (al-ijtima'), being separated into parts (al-iftiraq), motion (al-haraka) and rest (al-sukun)

tastes (al-tu'um)/There are nine species of them: bitterness, pungency, saltiness, astringency, acidity, puckeriness, sweetness, greasiness, and insipidity. Through combinations of these there are innumerable species of tastes.

and odors (al-rawa'ih)/These are of many species without special names. And it is most evident that all accidents except the states of coming into being occur only in bodies. If it is established that the world is made up of substances and accidents, and the substances are bodies and atoms, we then may say that everything is originated.

Some of the accidents are known by observation, as motion following rest, light following darkness, and blackness following whiteness. And others are known by proof, such as the occurrence (tarayan) of nonexistence, as seen from its contraries. For eternity is inconsistent with nonexistence because if the eternal is necessarily existent in itself, then it is clear that eternity is inconsistent with non-existence; otherwise eternity must be ascribed to the eternal simply by way of affirmation, since that which proceeds from a thing by purpose and choice is of necessity originated, but an effect which is joined to a necessary eternal cause is itself eternal because it is impossible for a necessary effect to lag behind its cause.

As for substances (al-a'yan) [they are among the originated things] because they are not free (la takhlu) from originated things, and whatever is not free from originated things is itself originated. The first premise [that substances are not free from originated things] is so, because they are not free of motion and rest, which are originated. This not being free of motion and rest is due to the fact that the body and the atom are not free from residing within some boundary (hayyiz). If the substance is preceded by another kawn (state of coming into being) in that very same boundary, then it is at rest; and if it is not so preceded by another kaun in the very same boundary, then it is in motion. This is what they mean when they say,

"Motion is two kawn's at two times (fi anayn) in two places (fi makanayn), and rest is two kawn's at two times in one place."

If objection is made that it is possible that there was not at all  kawn preceding this [kawn which has been assumed], as for example at the time of its being originated, so [there was a time that] it was neither in motion nor at rest, we reply that this objection does not impair our argument, since it admits the claim that this statement has been made about bodies in which there were a number of kawn's [one after the other] and in which there was a renewing of seasons and times.

As for our belief that motion and rest are originated, that is based upon the fact that they belong among accidents, which are not continuous.

Furthermore the very quiddity of motion is that there is in it a transition from one state (hal) to another, which logically requires that something else preceded motion; this would be inconsistent with eternity of motion. Moreover every motion may come to an end and is without permanency, and every rest may cease to exist, inasmuch as every body is subject of necessity to motion. But as you know, whatever may cease to exist cannot be eternal.

The second premise [that whatever is not free of originated things is itself originated] is true, for if that which is not free of originated things were established to be from eternity, then it would be inseparably connected with the establishment from eternity of that which is originated, and that is impossible.

Here then are the investigations [to be made of the objections concerning substances]. The first objection is that there is no proof for confining the [use of the term] "substances" to atoms and bodies, and that this [narrow definition] denies the existence of a self-subsistent possible thing which does not have boundaries at all, such as the Intelligences and the absolute souls of which the Philosophers speak. And the answer to this is that the thing which is asserted to be originated is that possible thing the existence of which is established by proof. And this possible thing consists of the substances which have boundaries and accidents. The proofs for the existence of the absolute beings [such as Intelligences and absolute souls] are incomplete, as has been shown in larger treatises.

The second objection is that what has been said does not prove the origin of all accidents, since the origin of some of them is not perceived by observation, nor is the origin of that which is contrary to them such as the accidents which subsist in the heavenly spheres, namely shapes (ashkal), extensions (imtidadat), and lights (adwa'). The answer is that this does not thwart the purpose of the argument, for the origin of the substances demands of necessity the origin of the accidents since they only subsist in these substances.

The third objection is that eternity (al-azal) does not express a special state, so that the existence in that state of originated things is inseparably connected with the existence of the body in that state, but eternity is an expression for non-beginning or for the continuance of existence in times which are reckoned as unending in the past. The meaning of the eternity of originated motions is that there is no motion which did not have another motion preceding it, and so on without a beginning. This is the position of the Philosophers, who although they admit that no particular motion is eternal, yet make this statement rather of absolute motion (al-haraka al-mutlaqa). The answer to this is that the absolute does not have existence except in the particular, so, since each particular is originated, the eternity of the absolute is inconceivable.

The fourth objection is that if each body were in a boundary, that would necessitate the non-limitation of bodies, inasmuch as the boundary (alhayyiz) is the inner surface of a container which touches the outer surface of the thing contained. The answer to this is that the boundary according to the Mutakallims is the imaginary space (al-faragh) which the body occupies and in which it extends to its dimensions. And when the fact is established that the world is originated it being known that anything originated must have an originator (muhdith) it is then established that the world has an originator, for of necessity it is impossible that there be a preponderance

(al-tarajjuh) in favor of one of the two alternatives of something possible without there being "a determinant to bring about the preponderance" (murajjih).

Chapter 4

THE ORIGINATOR OF THE WORLD

The Originator of the world is Allah, the One, the Eternal, the Living, the Powerful, the Knowing, the Hearing, the Seeing, the Desiring, and the Willing. He is not an accident, nor a body, nor an atom; nor is He something formed, nor a thing limited, nor a thing numbered, nor a thing portioned or divided, nor a thing compounded; nor does He come to an end in Himself. He is not described by quiddity, nor by quality, nor is He placed in place. Time does not affect Him and nothing resembles Him, and nothing is outside of His Knowledge and Power.

The Originator (muhdith) of the world is Allah/He is the necessarily existent essence (al-dhat al-wajib al-wujud) whose existence is of His essence. He does not need anything at all, since were His existence only possible. He would be a part of the world and not suited to be the Originator of it and the one who caused its beginning, even though "world" ('alam) is a name applied to all that is properly a sign ('alam) for the existence of the one who caused its beginning. Closely allied to this is the statement that the cause of the beginning of all possible things must be necessarily existent, since were He a possible only, He would be one of the many possible things and not the cause of their beginning.

It is sometimes fancied that this is a proof for the existence of the Maker without necessarily abolishing the endless chain (al-tasalsul). But this is not the case. It is rather a reference to one of the proofs for the unsoundness of the endless chain. And this proof is that if a chain of possibles were arranged to infinity, this chain would still need an [efficient] cause, which must not be the thing itself nor a part of it, because it is impossible for a thing to be the [efficient] cause of itself or of its own causes. But it must be outside the cause, so the efficient cause would then be necessary and the endless chain would be broken.

Of the noted kinds of proof there is the one of tallying (al-tatbiq). This consists in supposing a series [of effects] from the last effect (ma'lul) to infinity and another series, for example, of just one short of this last effect to infinity. Then we apply the two series so that we make the first of the first series correspond with the first of the second series; the second with the second, and so on. Thus, if there is a unit of the second series for every unit of the first series, then the less is like that which is more than it, and that is impossible.

Otherwise there is something in the first series without something to correspond to it in the second, so the second is broken off and comes to an end. This necessitates the finiteness of the first series since it only exceeds the second series by a finite amount; and that which exceeds the finite by a finite amount is of necessity finite. This proof of tallying can only be used of that which comes under the category of existence and not with that which has only to do with the estimative faculty (wahm mahd), for it breaks down with the breaking down of the estimative faculty.

This argument is not to be refuted by the arranging of series of numbers, in which two series are applied to each other, one of them from one to infinity and the second from two to infinity, nor by things pertaining to the Knowledge of Allah and things pertaining to the Power of Allah, for in spite of the fact that they are both infinite, the things pertaining to the Knowledge of Allah are more than the things pertaining to His Power. This is so, since infinity, when applied to numbers and things pertaining to the Knowledge and the Power of Allah, means that they do not end in one definite limit beyond which no other limit can be conceived. This does not mean that whatever possesses infinity comes under the category of existence, inasmuch as that is impossible.

the One/that is to say, the Maker of the World is one. The idea of the Necessarily Existent cannot be true except of one essence. The most noted of the proofs for the unity of Allah among the Mutakallims is that of mutual hindrance (al-tamanu') which is referred to in the saying of Allah, "If there were in the two of them [that is, the heavens and the earth] gods other than Allah, these two would have been corrupted (fasadata)" (Qur'an 21:22). The explanation of this is that if two gods were possible, mutual hindrance of each other would be possible. One of them would will that Zayd move and the other that he remain at rest, since each of the two things is possible in itself. In like manner the connection of the Will with each of them [is possible], since there is no mutual opposition between the two wills, but only [a mutual opposition] between the two things willed. So either the two things occur and the opposites unite [which is impossible], or [if only one of the two things occurs] it follows that one of the two gods is powerless. This powerlessness is an indication of being originated and of possibility, because in it there is the defect of being in need of something.

So plurality necessitates the possibility of mutual hindrance, which [in turn] necessitates the impossible, so it is impossible. This is the detailed explanation of the statement that if one of two is not able to oppose the other, it then follows that he is powerless. And if he is able [to oppose the other], then the other is powerless. What we have just mentioned refutes the proposition that it is possible for the two to agree without mutual hindrance, or that hindering and opposing [in the case of two gods] are impossible because hindering and opposing necessitate the impossible, or that the agreement together of the two wills, as though one should will that Zayd move and remain at rest at the same time, is impossible.

Know that the statement of Allah, "If there were in the two of them gods other than Allah, they would have been corrupted" (Qur'an 21:22) is a convincing argument (hujja iqna'iya). The necessary consequence (mulazama) [of such a statement is the acceptance of the conclusion as] is customary in the case of statements which conform to rhetorical syllogisms (al-khitabiyat). For it is customary when there are many exercising the office of governor, that there is mutual hindrance of one another and that one gets the upper hand, as is indicated in the statement of Allah, "Some of them gained the mastery over the others" (Qur'an 23:93). [Otherwise the argument is incomplete.] Then if actual corruption is meant that is, the passing away from the present visible order [of the heavens and the earth] a mere plurality [of gods] does not necessitate that, for it is possible that there be an agreement [by the gods] on the present visible order. If the possibility of corruption is meant, there is nothing to indicate the denial of this, since the statutes bear witness to the folding up of the heavens and the removal of the present order. So it is undoubtedly possible.

One does not say that the necessary consequence of such a statement is so absolute that the meaning of the corruption of the heavens and the earth is that they were not created, on the ground that, if two makers were assumed, a mutual hindering of one another in performing acts would be possible, so that one of them would not be a maker nor would anything be made. For we say that the possibility of there being mutual hindrance of one another only requires that there be but one maker and not the negation of that which is made, although it does come to mean the impossibility of the necessary consequence, if non-creation is meant by the act; and it comes to mean the impossibility of the negation of the necessary if by possibility non-creation is meant.

It may be objected that [in the Qur'an quotation above] the force of the word "if" (law) is the negation in past time of the second statement through the negation of the first, so it only indicates the denial of corruption in the past because of the denial of the plurality [of gods]. In answer to this we reply that this is grammatically true, but "if" (law) may be used to indicate the negation of the apodosis following the negation of the protasis irrespective of time, just as in the statement, "If the world were eternal from the beginning it would be unchangeable." The verse quoted above is of this kind. One of these uses may seem equivocal to the other according to some minds, and hence the confusion.

the Eternal (al-qadim)/ This is in explanation as a necessary consequence of what we already know, inasmuch as the Necessarily Existent can not be other than eternal, that is to say, there is no beginning to His existence. If He were something originated preceded by non-existence, His existence would then of necessity be contingent on something else. For this reason some have made the statement that the Necessarily Existent and the Eternal are synonymous terms. But for the sake of accuracy in differentiating these two terms, that is not quite right. A statement about their being co-extensive terms depends on what is true regarding them. Some say that the term

"eternal" is more general [than "necessarily existent"] because it is true of the attributes of the Necessarily Existent that they are eternal in contrast to the term "necessarily existent," which is not true of the attributes. It is not impossible to say that there is a plurality of eternal attributes, but it is impossible to say that there is a plurality of eternal essences. Some of the later Mutakallims like al-Imam Hamid al-Din al-Darir and his followers explain the point by saying that the Necessarily Existent One in His essence is Allah and His attributes. From the idea that everything which is eternal is necessarily existent in its essence they made their deduction that if the Eternal were not necessarily existent, non-existence would have been possible for Him, and

He would have needed a determining principle (mukhassis) [to have specified existence in His case]. Thus He would have been originated (muhdath), since we only mean by originated that thing the existence of which is connected with the fact that something else brings it into existence.

Furthermore, those [who say that "eternal" is a more general term than necessarily existent] objected that the attributes, were they necessarily existent in their essence, would be continuous (baqiya). Continuance (al-baqa) is an Idea (ma'na) itself, so the existence of a real Idea then subsists in another Idea. Reply was made to this that each attribute continues by means of a continuance which is that very attribute itself. This is an extremely difficult concept, for the assertion that the Necessarily Existent in His essence is a plurality is inconsistent with the unity of the Deity, while the assertion that the attributes are only possible [and not necessary] is inconsistent with the statement of those who say that every possible being is originated.

If they assert that the attributes are eternal in time, meaning that there was no time when non-existence preceded them; and that this is not inconsistent with their essential origin, in the sense that they need the essence of the Necessarily Existent, then their position is that of the Philosophers, who divided both Eternity and Being-originated into essential (dhati) and temporal (zamani). In this position there is a denial of many foundations of the faith, so a further verifying of this matter will come later.

the Living (al-hayy), the Powerful (al-qadir), the Knowing (al-'alim) the

Hearing (al-sami'), the Seeing (al-basir), the Desiring (al-sha'i), and the

Willing (al-murid)/The proof for this is by a decisive immediate inference of logical reasoning, inasmuch as Allah is the Originator of the world according to a definite original plan and preconceived order, as is evidenced by the fact that the world comprises [His] well-ordered works and excellent handicrafts. He is not devoid of those attributes, for the contraries of these attributes signify defects from which Allah is necessarily far removed.

Furthermore these attributes have come down to us in the Law (al-shar') but inasmuch as some of them are those upon which the establishment of the Law is not based, it is proper in a case of this kind of attribute to rely upon the Law itself, as for instance the attribute of the unity of the

Deity in contradistinction to the attribute of the existence of the Maker and His Speech, and similar attributes upon which the establishment of the Law is based.

He is not an accident/because an accident does not subsist in itself, but needs a locus (mahall) to give it subsistence. So the accident is a possible. And [again He is not an accident] because the continuance [of an accident] is impossible. Otherwise continuance would be an Idea that subsists in the accident, and that would necessitate the subsistence of an Idea in an Idea, which is impossible. For the subsistence of an accident in a thing means that its having boundaries (tahayyuz) follows upon (tabi') the fact that the thing has boundaries. The accident has no boundaries of itself, in the sense that something else may be said to have boundaries by following upon the accident. This is based on the fact that the continuance of a thing is an

Idea which is superadded to its existence, and on the fact that the meaning of subsistence [of one thing in something else] is [the thing's] following upon the other thing in having boundaries.

The right position [regarding this] is as follows: First, continuance is the perpetuity of existence and the absence of passing out of existence. Its real essence is its existence with respect to another time. The meaning of our saying, "It existed but did not continue," is that it was originated but its existence did not persevere nor was it established [in reality] for the second time. Second, subsistence is the specializing which describes the thing described just as in the case of the terms predicated of the Creator (al-bari). Third, bodies cease to exist at every moment of time (fi kull an), and what we observe of continuance in them by way of renewal of similars is no less credible than what occurs in accidents. Surely it is incorrect for them to maintain that an accident subsists in an accident, as in the case of the swiftness and slowness of motion. There are not two things here one, motion; and the other, swiftness and slowness but we have a certain definite motion which in relation to some other motions is called swift and to others slow.

This clearly shows that swiftness and slowness are not two different species of motion, for real species in the true sense of the term do not distinctly differ from one another even though there is a difference in their respective relations to something else.

nor a body (jism)/ for the body is something compounded and having boundaries, which is a mark of being originated

nor an atom (jawhar)/ [This is true] from our standpoint, for we say that jawhar is the name for a part (al-juz') that cannot be further divided, having boundaries and being a part of a body. Allah is far exalted above such a definition; and [it is true also] from the standpoint of the Philosophers, because they make jawhar one of the divisions of the possibles, although they make it to be the name of an existing thing however, not in a subject whether absolute or having boundaries. They mean by jawhar the possible quiddity which whenever it does exist is not in a subject. But if by body (jism) and atom (jawhar) is meant the self-subsistent and existing thing which is not in a subject, then these terms must not be applied to the Maker, for they are not mentioned in the Law, along with the fact that the understanding jumps at the conclusion that these terms mean "compounded" and "that which has boundaries." The Corporealizers (al-Mujassima) and the Christians (al-Nasara) took the position that jism and jawhar may be applied to Him, giving a conception of Allah from which He is necessarily far removed.

If it is objected that terms like "the existing being," "the necessarily existent," and "the eternal'' cannot properly be applied to Allah since they do not occur in the Law, we reply that the basis is by Agreement (al-ijma), which is one of the canonical bases. It is sometimes suggested that Allah, the Necessarily Existent, and the Eternal are synonymous terms, and that the term "existent" is inseparable from the Necessarily Existent, so if the Law applies one term of a language [to Him] that fact makes it permissible to apply a synonym of that term or whatever approximates it in that or any other language, but this is a matter for consideration.

nor is He something formed (musawwar)/ Formed means having a form (sura) or a shape (shakl) like the form of a man or of a horse. Form is one of the special characteristics of bodies. It occurs in them by means of quantities (kammiyat) and qualities (kayfiyat) and by setting limits and ends.

nor a thing limited (mahdud)/ Limited means having a limit or an end.

nor a thing numbered (ma'dud)/ Numbered means having number and multiplicity; that is, He is not the locus of quantities, either continuous (muttasila) like magnitudes (maqadir), or discrete (munfasila) like things counted. This is quite evident.

nor a thing portioned or divided/ This means possessing portions and parts.

nor a thing compounded/ of these, since they all have that need [for something else] which is inconsistent with necessary existence. That which has parts is called "compounded" when they are in composition together, and "portioned" and "divided" when they are separated.

nor does He come to an end in Himself/ because this is one of the characteristics of magnitudes and numbers.

He is not described by quiddity (al-ma'iya)/ That means He does not share the same genus with other things; for when we say [quiddity, or] "What is it?" we mean, "Of what genus is it?" But sharing the same genus (al-mujanasa) requires that the things which share the same genus differ from one another by means of certain divisions which are set up, and that necessitates the existence of composition.

nor by quality (al-kayfiya)/ that is, of color, taste, odor, heat, cold, dampness, dryness, or any other thing predicated of bodies or things which follow upon mixture or composition

nor is He placed in place (makan)/ for being placed (al-tamakkun) is an expression for the penetration of one dimension (bu'd) into another, whether real or imagined. This is called place. Dimension is an expression for an extension (imtidad) subsisting in a body, or in itself according to those who assert the existence of the vacuum (al-khala). Allah is far removed from extension and magnitude, because this requires His being divided into parts.

Objection may be raised [to this argument] that the pure atom (al-jawhar al-fard) has boundaries and yet does not have dimension; for otherwise it could be divided [and thus it would not be a pure atom]. To this we reply that "being placed" is a more special term than "having boundaries," because the boundary (al-hayyiz) is the imaginary empty space which any thing occupies whether it has extension or not. That which has been mentioned above is a proof of His not being placed in place.

But the proof of His not having boundaries is that if He were bounded, He would either be bounded from eternity and this would necessitate the eternity of the boundary or He would not be bounded from eternity, so He would be a locus for originated things. He is also either co-extensive with the boundary or is less than it and so [in either case] is finite; or He is more than it and therefore divisible. If He is not in place, He does not extend in any direction of place, being neither upward nor downward nor in any of the other directions, inasmuch as directions are the limits or extremities of places [by which a thing is surrounded], or they are the places themselves with reference to their relationship to the thing [surrounded by the places].

Time (al-zaman) does not affect Him/ With us time is an expression for something renewed by which something else renewed is measured. With the Philosophers it is the measure of motion. Allah is far removed from that. Know then that the mention by al-Nasafi of some of the things from which Allah is far removed makes unnecessary the mention of others of them. However, he attempted here to go into detail and to explain clearly the matter of Allah's being far removed [from created things] in order to give all that the subject of the Necessarily Existent deserves and to answer in the most complete and emphatic way the Comparers (al-Mushabbiha) and the Corporealizers (al-Mujassima) and all the other parties of error and perverseness. It was of no consequence to the author that [in doing so] he had to repeat synonymous terms and explain that which is well known. This remoteness of Allah [from created things] which I have mentioned is based on the fact that these terms [i.e., of the Comparers, Corporealizers, and so on] are inconsistent with the term Necessary Existence, since in them there is that defect which comes from their implying that He is originated and possible, as we have pointed out.

This is not the way which the Early Theologians took [to explain this] for they said that the meaning of accident (al-arad) according to etymology is that which cannot continue; that the meaning of atom (al-jawhar) is that from which other things are composed; and that the meaning of body (al-jism) is that which is composed of other things, as is indicated in their saying, "This is bulkier (ajsam) than that." And they said that if the Necessarily Existent were compounded, then the parts of which He is composed would be described by attributes of perfection (al-kamal), and that would require a plurality of necessarily existents; or the parts would not have these attributes and would therefore be lacking in something and have been originated.

Also the Necessarily Existent [according to them either] must be of all forms, shapes, qualities and magnitudes but if this were the case it would have to follow that He would unite in Himself things contradictory to each other or else He must be of only some of these forms, shapes, qualities, and magnitudes; and these will have to be of the same order both in conveying equally the idea of either praise or blame, and in the absence of any evidence that originated things apply to Allah. But if this were the case, then Allah would need a determining principle (mukhassis) [to make a selection among the things which are assumed not to convey any idea of either praise or blame], and thus He would come under the power of something outside Himself and consequently would be originated. Furthermore [if there were no evidence in originated things that these attributes apply to Allah, then] He would be in contrast to such attributes, for example, as Knowledge and Power, which are attributes of perfection and concerning which there is evidence in originated things that they do apply to Allah; but the opposites of these attributes of perfection are those attributes of imperfection (al-nuqsan) concerning which there is no evidence in originated things that they apply to Allah.

These opinions of the Early Theologians rest on weak foundations, which cause damage to the beliefs of those who seek after truth, and give currency to the effusions of the vilifiers of religion, who in their arguments try to show that all these lofty problems of theology are based on nothing but frail ambiguities like these. The one who disagrees with this position [regarding Allah's being far removed from created things] cites the statutes (al-nusus) that plainly teach, regarding Allah, that He extends in a direction, has a body, form, and bodily members. He says further that each of two existing things is by supposition either continuous and contiguous to the other, or is discrete and cut off from the other in some direction. Now Allah is neither residing [in the world] nor a locus for the world, so He is cut off from it in some direction. He therefore has boundaries and is a body or a part of a body, formed and finite.

The answer to this is that here is a case of pure fancy (wahm) and a judgment concerning objects not perceived by the senses according to judgments that apply to objects perceived by the senses. The decisive proofs rest on such matters as remove Allah far from any such thing. So the science [dealing with the interpretation] of the statutes must be committed to Allah according to the custom of the Fathers (al-salaf), who [committed such things to Allah because they] preferred to follow the safer method. Or the statutes may be interpreted, as the Later Theologians (al-muta' akhhirun) chose to do, by sound interpretations (taw'ilat sahiha) in order to refute the thrusts of the ignorant, to incline [towards the truth] the disposition of those who are immature, and to follow the wiser path.

and nothing resembles Him/ that is to say, nothing is like Him. If it is understood that by similarity [to something] there is a being united [to it] in reality, it is clear that He is not like anything. And if similarity means that one of two things may take the place of the other that is, each is good for what the other is then no existing thing can take His place in any of the things predicated of Him, for what is predicated of Him in the way of Knowledge, Power, and so on is so much more majestic and exalted than what is found in creatures that there is no basis for comparison between Allah and His creatures.

The author of al-Bidaya said that the knowledge which we [creatures] have is something existing, an accident, originated, possible of existence, and renewed every [moment of] time. So if we establish knowledge as an attribute of Allah, it is something existing, an attribute, eternal (qadim), necessarily existent, everlasting from eternity (al-azal) to eternity (al-abad). Thus the knowledge of creatures is not in any respect similar to His knowledge. This is the statement of the author of al-Bidaya; when he explained that the similarity of two things to each other according to our view is established by their sharing together all things predicated of them, so that if the two differ in one thing predicated the similarity breaks down.

Al-Shaykh Abu 'l-Mu'in said in al-Tabsira that the lexicographers do not preclude the statement that Zayd is similar to 'Amr in knowing fiqh, if he equals him in it and can take his place in this matter, although there may be many points of difference between them. The statement of the Ash'arites that similarity does not exist except in equality in all respects is unsound, for the Prophet said, "Wheat for wheat, like for like." He meant by this equality in measure only, for wheat differs as well in weight, in number of grains [to a measure], and in hardness and tenderness. It is clear that there is no disagreement between the two positions, for al-Ash'ari meant equality in all respects where there is a similarity, as in measure, for example. Therefore it is not necessary that the statement in al-Bidaya be understood as meaning complete equality; otherwise when two things have in common all things predicated of them and are equal in all respects, that prevents there being a plurality of things, for how is similarity conceivable [if they are exactly alike]?

and nothing is outside of His Knowledge and Power/This is true, for ignorance or inability in a part is a lack and a need which call for a determining principle, whereas the decisive statutes speak of universal Knowledge and all-embracing Power. So then He is Omniscient and Omnipotent.

This is unlike the position of the Philosophers, who assert that Allah does not know particulars and that there is only in Him power to do one thing, [since they make Allah's will to do the act necessary] there is no possible choice on His part between doing and abstaining from the act; and unlike the Dahrites (al-dahriya) who claim that Allah does not know His essence; and unlike al-Nazzam,  who asserted that He is unable to create ignorance and the vile thing; and unlike al-Balkhi, who asserted that He is unable to do anything similar to that which is in the power of the creature [to do] ; and unlike the Mu'tazilites in general, who asserted that He is unable to do that which is in the power of the creature to do.

Chapter 5

SOME ATTRIBUTES OF ALLAH

He has attributes from all eternity subsistent in His essence. They are not He nor are they other than He. And they are Knowledge and Power and Life and Might and Hearing and Seeing and Willing and Desiring and Doing and Creating and Sustaining.

He has attributes/inasmuch as it has been established that He is Knowing, Living, Powerful, and so on. It is known that each of these attributes points to an Idea superadded to what is understood by the term "the Necessarily Existent," nor are these attributes to be taken as synonymous terms. Furthermore if a derivative term can be properly predicated of a thing, that thing necessarily possesses the source from which that term is derived. And thus it has been established that Allah possesses the attributes of Knowledge, Power, Life, and so on. This is unlike the view of the Mu'tazilites, who assert that He is Knowing without possessing Knowledge; He is Powerful without possessing Power, and so on.  But this view of theirs is self-evidently impossible, for it is analogous to our saying, "A thing is black but there is no blackness in it." And furthermore it has already been established in the statutes (al-nusus) that Allah possesses Knowledge, Power, and other attributes. Finally the procession from Allah of acts of which He has perfect understanding points to the existence of Knowledge and Power in Him, not merely to the fact that He can be described as Knowing and Powerful.

The question at issue is not regarding that [transient kind of] knowledge and power which is generally included under the qualities (al-kayfiyat) and habits (al-malakat) for our Early Theologians have explicitly stated that just as Allah is Living and has Life from eternity, which is not an accident, nor is it impossible that it continue forever, so [also in the case of Knowledge] they say that Allah is Knowing, that His Knowledge is from eternity, that it is all-embracing, that it is not an accident, that it can continue forever, and that it is not necessitated nor acquired. And they affirm the same of the remainder of the attributes.

The question at issue is rather regarding that [eternal] Knowledge of the Maker of the World and in like manner all the other attributes whether it is an attribute from eternity subsisting in Him, something superadded to Him, and is analogous to that [transient] knowledge of any one of us who knows, which knowledge is an accident, subsisting in him, something superadded to him and originated.

The Philosophers and the Mu'tazilites denied this and asserted that the attributes are the very essence itself. This means that His essence with respect to its connection with things known (al-ma'lumat) is described by the term "Knowing" and with respect to things over which He has Power (al-maqdurat) is described by the term "Powerful," and so on. This, they say, does not imply any plurality in the essence [of Allah] nor does it imply the existence of numerous eternal and necessarily existent beings. The answer to this is to be found in what has already been said, namely, that [even according to us] the existence of numerous eternal essences [outside of Allah] is an impossibility. Furthermore, their contention [that our belief in the existence of eternal attributes within Allah implies a belief in the existence of eternal essences outside of Allah] does not follow. Finally, the Mu'tazilite view would lead to the absurd conclusion, namely, that Knowledge, for instance, would be identical with Power and Life, and that it also would be identical with the Knowing One, the Living One, and the Powerful One; and furthermore it would also lead to the conclusion that He who is of necessary existence would not subsist in His own essence; and so on to many other similar absurdities.

from all eternity (azaliya)/This is unlike the Karramites, who assert that Allah has attributes but that those attributes must be originated, inasmuch as it is impossible for things which are originated to subsist in His essence.

subsistent in His essence/Of necessity nothing can be said to be an attribute of something unless it subsists in that something. This is unlike the Mu'tazilites, who assert that Allah speaks with a kind of Speech which subsists in something outside Himself. The purpose of this statement of theirs is to deny the existence of Speech as an attribute of Allah, and not to affirm that Speech does exist as an attribute of Him but without subsistence in His essence. The Mu'tazilites maintained the position that establishing the attributes destroyed the unity of Allah, inasmuch as they are eternally existent and distinctly different from the essence of Allah, so it follows that something other than Allah is eternal and that there are numerous eternal beings, nay rather, there are numerous necessarily existent beings, as seen in references which appear in the statements of the Earlier Theologians (al-mutaqaddimun). The clear explicit statement of the position that the one who is Necessarily Existent in His essence is Allah and His attributes came from the Later Theologians (al-muta'akhkhirun). The Christians (al-Nasara) have become Unbelievers [so say the Mu'tazilites ] in establishing three eternal beings, so what is to be said of one who establishes eight or more?

Al-Nasafi referred to the answer to this question by saying,

They are not He nor are they other than He/that is, the attributes of Allah are not His essence itself nor are they other than it. This implies neither the eternity of that which is other than He nor the plurality of eternals. Although the Christians do not expressly state that there are distinctly different eternal beings, yet this position compelled them to posit the three persons of the Godhead (aqanim) namely Existence, Knowledge, and Life, calling them the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit (ruh al-qudus).

They claim that the person (uqnum) of Knowledge transferred himself into the body of Jesus- on him be- peace so they permit the separation and transference of the persons, inasmuch as they are distinctly different essences.

Some say that it is impossible to make plurality and multiplicity depend upon distinct entities being made (al-taghayur) this term meaning that it is possible to separate them absolutely so that series of numbers from one, two, three and so on are many and numerous, yet some are a part of others and the part is not distinctly different from the whole.

It is also inconceivable that there be a dispute among the People of the Approved Way and the Community on the question of the multiplicity and plurality of the attributes of the Deity as to whether they are distinctly separate or not. However, it is preferable to say that the plurality of eternal essences but not the plurality of an essence and attributes is impossible. It is also better not to say boldly that the attributes are necessarily existent in themselves but rather [to say] that they are not necessarily existent in anything else but in that which is not themselves nor other than themselves; I mean by that the Essence of Allah Exalted of Himself and Extolled.

This is what one means when he says that the Necessarily Existent in His essence is Allah and His attributes, the idea being that these are necessarily existent in the essence of the Necessarily Existent. But in themselves they are possibles. There is no absurdity in the eternity of the possible if this eternity subsists in the essence of the Eternal, is necessarily existent in

Him, and is not separated (munfasil) from Him. Not every eternal is a god, so the existence of a number of gods is not to be implied from the existence of eternals. We must rather say that Allah taken with His attributes (bi sifatihi) is eternal. The term "eternals" should not be used lest the estimative faculty (al-wahm) go so far as to think that each of the eternals subsists in itself and that divine attributes are predicated of it.

Because of the difficulty of this question the Mu'tazilites and the Philosophers denied the attributes, the Karramites denied their eternity, and the Ash'arites denied both that the attributes are other than He and that they are His essence.

Objection may be made that this, which appears to be a denial, takes away the force of the two contradictories and is in reality a uniting of them; for the explicit denial that the attributes are other than He, for example, establishes inclusively their identity with Him; and the establishing of them as other than He along with an explicit denial of their identity with Him is a uniting of the two contradictories. So also the explicit denial of identity is a uniting of them for that which is understood by a thing; if it is not that which is understood by any other thing- that is, other than the first thing- then it is identical with the first thing, and there is no third intermediate thing conceivable between the two.

We reply to all this that they have interpreted "otherness" (al-ghayriya) to be the state of coming-into-being on the part of two existent things so that the existence of one is determined and conceived along with the nonexistence of the other; that is to say, it is possible to separate them from one another. They have interpreted "identity" (al-ayniya) to be the uniting together of that which is understood in such a way that there is no distinction of difference at all, and thus there are not two things contradictory to each other. But an intermediate thing is conceivable to the extent that what is understood by one thing is not that which is understood by the other. Yet it does not exist without the other thing, as the part along with the whole, the attribute along with the essence, and some of the attributes along with other attributes. This is true, for the essence and attributes of Allah are eternal from the beginning, and the non-existence of such an eternal is impossible.

It is impossible for one as a part of ten to continue without the ten, and for ten to continue without the one, inasmuch as one is a part of ten. The non-existence of the ten means the non-existence of the one, and the existence of the ten means the existence of the one. This, however, is distinctly unlike the originated attributes, for it is conceivable that the essence subsist [in itself] without these attributes which are originated, so they are other than

His essence. Thus did the Early Theologians argue.

But this calls for consideration, for if they mean that from the standpoint of each of the two entities a real separation in existence is valid, this is to be contradicted in the case of the world, which must be taken along with its Maker, and the accident, which follows its locus, inasmuch as the existence of the world is inconceivable if the Maker of the world were non-existent, because

His non-existence is impossible; nor is the existence of an accident such as blackness, for example conceivable without its locus. All this is quite evident; besides, it is certain that there must be a distinct difference [between the two entities] in order that they may be made to agree. And if they consider the matter from one standpoint only, nevertheless there must be a distinct difference between the part and the whole, and so also between the essence and the attribute; so that it is really possible for a part to exist without the whole and for the essence to exist without the attribute.

What the Early Theologians have said about the impossibility of the one [of ten] continuing without the ten appears to be unsound. One must not say that this means that it is possible then to conceive of the existence of each of them along with the non-existence of the other, even as a mere supposition.

Even if it is impossible, the world may be conceived of as existing, and then later the establishing by proof of a Maker is to be sought for. This is different from the question of the part and the whole; for just as the existence of ten is impossible without a unit, so the existence of a unit of ten is impossible without the ten, since were it to exist alone it would not be one of the ten. The result is that some consideration must be given to this explanation of the relationship [between the two entities]; and it is quite evident that the complete separation [of essence and attributes] is impossible.

For we say that the Early Theologians have clearly stated that the attributes are not distinctly different from one another on the basis that their non-existence is inconceivable because they are from eternity. Yet it is certain that we may conceive the existence of some of them like Knowledge, for example, and then establish the existence of others by proof. It is known that they did not have this idea in mind even though it does not apply to the example of an accident and its locus. If consideration were to be given to explaining the relationship between the two entities, there would be no distinct difference between the things related, as between father and son, or between two brothers, or as between cause and effect; rather there would be no distinct difference between two different things (ghayrayn), for ghayr is a term for showing relationship. But no one holds this.

It may be suggested that it is possible that the idea of the Early Theologians was that the attributes are not He according to what is usually understood, nor are they other than He as far as existence is concerned, as is the case of all predicates in relation to their subjects; for there must be some stipulation of unity between them insofar as existence is concerned, in order that a predication may be valid; and there must be a distinct difference insofar as there is something to be understood about them so that the predication may mean something. This is just as we say, "Man is a writer" and not "Man is a stone,*' which is unsound, or "Man is a man," which means nothing.

We say that this suggested argument is sound in the case of the attributes "Knowing" and "Powerful" in relation to the essence [of Allah], but not sound in the case of the attributes "Knowledge" and "Power," even though the statement regarding these latter attributes refers to Him. Nor does the argument apply to parts which are other than those which are predicated, such as a unit of ten or the hand of Zayd. In al-Tabsira there is mention of the argument that a unit of ten is something other than ten and that the hand of Zayd is something other than Zayd. None of the Mutakallims said this except Ja'far b. Harith. In this he differed from all the Mu'tazilites. This was reckoned a bit of ignorance on his part, because ten is the term which is applied to all the individual units and which includes each individual of the units along with the others. So if one were other than ten, it would be other than itself, for it is one of ten, although ten is formed from something else besides. So also if the hand of Zayd were other than Zayd, then the hand of Zayd would be other than itself. This is what Ja'far says, and what it implies is evident.

And they/that is, the attributes from all eternity

are Knowledge (al-'ilm)/which is an attribute from eternity. The things that have to do with Knowledge are unveiled when connected with this attribute.

and Power (al-qudra)/which is an attribute from eternity. It makes an impression on things over which He has power on their being connected with it

and Life (al-hayat)/which is an attribute from eternity bringing about the validity of Knowledge

and Might (al-quwa)/which has the meaning of Power

and Hearing (al-sam')/which is an attribute connected with things heard

and Seeing (al-basar)/which is an attribute connected with things seen. It comprehends completely n neither by the use of the imagination (al-takhayyul) nor of the estimative faculty (al-tawahhum) nor by an impression being made on some sense organ and a current of air reaching it. The eternity of these two attributes of Hearing and Seeing does not require the eternity of the things heard and seen, just as the eternity of Knowledge and Power does not require the eternity of the things which are known and in His Power, because they are all eternal attributes, and connections with originated things are originated for them.

and Willing (al-irada) and Desiring (al-mashi'a)/These terms are expressions for an attribute in the Living One which brings it about that one of two alternatives among the things over which He has power is specified and actually comes into being at a certain time, even though His Power maintains an equal relationship to each of them and even though the connection of Knowledge with it is a consequence of its actually coming into being. In this statement attention is drawn to the answer made in refuting the one who asserts that Desiring is eternal and that Willing is originated and subsistent in the essence of Allah, and also in refuting the one who asserts that the meaning of Allah's Willing His own action is that He is not compelled nor heedless nor overcome, and that the meaning of His Willing the action of others is that He commands them. How can this be the meaning of it, when He has commanded every legally responsible person (mukallaf) to believe and perform all the rest of the duties? Had He desired that, it would have happened.

and Doing (al-fi'l) and Creating (al-tatyliq)/ These are expressions for an attribute existing from eternity which is called at-takwin (bringing-into-being). Its verification comes later. Al-Nasafi avoided using the word al-khalq (the creation) inasmuch as it is often used in place of al-makluq (the thing created).

and Sustaining (al-tarziq)/It is a special kind of bringing-into-being which al-Nasafi explained thus in order to point out that things like creating, sustaining, forming, bringing to life and death, and other things as well which are ascribed to Allah are traced back to a real attribute existing from eternity and subsistent in the essence of Allah which is bringing-into-being (altakwin).

This is unlike the position of al-Ash'ari, for he asserted that these things are relationships (idafat) and attributes of actions.

Chapter 6

THE ATTRIBUTE OF SPEECH

And in Speech.

He speaks with a kind of Speech which is one of His attributes, from all eternity, not of the genus of letters and sounds. It is an attribute incompatible with silence and defect Allah speaks with this attribute, commanding, prohibiting, and narrating. The Qur'an, the Speech of Allah, is uncreated and it is written in our volumes, preserved in our hearts, recited by our tongues, heard by our ears, [yet] is not a thing residing in them.

And Speech (kalam)/ is an attribute from eternity which is an expression for that context composed of letters called the Qur'an. [This is similar to] any one of us [who] whenever he commands, prohibits, and narrates finds of himself an idea and then indicates it by an expression or by writing or by a gesture. This attribute is something other than the attribute of

Knowledge, since a man may narrate something which he knows not [to be a fact], but rather knows the contrary to it. This attribute is an attribute different from Willing, for one may command something he does not will, like the person who commands his slave to do something in order to reveal his disobedience and insubordination. This kind of speech is called "speech of the mind" (kalam nafsi). Al-Akhtal  referred to this kind of speech in saying,

Verily speech is in the heart,

And the tongue has been made only as a guide to the heart.

And 'Umar- may Allah be well pleased with him- said, "Verily, I made a saying right and sound in myself." And often you say to your friend, "Verily there is speech within me, which I wish to relate to you." The proof for the establishment of the attribute of Speech is the Agreement (ijma) of the Muslim people and mutawatir traditions from the prophets, which assert that Allah is a Speaker since it is certain that speaking is impossible without the attribute of Speech being established. It has been established that Allah has eight attributes: Knowledge, Power, Life, Hearing, Seeing, Willing, Creating, and Speech. And since the last three are more open to dispute and more obscure, he again referred to their being established as sure and eternal and went into some detail in his statement of the fact that they are firmly established.

So al-Nasafi said,

He/that is, Allah

speaks with a kind of Speech which is one of His attributes/Of necessity it is impossible to affirm the derivative of any thing without affirming the subsistence in that thing of the source of its derivation. In this way al-Nasafi refuted the Mu'tazilites, inasmuch as they took the position that Allah is a Speaker of Speech which subsists in something other than Himself, and is not one of His attributes.

from all eternity/Of necessity it is impossible that originated things subsist in His essence.

not of the genus of letters and sounds/Of necessity letters and sounds are originated accidents, the occurrence of some of which is conditioned on the fact that others have been finished. By immediate perception we know that it is impossible to pronounce the second letter [of a word] without finishing off the first letter. This is a refutation of the Hanbalites and the Karramites, who say that the Speech of Allah is an accident of the genus of sounds and letters, and yet in spite of that it is eternal.

It/that is, Speech

is an attribute/that is, an idea subsistent in the essence

incompatible with silence/which is the leaving off of speech while yet having the power to speak

and defect/This is the lack of fitness in the organs of speech either because of the nature created within one, as in the case of dumbness, or because of weakness and immaturity, as in infancy. Objection may be made that this definition applies to uttered speech only, in contrast to speech of the mind, since silence and dumbness are incompatible with verbal utterance only. To this we answer that the meaning here is internal silence and internal defect, so that one neither desires utterance within himself nor is capable of it. So just as Speech is of both kinds, uttered and in the mind, so also is its contrary; I mean by that silence and dumbness.

Allah speaks with this attribute, commanding, prohibiting, and narrating/ This means that Speech is a single attribute with a variety of forms for commanding, prohibiting, and narrating that differ according to the matters with which Speech is connected. In this, Speech is analogous to Knowledge, Power, and the rest of the attributes. Each of them is a single eternal attribute, but variety and origination occur only in making connections and adding relationships, inasmuch as that is more fitting to the perfection of the unity of Allah. And there is no proof that each attribute has variety within itself. Objection may be raised that these things [such as commanding, prohibiting, and narrating] are divisions of Speech, without which it is unreasonable to think of the existence of Speech. We reply that this is impossible, nay rather, that Speech becomes one of these divisions only when the connections [with originated things] are made. This is true of Speech which does not pass away, but in the beginning from all eternity there was no division whatsoever. And some took the position that from all eternity Speech was narrative (khabar) and that all other kinds of Speech go back to it. They say that the result of the command is to give the information (al-ikhbar) that performing the act deserves reward and failure to do it deserves punishment; and that prohibition is just the opposite of this; and the result of asking for information (al-istikhbar) is the narrative which comes from seeking to be instructed; and the result of summoning is the narrative which comes from seeking a response. Answer may be made that of necessity we know there are differences in these meanings, and the fact that some of them require the others does not demand their being united into one.

Objection may be raised that command and prohibition without someone who is commanded or who is prohibited is a bit of foolishness and unreality, and that to say that from eternity there is on the part of Allah narration which assumes the past time is a pure falsehood from which Allah must be far removed. To this we reply that no difficulty results if His Speech is not made from eternity to be command, prohibition, and narrative. If we do make His Speech to be command, prohibition, and narrative, then the command from eternity is to compel the one commanded thereby to obtain it at the time he comes into existence and to make him fit to obtain it. It is sufficient then that there be in the knowledge of the one commanding the existence of the one to be commanded, which is analogous to a man's taking it for granted that he had a son, and then commanding him to do something after he should come into existence. Narration that refers to eternity is not described by any time at all, since with Allah there is no past, future, nor present, because He is far removed from all time, just as His Knowledge is eternal and is unchanged by the changing of times.

And when al-Nasafi spoke explicitly of Speech as being from eternity, he wanted to call our attention to the fact that this term "al-Qur'an" is sometimes applied to the eternal Speech of the mind just as it is applied to the originated context (al-nazm) which is read, so he said,

The Qur'an, the Speech of Allah, is uncreated (ghayr makhluq)/He followed the term "al-Qur'an" with the words "the speech of Allah" because of what the Early Theologians had stated saying that the Qur'an is the uncreated Speech of Allah and not that the Qur'an is said to be uncreated.

This distinction is made lest the mind jump to the conclusion that the thing composed of sounds and letters is eternal. This is just the position that the Hanbalites took out of ignorance and obstinacy. And al-Nasafi used "uncreated" instead of "unoriginated" in order, first, to call attention to their oneness in meaning; second, to make his statement agree with the tradition in which the Prophet may Allah bless and give him peace said, "The Qur'an is the uncreated Speech of Allah, and whoever says that it is created is not a Believer in Allah the Majestic One," and, third, to take into account the dispute between the two parties on the well-known subject of whether the Qur'an is created or uncreated. So the whole question is to be interpreted as the question of the creation of the Qur'an. The verifying of this matter on which they and we differ goes back to whether or not the Speech of the mind can be established. However, we do not say that the verbal expressions (al-alfaz) and letters are eternal, and they do not say that the

Speech of the mind is originated.

The proof for our position has already been stated, namely, that it is established by Agreement and mutawatir tradition of the prophets -may the blessing of Allah be on them- that Allah is a Speaker, the only meaning of which is that He has the attribute of Speech and that, since the subsistence in the essence of Allah of the verbal Speech which is described as originated is impossible, the Speech which is described as eternal and in the mind is designated as the attribute of Allah.

The Mu'tazilites have inferred that the Qur'an is to be described by attributes which pertain to a created being and by marks which show its origination: that is, such things as its composition and arrangement, its having been brought down as a whole and then revealed bit by bit, its being in the Arabic language, its being heard by the ear of man, and its being rhetorical and inimitable and so on. All this only raises an argument against the position of the Hanbalites and not against us, for we admit that the arrangement of the Qur'an is originated. Our statement [about the Qur'an being uncreated] has only to do with the Eternal Idea.

Since the Mu'tazilites were unable to deny that Allah speaks, they held that when He speaks it means that He brings into existence the sounds and letters in their places or He brings into existence the written characters of the Preserved Tablet (al-lawh al-mahfuz) which may or may not be read. They differed about this last point. You are well aware that the one who is moved is the one in whom the motion subsists and not the one who brings the motion into existence. Otherwise it would be sound for the Creator to be described with accidents which are created of Him. And Allah is far exalted above anything like that.

One of the greatest ambiguities [regarding the Qur'an] according to the Mu'tazilites is stated by them as follows. You [orthodox people] are agreed that the Qur'an is the name for that which has been transmitted to us between the two covers of the volumes by tawatur. Believing this requires that the Qur'an be written in the volumes, recited by the tongues of men, and heard by their ears. All these things are of necessity marks which indicate that the Qur'an was originated. So al-Nasafi pointed out the answer to this by saying,

and it/that is, the Qur'an, which is the speech of Allah

is written in our volumes/that is, with written characters and with forms of letters which indicate it

preserved in our hearts/that is, by verbal expressions which are imagined

recited by our tongues/with letters which are pronounced and heard

heard by our ears/and with these also

[yet] is not a thing residing (hall) in them/He means to say that in spite of all this the Qur'an, the Speech of Allah, does not reside in the volumes, nor in the hearts, nor in the tongues, nor in the ears; but it is an Eternal Idea subsisting in the essence of Allah. This Idea is expressed and heard by means of the context which indicates it, and preserved by the context which is imagined in the mind and is written by marks, by forms, and by characters which are used conventionally for the letters that indicate the Qur'an. This is analogous to our saying that fire is a burning substance, which is recalled to mind by a verbal expression and is written down with a pen, but it does not follow that the real essence of fire is a sound and a letter.

The verifying of this fact is that a thing has a kind of existence in substances (al-a'yan), another kind of existence in minds (al-adhhan), another in an expression (al-ibara), and still another in writing (al-kitaba) . The writing indicates the expression, the expression indicates what is in the mind, and it in turn indicates what is in the substance. So whenever the Qur'an is described as one of the things inseparably connected (lawazim) with the Eternal, as when we say that the Qur'an is uncreated, the meaning is its true existential essence in external reality. Whenever it is described as that which is inseparably connected with things created and originated, the verbal expressions which are spoken and heard are meant, as when we say, "I have recited half the Qur'an," or the expression imagined in the mind as when we say, "I have memorized the Qur'an," or the characters that are written down are meant as when we say, "It is unlawful for one who is defiled to touch the Qur'an."

And since that which is indicated in the legal judgments by the term "Qur'an" is the verbal utterance (al-lafz) and not the Eternal Idea, the Imams in fundamental matters of dogma defined it as that which is written in the volumes and transmitted by tawatur. And they applied the name

[Qur'an] both to the context and the Idea; that is, they applied it not only to the Idea, but to the context as well, in so far as it indicates the Idea. In regard to the Eternal Speech which is an attribute of Allah, al-Ash'ari took the position that it was possible for it to be heard; and al-Ustadh Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini denied it. Abu Mansur [al-Maturidi] also chose this [latter] position. The meaning of the saying of Allah, "Until he hear the speech of Allah" (Qur'an 9:6) is that he heard that which indicates it, which is analogous to one's saying, "I hear the knowledge of So-and-so.*' So Moses heard a sound which indicated the Speech of Allah, but since it was without the means of a book or an angel, Moses was given the special name of "interlocutor" (al-kalim).

Objection may be raised that were the Speech of Allah really in an Eternal Idea and metaphorically in a constructed context, then it would be sound to deny Speech of Allah, by saying that the inimitable (al-mu'jiz) context which was sent down from above bit by bit and divided into suras and verses is not the Speech of Allah. But the Agreement [of the Muslim people] opposes this last statement. Also it may be objected that if the inimitable thing which was an object of contention in recitation were in reality the Speech of Allah, it would be positively certain that this can only be conceived of the context which was composed and divided into suras, since there would have been no meaning to their opposing the Eternal attribute of Speech. To this we reply that the verifying of this is to be found in the fact that the Speech of Allah is a name common to two things. In the first place it applies to the Eternal Speech of the mind the idea conveyed by the relationship here in the phrase "Speech of Allah" is that it is an attribute of Allah and in the second place it applies to the Speech which is originated and to verbal utterance, composed of suras and verses the idea conveyed by the relationship [of Speech to Allah] here is that it is created by Allah and not one of the compositions of His creatures. So denial of the

Eternal Speech as suggested above is not at all sound. That which is inimitable and over which they contended can only be the Speech of Allah.

The claim made by some of the Early Theologians that this expression is metaphorical does not mean that it is the conventional usage applied to the context which has been composed, but rather it means that in being verified as a reality and in essence the Speech is the name of the Idea which subsists in the mind. Giving the verbal utterance the name ["Speech of Allah"] and making it the conventional usage for this Idea are only results of its indicating the Idea. So there is no dispute with them about the conventional usage of the word and giving it this name.

Some of the Verifiers (al-muhaqqiqun) maintained that the Early Theologians used the term "the Speech of Allah" as an eternal Idea. It was not something that was contrasted with the verbal utterance so that it meant that which is indicated and understood by the verbal utterance, but it was something in contrast to the substance itself. The meaning of the term was: that which does not subsist in itself like the rest of the attributes. They meant that the Qur'an, being eternal, is the name which is used for both the verbal utterance and the Idea and includes them both. This is not the position held by the Hanbalites, who maintained that the context which was composed and arranged in parts is eternal. We know by immediate perception that it is positively impossible for one to pronounce the "s" (sin) of bism 'illahi without first pronouncing the "b" (ba). But they mean that the verbal expression which subsists in the mind is not arranged in parts [one after the other] in His mind like that which subsists in the mind of the one who has memorized it, without any arrangement of parts and without some of it preceding other parts. The arrangement takes place only when one gives expression to it in utterance or when one reads without using the organ [of speech]. This is the explanation of their statement, "That which is read is eternal, but the reading is originated." But that Speech which subsists in the essence of Allah has no arrangement of parts, so that whoever hears His Speech hears it without any arrangement of parts, for He needs no organ [of speech].

This is the conclusion to be reached from the statement of the Verifiers. It is well for one then to conceive the Speech of Allah as verbal expression, subsistent in the mind, not composed of letters either uttered or imagined, since it is stipulated of these that the presence of some precludes the presence of others; nor is it composed of the characters which are arranged in order and which indicate it. And we do not conceive the speech which subsists in the mind of the one who has memorized it except as forms of letters which are stored up and inscribed in his imagination (khayal), so that if he turns to them, it becomes speech constructed of verbal expressions which are imagined, or of marks which are so arranged that whenever he gives utterance to them they become speech which is heard.

Chapter 7

THE ATTRIBUTES OF CREATING AND WILLING

And Creating is an attribute of Allah from all eternity. And it is Allah's creating the world and every one of its parts, not in eternity, but rather at the time of its becoming existent, according to His Knowledge and Willing. And it [that is, the attribute of Creating] is not the thing created, according to our opinion.

And Wilting is an attribute of Allah from all eternity, subsistent in His essence.

And Creating (al-takwin)/ It is the idea expressed by such words as al-fi'l (doing), al-khalq (creation), al-takhliq (producing), al-ijad (bringing-into-existence), al-ihdath (originating), and al-ikhtira' (inventing). It is explained as the bringing of the non-existent (al-ma'dum) from non-existence into existence.

is an attribute of Allah/because both Reason and Tradition agree that He is the Producer (alkhaliq) and the Creator (al-mukawwin) of the world, and because it is impossible to apply a derivative term to a thing without the source of the derivative being a descriptive of it and subsistent in it.

from all eternity (azaliya)/ because of certain reasons. The first is that originated things cannot subsist in Allah, as we have seen. The second is that Allah in His Speech, which is from eternity, described His essence by the term al-khaliq, so were He not from all eternity Creator, that would either necessitate falsehood [on His part] or a resorting to metaphorical language, by interpreting it to mean that He is the Creator in the future or that He is able to create without difficulty. The real fact is that were it permissible to apply the term "the Creator" to Allah as meaning "the One who is able to create," it would then be permissible to apply to Him all of the terms having to do with the accidents over which He has power. The third reason is that were He originated (hadith), there would be two alternative absurdities.

(a) If He were originated by another creation, that would necessitate the Endless Chain, which is impossible. It would necessarily follow then that it is impossible for the world to be created, in spite of the fact that we see that it is. (b) Or if He were originated He would be so without another creation, and thus that which is originated dispenses both with the originator and the act of origination. This statement does away with the Maker [of the world although the fact of His existence has already been proved]. The fourth reason is that were He originated, He would have been originated: (a) either in His essence and therefore He would be the locus of things originated; (b) or in something else, just as Abu al-Hudhayl maintained, saying that the creating of each body (jism) is something subsistent in it, so each body is the producer and creator of itself. Clearly this is impossible.

These [four] proofs are based on the fact that Creating is a real attribute like Knowledge and Power. But the Verifiers among the Mutakallims say that Creating is one of the relationships (al-idafat) and rational expressions (al-i'tibarat al-aqliya), like the statement, for example, that the Maker is before everything and with everything and after everything; His name is on our tongues. He is the object of our homage, He causes us to die and to live, and so on. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that from eternity He is the beginning of the acts of producing and sustaining, the giving of life and of death, and so on.

There is no proof for the position that Creating is another attribute in addition to Power and Willing, for although Power has a relationship equal to the existence or non-existence of a thing created, it is only when Willing embraces one of the two potentialities that this one is specified [and becomes actual].

Those who assert that Creating is originated make the deduction that we can not conceive of it without there being that which is created, just as the act of striking is inconceivable without there being the one who is struck. So were Creating eternal, the eternity of things created must be posited; but that is impossible.

Al-Nasafi pointed out the answer to them by saying,

And it/that is, Creating

is Allah's creating the world and every one of its parts, not in eternity, but rather at the time of its becoming existent, according to His Knowledge and Willing/ So Creating continues from eternity to eternity (azalan wa abadan) and the thing created is originated by the origination of the connection [between Creating and that which is created], just as in the case of Knowledge and Power and other eternal attributes, the eternity of whose connections does not follow from their own eternity, inasmuch as their connections are originated. In this there is the verifying, first, of the proposition that if the existence of the world is not connected with the essence of Allah or with one of His attributes, then it follows that the Maker [of the world] has been deprived of His function and also that there is no need for verifying the fact that originated things come from one who brings them into existence, but these conclusions are impossible [so the existence of the world must be connected with the essence of Allah or one of His attributes]; and, second, of the proposition that if the existence of the world is connected with the essence of Allah then this (a) either requires the eternity of that with which its existence is connected, and that necessitates the eternity of the world, which is unsound, or (b) it does not necessitate it; so Creating then is eternal also, even though the thing created which is connected with Creating is originated. In this there is also the verifying of what is to be said of the proposition that the connection of the existence of the thing created with Creating is just as much as saying that it is originated, inasmuch as "the Eternal" is defined as that the existence of which is not connected with anything else, and "the originated" is defined as that the existence of which is connected with something else.

This is a matter for consideration, inasmuch as this is the meaning of "eternal" and of "originated" according to what the Philosophers say. But "the originated" is defined by the Mutakallims as that thing the existence of which had a beginning, meaning that its existence was preceded by nonexistence; and "the eternal" is the contrary of this. The mere connection of the originated thing with something else does not require, according to this meaning, that it be originated, but mere connection permits it to be in need of something else, proceeding from it and lasting as long as it lasts, which is just what the Philosophers held in claiming that its eternity is one of the possibles, just like primary matter (al-hayuli), for example. Certainly whenever we establish, by means of a proof that does not rest on the origination of the world, that the world proceeded from the Maker by [His] choice rather than of necessity, then the proposition that its existence is connected with the Creating of Allah is a proposition that it is originated. And from this one may go on to say that it applies to every part of the world, thereby answering the one who asserts that some parts, like primary matter, are eternal. Or the Philosophers maintain that some parts are eternal, meaning that they were not preceded by non-existence, which, however, does not mean that the world was not created by something outside itself.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that we do not admit that Creating is inconceivable without the existence of the created thing, and that Creating has the same relation to the thing created as the act of striking has to the one struck. Striking is an attribute showing relationship which is inconceivable without the two things related, namely, the striker and the one struck, but

Creating is a real attribute that is the basis for the relationship, which is the bringing of the non-existent out from non-existence into existence, but not the relationship itself. Yet even were it the relationship itself, according to the terminology used by the Early Theologians, then the proposition, which verifies this relationship as true without there being a thing which was actually created, would be a contention and a denial of that which is necessary. And this [proposition that Creating bears the relation to the thing created that striking does to the thing struck] is not to be rejected by saying that striking is an accident the continuance of which is impossible; for [even if it is an accident] it must be connected with the thing acted upon, and pain must pass on to the thing acted upon, inasmuch as it exists at the same time as the action, since were it delayed [until another time] it would become non-existent. This is unlike the action of the Creator. His action is from eternity and of necessity endures, continuing until the time of the existence of the thing acted upon.

And it [that is, the attribute of Creating] is not the thing created (al-mukawwan), according to our opinion/This is true because of necessity the action is distinctly different from the thing acted upon, just as striking differs from the one struck and eating from the thing eaten; and also because certain absurd things would follow were Creating the thing which is itself created. First, the created thing would of necessity be a thing created and produced by itself, since it is created by a creating which is the thing itself, so it would be eternal and independent of the Maker. This is impossible. Second, the Creator would of necessity have no connection with the world, except that He is before it in eternity and exercises His power over it, yet without having made it or without making an impression on it, this being a necessary consequence of its being created by itself. This does not require Him to be a Creator nor the world to be created by Him, consequently it is not valid to say that He is the Creator and the Maker of the world. This is false. Third, it would require that Allah not be a creator of things, since of necessity the only idea that the Creator conveys is that He is the one in whom Creating subsists. But whenever creating is identical with the thing created then it is not subsistent in the essence of Allah. Fourth, it would require one to admit the validity of such a proposition as that the creator of blackness in a given rock, for example, is black, and that the rock is the creator of the blackness, inasmuch as the only meaning of creator and blackness is the one in whom creating and blackness subsists. They are one and the same thing, and their locus is one and the same.

All of this calls attention to the fact that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between the deed and the thing done. However, the one who uses Reason must ponder such investigations as these and not ascribe to the well grounded among those learned in the principles of the faith something which is known by immediate perception to be impossible by anyone who has the least discernment. Rather let him seek valid ground for the statement which they make which serves as a basis for dispute among the Learned and for controversy among those who use Reason.

For whoever says that creating is identical with the thing created means that if the doer does anything, then there is nothing in this but the doer and the thing done. But the idea denoted by terms like "creating" and "bringing into existence" is an expression for that which takes place in Reason, since there is a relation between the doer and thing done. It is not something verified as distinctly different from the thing done in the world of reality.[1]

…

Chapter 8

THE BEATIFIC VISION OF ALLAH

That there is a Vision of Allah is allowed by Reason and necessary by Tradition. A proof on authority has come down affirming that Believers have a vision of Allah in the abode of the next World. And He is seen [unlike any material being] not in place nor in a direction so far as being confronted, nor by the conjunction of the rays of light, nor by a certain definite distance between the one who sees and Allah.

That there is a Vision (ru'ya) of Allah/This means the complete unveiling (inkishaf) through the [sense of] sight, which is defined as the comprehension of a thing as it really is by means of the sense of sight.

That is to say that whenever we look at the full moon and then close the eyes, it is clear that, though we see the moon unveiled both when the eyes are open and when they are closed, its being unveiled is more complete and perfect in gazing at it. So we have in relation to the object seen a special state called Vision.

is allowed by Reason/This means that Reason when acting by itself does not decide that the Vision is impossible so long as there is no proof brought against it, in spite of the fact that at first there was no Vision [before it was mentioned in revelation]. This is a necessary ruling, so whosoever claims that the Vision of Allah is impossible must produce his proof.

The People of Reality demonstrated the possibility of the Vision in two ways, one based on rational argument ('aqli) and the other based on traditional authority (sam'i). The establishment of the first proof is as follows. Undoubtedly various [bodily] substances and various accidents are seen by us, inasmuch as we of necessity distinguish by the faculty of sight between one body and another body and one accident and another accident. Now the common designation inevitably implies a common cause; this cause is either existence or origination or possibility, inasmuch as there is no fourth alternative which is common to both substances and accidents.

Origination is a term explicatory of the fact that the existence took place after non-existence; and possibility is a term explicatory of the fact that both existence and non-existence are not the result of the necessity of their own nature. But as for non-existence, it cannot enter at all into consideration of causality [for non-existence cannot be the cause of anything]. Consequently

[whichever of the three alternatives is taken] existence has been established [inasmuch as origination and possibility also imply existence]; and this existence is common both to the Maker and to that which is made by Him.

Thus it has been established that it is possible for Allah to be seen by reason of the fact that the cause for such a possibility, namely existence, has been demonstrated as being true concerning Him.

That sometimes a thing is not seen [even though it exists] is due to the fact that it is of the nature of that kind of possible which depends for its realization on the presence of a certain condition; or as may be said the absence of such a condition acts as something which of necessity is a preventer [of its being seen]. Therefore it would be proper to say that other existent things such as sounds, flavors, odors, and their like may be seen; and the fact that they are not seen is only because Allah did not create in the creature the vision of them in the customary way, and not because they cannot be seen.

It may be objected that it is not proper [for us to say that sounds, flavors, and odors may be seen], so no cause is required. And even if this fact were to be admitted, one specific thing may be caused by different things, just as heat is caused by the sun and by fire. So in this instance the one specific thing did not require a cause that is common [to it and other things that have a common designation]; and even were this fact admitted, the non-existent is suitable as a cause for the non-existent; and were this fact to be admitted, existence in general is not admitted to be a common cause, but rather the existence of each separate thing in itself. To all this it may be answered that the meaning of cause in this case is that which is connected (muta'alliq) with the Vision and the one receiving the Vision. It is quite clear that this connection must be something having existence. But then it must not be that which pertains especially to body or accident, for when we first see a shape approaching from afar we comprehend of it only a sort of "itness"

(huwiya) rather than anything which specifies it as substance or accident or man or horse and so on. After first seeing it as connected with the "itness" of the shape, we may be able to distinguish what substances and accidents there are in it, and sometimes we may not be able. So that which is connected with the Vision is the fact that we may be able to distinguish what substances and accidents there are in it, and that sometimes we may not be able. So that which is connected with a Vision is the fact that the thing has some sort of "itness." This is what is meant by existence, and it is necessary that existence be common to all things seen. This calls for consideration, because the thing which is connected with the Vision may be the fact that it possesses body and whatever there are of accidents accompanying it without considering its particular characteristic (khususiya).

The statement of proof from the second standpoint [that is, from authority] is first, that Moses requested a vision, saying, "O my Lord, make me see, let me look unto Thee" (Qur'an 7:139); so had the vision not been possible, the request for it would have been something of ignorance on his part as to what is permissible and not permissible in regard to the essence of Allah, or it would have been some sort of foolishness, or trifling, or a request for the impossible, but the prophets (al-anbiya) are far removed from anything like that; and second, that Allah connected the vision of Moses with the abiding of the mountain firm in its place, which is something possible in itself. That which is connected with the possible is possible the idea in this statement being to give the information that the establishing of a thing connected [with something else] goes along with the establishing of the thing with which it is connected and the impossible is not to be established on the basis of any of those things the determination of which is possible [so the vision requested by Moses and connected with the mountain's abiding firm, is something possible].

Different objections have sometimes been made to this view. The strongest objection is that this request of Moses was made on behalf of his people when they said, "We will never believe in thee, until we see Allah openly" (Qur'an 2:52). So he asked that they might know that it was impossible, just as he knew that it was. Then some objectors say, "We do not admit that the thing to which it was connected is possible; no, indeed, for it was the abiding of the mountain firm in its place at the very time that it was moving and that is impossible." Answer may be made that each of these two statements is contrary to the literal meaning of the verse. There was no necessity for Moses to commit a fault [like this] because if the people were Believers, it was sufficient for Moses to tell them that the Vision was impossible; and if they were Unbelievers, they would not have believed him in saying that Allah had ruled that the Vision was impossible. In any case the request would have been [under such circumstances] a sort of trifling.

The abiding of the mountain firm in its place at the time of motion is also possible [if the verse means] that rest occurs in place of motion, for the only thing that is impossible is the joining together of motion and rest.

and necessary by Tradition. A proof on authority has come down affirming that Believers have a vision of Allah in the abode of the next World/ First, there is the Book, which gives the statement of Allah, "On that day beaming faces to their Lord shall be looking" (Qur'an 75:22). Second, Tradition (al-sunna) gives the statement of the Prophet, "Verily you will see your Lord just as you see the moon on the night when it is full." This is a well-known (mashhur) tradition reported by twenty-one of the principal Companions. Third, as for Agreement, it states that the Muslim people were agreed that the Vision of Allah occurs in the abode of the next World and that the verses which have come down regarding it are to be taken literally.

Later there appeared the statement of those who differed [from this], and their equivocations and interpretations spread. Their greatest equivocation is the rational one, that it is a stipulation of a person seen in a vision that he must be in place, in a direction and [in a position] confronting the one who sees; that there be a certain definite distance between the two, so that he who is seen is neither extremely near nor extremely far away; and that there be a conjunction of the rays of light from the eye with the one seen. All this, they say, is impossible in the case of Allah. The answer is to make this stipulation impossible. Al-Nasafi referred to it in saying,

And He is seen [unlike any material being] not in place or in a direction so far as being confronted, nor by the conjunction of the rays of light, nor by a certain definite distance between the one who sees and Allah/ To draw analogy for the Unseen (al-gha'ib) from the Seen (al-shahid) is unsound. The fact that it is not stipulated that Allah see us [with the sense of sight] is sometimes adduced as a proof [that Allah is not seen in a place, and so on]. This is a matter for consideration, [95] for the statement concerning the Vision says that it is by the sense of sight.

Objection may be made that were the Vision a possibility, were the senses sound and all the other stipulations existent, of necessity He would be seen; otherwise it would be possible for lofty mountains to be in front of us and yet we should not see them, but this is sophistry. We reply that this is impossible, for the Vision according to us is by the creating of Allah; and it does not necessarily follow when all the stipulations are met.

The objectors say that among the authoritative proofs [against it] there is the statement of Allah, "Eyes do not perceive Him, although He perceives the eyes" (Qur'an 6:103). Now although we admit that the meaning of eyes in the verse is inclusive [without any exception being made]; and that the purport of the verse is a general negation and not a negation of perceiving in general [to which there might have been a particular case as an exception]; and that perception here is absolute vision, not vision from the standpoint of encircling all sides of the one seen; yet our answer is that there is no indication regarding perception that this is a general statement covering all times and states.

It may be deduced from the verse quoted that the Vision of Allah is allowable; since were it impossible there would be no reason for commending the negation of it, just as the non-existent being is not commended for its non-vision, for the Vision itself [in this supposition] is impossible. But rather the commendation appears in the fact that though the Vision of Him is possible, yet He is not seen because of its being made impossible and unattainable by the veil of Majesty.

If we make perception an expression for vision from the standpoint of encircling one from all sides and boundaries, then the verse indicates that the Vision is allowable, nay rather it is verified even more clearly as real, for the meaning is that Allah although seen, is not perceived by the eyes because He is exalted of Himself above being limited and described by boundaries and sides.

Also objectors say that the verses of the Qur'an expressing a desire for the Vision are joined up with a desire for magnifying [Allah] and disapprobation [of the people of Moses]. The answer to this is that it was for the purpose of distressing the people of Moses and opposing them in asking for the Vision, not because it was impossible. Otherwise Moses would have prevented them from doing it, just as he did when they asked him to make gods for them. And he said, "Nay rather you are an ignorant people" (Qur'an 27:56). And this is a mark of the possibility of the Vision in this world (al-dunya). For this reason the Companions of the Prophet differed as to whether the Prophet saw his Lord on the night of the Ascension (al-mi'raj) or not. And the differing about its occurrence is a proof of its possibility. But [the occurrence of] the Vision in sleep has been recorded of many of the Fathers. Doubtless it is a species of observation by the heart

(al-qalb) rather than the eye.

Chapter 9

THE CREATOR AND THE ACTIONS OF HIS CREATURES

Allah is the creator of all the actions of His creatures whether of Unbelief or of Belief, of obedience or of disobedience. And they are all of them by His Will and Desire, by His judgment, by His ruling, and by His decreeing. His creatures have actions of choice for which they are rewarded or punished. And the good in these is by the good pleasure of Allah and the vile in them is not by His good pleasure.

Allah is the creator (khaliq) of all the actions of His creatures whether of Unbelief (al-kufr) or of Belief (al-iman), of obedience (al-ta'a) or of disobedience (al-'isyan)/ This is unlike the Mu'tazilites, who asserted that the creature is the creator of his own actions. The early Mu'tazilites refrained from using the expression "creator" when speaking of the creature (al-abd), and only used expressions like "bringer into existence" (mujid), "inventor" (mukhtari'), and so on. But when al-Jubba'i and his followers saw that the terms all meant the same, namely "the one who brings out of non-existence into existence" (al-mukhrij min al-adam 'ila l-wujud) they became bold and used the expression "creator" (al-khaliq).

The People of Reality objected for certain reasons. The first is that the creature, were he the creator of his actions, would know all the particulars of these actions, since of necessity the bringing a thing into existence through power and choice cannot be anything but that. And the obligation [to know all the particulars] is unsound, for walking from place to place may comprise a series of interrupted rests and of motions, some swifter and some slower than others, yet all the while the person walking has no feeling of this. This is not because he is diverted from the knowledge of it, nay rather, were he asked about the actions he would not know. Yet this happens with the most evident of actions. But when you consider the motions of the members of his body in walking, grasping, seizing, and so on, and what he needs for moving his muscles and straining his nerves and so on, the matter is clearer still [that is, that he does not know all their particulars]. The second reason is that there are the statutes (al-nusus) which have come down regarding this subject, such as the statement of Allah, "And Allah has created you and what you do" (Qur'an 37:94). This means "your doing," the ma (what) being masdariya (related to a verbal noun) so that there is no necessity for omitting the pronoun; or it means "your deed," the ma being mawsula (relatival), and this comprises actions. For if we say the actions of the creatures are created by Allah or by the creatures, we do not mean by the action the masdariya meaning, which is the bringing into existence and the bringing to pass, but the result of the masdar (verbal noun) which is connected with the bringing into existence and the bringing to pass, I mean what we observe of motions and rests, for example. The fine point that may be forgotten is that one may fancy that the citation of the verse depends on the ma being masdariya. And there is the statement of Allah, "Allah is the creator of everything" (Qur'an 39:63, 13:17). This by rational proof means everything possible, and the action of the creature is a possible thing. There is also the statement of Allah, "Is the one who creates as the one who does not?" (Qur'an 16:17). This commends the office of creator, and connects it up with being worthy of receiving adoration (al-ibada).

But it must not be said that he who asserts that the creature creates his action is a polytheist (mushrik) rather than a monotheist (muwahhid), for we say that polytheism is positing a partner for the Deity, meaning a necessarily existent partner just as the Magians (al-Majus) assert, or a partner deserving such adoration as the idolaters render their idols. The Mu'taziiites do not assert that, and moreover they do not make the office of creator in the creature like that of Allah, because the creature lacks causes and instruments which are [given to him] by the creation of Allah. However, the Early Theologians of the Trans-Oxus went so far in attributing error to them as to say that the Magians were in a happier state than the Mu'taziiites since the Magians only posited of the Deity one partner, whereas the Mu'taziiites posited innumerable partners. The Mu'taziiites argued that of necessity we distinguish between the motion of one who is walking and of one who is trembling, for the first movement is by choice, but the second is not. They also said that if everything were by the creative act of Allah, the imposing [on the creature] of a legal responsibility (taklif) would be unsound, as would also praise and blame, reward and punishment [of him]. And this [according to them] is quite clear. The answer is that this argument should be addressed to the Jabrites (al-]abriya) who deny absolutely to him, that is the creature, the power of acquisition and choice.

But we shall establish this point on grounds which we shall verify, if Allah wills. It is sometimes maintained that if Allah were the creator of the actions of the creatures, He would then be the one who stands, sits, eats and drinks, and the adulterer and the thief and so on. But this is a bit of stupendous ignorance, for the one of whom something is predicated (al-muttasif) is that one in whom it subsists, not the one who brought it into existence. Do they not see that Allah is the creator of blackness and whiteness and all the other things predicated of bodies, but they are not predicated of Him? Or perhaps it is maintained [that the creature creates] because of the sayings of Allah, "And Allah the best of creators is blessed" (Qur'an 23:14), "Since thou dost create from clay as it were in the shape of birds" (Qur'an 5:110).

The answer is that creating here means decreeing (al-taqdir).

And they/that is, the actions of creatures

are all of them by His Will and Desire/ It has been shown that we hold these [two terms] to be an expression for the same idea.

by His judgment (hukm)/ lt is not unlikely that the reference here is to the direct command (khitab) [of Allah] in creating.

by His ruling (qadiya)/ that is, His decision (qada). This is an expression for the action taken together with the judgments in addition [to it]. Objection is not to be made that were Unbelief by the decision of Allah, it would be necessary to be well pleased with it, for it is incumbent on us to submit to Allah's decision. The obligation [suggested here] is unsound, for being well pleased with Unbelief is Unbelief, for we say that Unbelief is not a decision but something decided, and that being well pleased is with the decision and not with the thing decided.

and by His decreeing (taqdir)/This is the limiting of each creature to the limit within which he exists whether of goodness or vileness, of use or harm, and to what he occupies of time and place and to what results thereby of reward and punishment. The purpose is to make a general statement concerning the Will and Power of Allah because of what has already been said about everything being by the creation of Allah. This [creation] calls for Power and Will [in Allah] since there is no coercion or compulsion [of Him].

Objection may be raised that the Unbeliever (al-kafir) is made an object of compulsion in His Unbelief (kufr) and the evil-doer (al-fasiq) in his evil-doing (fisq), so it is not sound to make them legally responsible for Belief and obedience. To this we reply that Allah willed for them Unbelief and evil-doing by their own choice, so there is no compulsion. For just as He knew that on their part they would choose Unbelief and evil-doing, so He did not make them legally responsible for the impossible [because they had choice].

The Mu'tazilites denied that Allah wills wicked and vile things, even to the extent that they said that He wills of the Unbeliever and the evil-doer that they believe and obey, and not that they disbelieve and disobey, because they [that is, the Mu'tazilites] asserted that willing the vile is vile, just as is the creating of it and bringing it into existence. We preclude that by saying that rather the vile is that which is acquired by the vile creature and is predicated of him. So with the Mu'tazilites most of the actions of creatures that occur are contrary to the Will of Allah. That position is indeed abominable. It was said of 'Amr b. 'Ubayd that he said, "No one ever silenced me as did a Magian who was on a ship with me. I said, Why dost thou not become a Muslim?' He said, 'Because Allah has not willed my becoming a Muslim; if He wills it, I shall become a Muslim' So I said to the Magian, 'Allah wills your becoming a Muslim but the Shaytans do not leave you alone' So the Magian replied, 'In that case I shall stay with the more victorious partner'" It is related that al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Hamadani came on a visit to his friend Ibn 'Abbad  with whom was al-Ustadh Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini. When he saw al-Ustadh, he said, "Praise be to Him who is far removed from wickedness (al-fahsha)" And al-Ustadh immediately replied, "Praise be to Him in whose kingdom nothing transpires but what He wills."

And the Mu'tazilites believed that command (al-amr) requires willing and that prohibition (al-nahy) requires non-willing. So they made the Belief of the Unbeliever the thing willed [by Allah] and his Unbelief that which was not willed. But we know that a thing may sometimes not be willed and yet commanded and may sometimes be willed and yet prohibited because of wise and beneficial matters which are within the knowledge of Allah; or because He is not to be asked concerning that which He does. Do you not perceive that a master whenever he wishes to demonstrate before those present with him the disobedience of his slave commands him to do something, and yet does not will that he do it? Both sides [the orthodox and the

Mu'tazilites] may hold fast to verses [which they cite] on the subject, and the door of interpretation is open to both parties.

His creatures have actions of choice for which they are rewarded/if they are actions of obedience

or punished/if they are actions of disobedience. This is unlike the position of the Jabrites, who claimed that no action at all belongs to the creature and that his movements are merely the movements of solid bodies (al-jamadat), the creature having no power over them, and no purpose or choice. And this is unsound, because of necessity we distinguish between the movement of grasping and that of trembling. We know that the first is by choice and the second is not. It is also unsound because were the creature not to have any part at all in action, it would not be sound to impose responsibility on him or to base his deserving reward and punishment on his actions, nor would it be sound to ascribe to him actions which demand for being real that purpose and choice precede them, that is, such actions as "he worshipped," "he fasted," and "he wrote," which are different from "the boy grew tall" and "his color darkened." The decisive statutes deny the position [of the JabritesJ as seen in the sayings of Allah, "A reward for that which they were doing" (Qur'an 32:17, 46:13, 56:23), "Whoever wills let him believe and whoever wills let him be an Unbeliever" (Qur'an 18:28). And there are other verses.

Objection may be raised that since the Knowledge and Will of Allah have been rendered universal it is absolutely certain that compulsion [of creatures] follows, for Knowledge and Will are either connected with the existence of the action and so it is necessary, or with the non-existence of the action and then it is impossible; and there can be no choice when there is necessity and impossibility. To this we reply that He knows and wills that the creature will do the action or not do it by his own choice, so there is no confusion about that. Or objection may be made that his act of free choice is either necessary or impossible, which fact is inconsistent with free choice. To this we reply that this position is impossible, for necessity by choice verifies choice as a reality and is not inconsistent with it. Furthermore, the position is contradicted by the actions of the Creator glorious is the mention of Him for His knowledge and Will are connected with His actions, so it follows that His action is necessary to Him.

Objection may be raised that there is no meaning to the statement that the creature acts by choice, unless he be the one who brings his actions into existence by purpose and will; and that it has already been shown that Allah is independent in creating actions and bringing them into existence; and also that it is a well-known fact that a thing over which someone has power does not come under two independent powers. We reply there is no use discoursing about the force and strength of this statement. We can only say that since it has been established by proof that the Creator is Allah, and that of necessity the power and will of the creature enter into some actions like the movement of grasping, though not into others like the movement of trembling, we needed to escape from this perplexing problem by saying that Allah is the creator (al-khaliq) of everything and the creature is an acquirer (kasib).

The verification of this position is that when the creature expends his power and will in action it is an acquisition (kasb) and when Allah brings it into existence following upon that, it is a creating (khalq), so the maqdur (the thing which is subject to power) comes under two powers but from two different standpoints. The act is a maqdur of Allah from the standpoint of being brought into existence (al-ijad), and a maqdur of the creature from the standpoint of acquisition (al-kasb). This statement is necessary from the meaning of the word "decreeing," even though we are unable to go beyond this in summarizing the expression used which already proves that the creature's action is by Allah's creating and bringing into existence exercised along with what the creature has of power and choice.

There are a number of ways of expressing the difference between the two things [that is, creating and acquisition]. Acquisition is that which occurs by the use of some instrument, but creating does not. Acquisition is a maqdur which occurs in the locus of its power, and creating is a maqdur which does not occur in the locus of its power, and it is not valid to separate acquistion from the one who has power over it; but it is valid to do so with creating.

And someone may object, "You have thereby established a co-partnership (al-sharika) [with Allah], the very thing with which you charge the Mu'tazilites." We reply that co-partnership is the coming together of two for a certain thing; then each may detach himself from the other along with that which is his own. So that would be like the partners of a village or a place, for example, just as though the creature were made a creator of his own acts and the Maker were made creator of all the rest of the accidents and the bodies. This is quite different from the position that something may be related to two things from two different standpoints; as for example a bit of ground belongs to Allah from the standpoint of creating and to creatures from the standpoint of the establishment of control over it; or just as the act of the creature is ascribed to Allah from the standpoint of creating and to the creature from the standpoint of acquisition.

And someone may object, saying, "How is it that the acquistion of the vile (al-qabih) is vile, vulgar, and necessarily deserving of blame and punishment, whereas the creating of it is not?" We reply that it is because it has been established that the Creator is wise, and because he does not create anything unless it has a praiseworthy outcome. Although we do not perceive it, we must hold that those actions which we deem vile sometimes have in them wise and beneficial matters, just as in the creation of the base and harmful bodies which give pain, whereas it is not so in the case of acquisition; for sometimes the good may be done and sometimes the vile. So together with the prohibition of that which is vile we make his acquisition of it vile and vulgar and necessarily deserving of blame and punishment.

And the good in these/that is, of the actions of the creatures. And the good is that which is connected with praise now and reward hereafter, or it may be better interpreted as that which is not connected with blame and punishment in order to include that which is permissible (al-mubah).

is by the good pleasure (rida) of Allah/that is, by His Will without any objection

and the vile in them/and it is that which is connected with blame now and punishment hereafter

is not by His good pleasure/ since there is objection to His having pleasure in it. Allah said, "And He does not take pleasure in the Unbelief of His creatures" (Qur'an 39:9). This means that Willing, Desiring, and Decreeing are connected with all actions, while good pleasure and desire and command are only connected with the good to the exclusion of the vile.

Chapter 10

THE CREATURE'S LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALLAH'S SUSTENANCE AND GUIDANCE

And ability accompanies the action, and it is the real essence of the power by which the action comes into being; and this word applies to the soundness of causes, instruments, and members of the body. And the validity of imposing a legal responsibility depends upon this ability, and the creature has no legal responsibility imposed upon him which is not in his capacity.

And the pain which exists in the one beaten as the consequence of being beaten by some man, or the state of being broken in glass as the consequence of its being broken by some man, and such things all that is something created by Allah. The creature has no part in the work of its creation, and a slain man is dead at his appointed time. The appointed time is one.

The forbidden thing is still Appointed Sustenance. Everyone receives in full his Appointed Sustenance whether from things permitted or forbidden; and it is inconceivable that a man will not eat his own Appointed Sustenance or that another than he will eat his Appointed Sustenance.

Allah leads astray whom He wills and guides aright whom He wills, and it is not incumbent on Allah to do that which is best for the creature.

And ability (al-istita'a) accompanies the action/ This is contrary to the position of the Mu'tazilites.

and it is the real essence of the power by which the action comes into being/ This is a reference to that which was mentioned by the author of al-Tabsira, in that ability is an accident which Allah creates in the animal, whereby he performs actions of choice, the ability being the cause ('ilia) of the action.

The Multitude (al-jumhur) hold that it is a condition (shart) for the performance of the action, but not its cause. In general, ability is an attribute which Allah creates [within the creature] following upon the soundness of the causes and the instruments when there is the purpose for acquiring the action. So if the creature purposes a good action Allah creates the power to do good, and if he purposes an evil action Allah creates the power to do evil [104] and he thus loses the power to do good and deserves blame and punishment. For this reason Allah blames the Unbelievers because they are lacking [in the ability] to hear.

If ability then is an accident, it is necessary that it be concomitant with the action and not prior to the action, otherwise it would take place without [his having] any ability and power over the action. This rests on what has already been said regarding the impossibility of the continuance of accidents. Objection may be raised as follows, "Suppose the impossibility of the continuance of accidents is admitted, still there is no dispute about the possibility of similar new accidents coming into being following upon the passing away of these; where then is the necessity for saying that the action occurs without there being any power?" In reply we say, "We claim that this is necessary only if the power by which [you say] the action takes place is that power which was there prior to the action; but if you make it a similar new power which is concomitant to the action, you thereby admit that the power by which the action is, can only be one that is concomitant with it. Then if you claim that there must have been similar powers prior to it, you must explain why it was impossible for the action to occur when the power first occurred.

Let us consider then what is to be said were we to suppose that the power which precedes the action continued until the time of the action either by similar new powers coming into being one after the other or by the continuous recurrence of accidents one after the other. If they say that the existence of the action is permissible through similar new powers coming into being one after the other, they abandon their first position whereby they made it permissible for the action to be concomitant with the power. Or if they say that the existence of the action is impossible in this way, then it follows that there was a making of a decision by someone and a preponderance of one thing over another without a determinant (murajjih) to make the preponderance, since the power remains unchanged in the state in which it was. But this conveys no meaning, for in the case of accidents it is impossible [that a change occur without a determinant].

Why then is the action caused by the power in the second case a necessary action and in the first case an impossible action? This is a matter for consideration, because those who say that ability precedes the action do not say that it is impossible for the power and the action to be concomitant in time; nor do they say that the origination of every action must be through a power absolutely prior to it in time, thus precluding the origination of the action at the same time as the origination of the power- all other conditions having been fulfilled.

This is also a matter for consideration, for it is permissible for the action in the first case to be impossible because of some unfulfilled condition or because of the existence of something that prevents the action, and yet in the second case to be necessary to fulfill the conditions although power is equally an attribute of the one possessing power in each case.

So some took the position that if the power, which gathers to itself all the conditions for making the impression (al-tathir) is meant by the word "ability," then the real fact is that it accompanies the action or else it precedes it.

As for the fact that it is impossible for accidents to continue: this is based on certain premises which are hard to explain. These are, first, that the continuance of a thing is something verified as real and superadded to it, second, that it is impossible for an accident to subsist in an accident, and third, that the two accidents cannot subsist together in a locus.

Since those who assert that ability precedes the action have made the deduction that the imposition of legal responsibility (al-taklif) occurs before the action, for of necessity the Unbeliever is legally responsible for Belief, and the one who neglects worship is legally responsible for worship after the time for it arrives; then if ability were not verified as real, it would follow that the one who is powerless is legally responsible, and that is unsound; so al-Nasafi referred to the refutation of this by saying,

and this word/that is, the expression "ability"

applies to the soundness of causes, instruments, and members of the body (al-jawarih)/ as in the saying of Allah, "And Allah demands of men Pilgrimage (hajj) to the House, of him who is able (istata'a) to find a way" (Qur'an 3:91). Objection may be raised that ability is an attribute of the one legally responsible, that the soundness of causes and instruments is not one of his attributes, and that how then is it valid to interpret ability as soundness? We reply that the purpose is the soundness of the causes and instruments which he possesses, so then ability may be predicated of the one who is legally responsible just as is this soundness. Therefore one may say that he is the possessor of soundness of causes and instruments. Because this compound expression is used, there is no derived name of the agent (ism fa'il) which may be predicated of him, which is not true of the word "ability."

And the validity of imposing a legal responsibility (al-taklif) depends upon this ability/which is the soundness of the causes and the instruments, not ability according to the first definition. If by powerlessness (al-'ajz) lack of ability is meant according to the first definition, we do not admit that it is impossible to impose responsibility on the one who is powerless. If it is understood to have the second meaning we do not admit the necessity of it, for it may be that the soundness of the causes and the instruments takes place prior to the action, even though the real essence of the power by which the action takes place has not yet come into being. Answer may be made that power is something potential (saliha) applicable to [either of] two contraries according to Abu Hanlfa, so that the power which is spent in Unbelief is the same power that is spent in Belief. There is no difference between them except in the connection which is made. This does not require a difference in the power itself, for the Unbeliever possesses power to believe, for which Belief he is legally responsible, only he has spent his power in Unbelief and by choice has wasted the opportunity of spending it in Belief, so he deserves blame and punishment. It is evident that in this answer there is an admission that power precedes the action, for one's power to believe while yet in the state of Unbelief is undoubtedly prior to Belief.

And if someone answers that the purpose of this statement is that even though the power is potentially applicable to two contraries, yet from the standpoint of connection it applies to only one of them- so that what must be concomitant to the action is the power connected with the action, and what must be concomitant to refraining from the action is the power connected with this refraining- so the power itself may be something antecedent and connected with the two contraries, we reply that it is inconceivable that there should be a dispute about this, nay rather it is futile. This is a matter which should be taken into consideration.

and the creature has no legal responsibility imposed upon him which is not in his capacity/ whether something impossible in itself like the uniting together of contraries, or possible in itself, but not possible for the creature, like the creation of a body. As for what is impossible on the basis that Allah knows something different or wills something different, as in the case of the Belief of the Unbeliever or the obedience of the disobedient, there is no disputing the fact that legal responsibility is imposed upon him, since this is something in the power of the one who is legally responsible when seen from his viewpoint. Then again it is a matter of agreement that there is no imposition of legal responsibility which is not in his capacity, as seen in the statement of Allah, "Allah does not impose upon a soul legal responsibility beyond its capacity" (Qur'an 2:286). There is also the command in His saying, "Tell me the names of these" (Qur'an 2:29). This was to baffle them, not to impose a legal responsibility. There is also the statement of Allah in which he spoke of the state of the Believers, "O our Lord, do not burden us beyond our ability"

(Qur'an 2:286). The meaning of "burden" here is not the imposing of legal responsibility but the introduction of limiting obstacles beyond their ability. The dispute is whether or not it is permissible [to impose a legal responsibility beyond the creature's ability]. The Mu'tazilites, disapproving of it on rational grounds, said that it was impossible. Al-Ash'ari permitted it because nothing which is from Allah is to be disapproved.

From the saying of Allah, "Allah does not impose upon a soul legal responsibility beyond its capacity" (Qur'an 2:286), the denial of its being permitted is sometimes inferred. The statement of this is that were it permissible to impose legal responsibility on a creature beyond its capacity, on the supposition that it actually occurred, something impossible would not necessarily follow. For of necessity the impossibility of al-lazim (the necessary) brings about the impossibility of al-malzum (the thing made necessary) in order to verify the meaning of al-luzum (necessity); but were this actually to occur it would necessarily follow that the Word of Allah is false. But that is impossible.

This is a telling point in showing that it is impossible for anything to occur if its non-occurrence is connected with the Knowledge, Will, and Choice of Allah. The solution of this question is that we do not admit in regard to everything possible in itself that, on the supposition that this possible thing occurred, it then follows that there was an impossible [as an alternative], and that this is necessary only were it [that is, the impossible] not precluded by something else which happens to it. Otherwise it would be permissible to say that the impossible is necessary on the basis of its being precluded by something else. Is it not seen that when Allah brought the world into existence by His power and choice, its non-existence was possible in itself, even though on the supposition that it occurred, the thing caused followed necessarily the complete cause? And this is impossible. And the upshot is that because something is possible in itself, then an impossible as an alternative does not necessarily follow on the supposition that the thing occurred. This is when we consider the essence of the thing; but when we consider something superadded to itself, we do not admit that there is no necessity for the impossible [as an alternative].

And the pain which exists in the one beaten as the consequence of being beaten by some man, or the state of being broken in glass as the consequence of its being broken by some man/The statement is limited in this way because it is valid that there be a ground for difference as to whether the creature has a part in it or not.

and such things/ as death, for example, as the consequence of killing

all that is something created by Allah/ because of what has already been said about Allah alone being the Creator and about all possible things being ascribed to Allah without there being any intermediary. The Mu'tazilites, in ascribing some actions to something other than Allah, said that if the action proceeds from the doer without the interposition of another action, then it results by way of immediate causality; otherwise it is by way of mediate causality (tawlid). The meaning of this is that the one action makes it necessary for him to do another action, as, for example, the motion of the hand necessitates the motion of the key in the hand; so pain is derived from the blow and the state of being broken from breaking. There are not two things created by Allah. We hold that everything is by the creation of Allah.

The creature has no part in the work of its creation/It would have been better not to have limited the statement by saying "creation," for in those acts resulting from mediate causality which they call mutawallidat the creature has no part at all. As for creation, [he has no part in it] because it is impossible for the creature to create; and as for acquirement [of the action, he has no part in it] because it is impossible for the creature to acquire that which does not subsist within the locus of his power. For this reason the creature is not enabled to do anything of this because he has not obtained this power, which is in contrast to actions of choice.

and a slain man is dead at his appointed time ('ajal)/ That is to say, at the time decreed for his death. This is unlike the assertion of some of the Mu'tazilites, who say that Allah cut short his appointed time. We believe that Allah has decided the appointed times of His creatures according to His knowledge without any changing of His mind, as is to be seen in the verse, "Whenever their appointed time comes, they will neither delay nor outstrip it an hour" (Qur'an 7:32, 16:62). The Mu'tazilites objected to this, citing traditions which mention the fact that some actions of obedience increase one's age; and also saying that if one should die thus at his appointed time, then his slayer would not deserve blame or punishment, nor would the payment of blood-money or chastisement be necessary, since the death of the slain man is neither by the creation of the slayer nor by his acquiring it.

The answer to the first objection is that Allah knew that, were the man not to perform such and such an obedient action, his age would be forty years; but He knew that he would perform it, so his age is seventy years. This increase in his age is related to that action of obedience because Allah knew that were it not for this action there would not have been an increase in his age. To the second objection the answer is that the necessity for punishing the slayer and making him accountable for his deed is linked up with service to Allah, because the slayer committed a thing forbidden by Allah and thereby acquired the action which resulted in death to the one slain by the customary way of things, for slaying is the action of the slayer by way of acquisition, although it is not his by way of creation.

And death subsists in the dead man and is created by Allah, and the creature has no part in it either in creating it or in acquiring it. This is based on the fact that death is existential (wujudi), in proof of which there is the statement of Allah, "He created death and life" (Qur'an 67:2). The majority, however, hold that it is non-existential ('adami) and that the meaning of the creation of death is that He ordained it.

The appointed time is one/This is unlike the position of al-Ka'bi, who asserted that the slain man had two appointed times, the one being slain and the other death, so that were he not slain he would live until his appointed time which is his death. This is also unlike the position of the Philosophers, who asserted that an animal has a natural appointed time, which is the time of its death through the dissolution of its moisture and the snuffing out of its heat, both of which are implanted in it, and other appointed times which cut it off contrary to the requirements of its nature through plagues and sicknesses.

The forbidden thing (al-haram) is still Appointed Sustenance (rizq)/ for Appointed Sustenance is that which Allah conveys to the animal so that he eats it. This may sometimes be a lawful thing (halal) and sometimes a thing forbidden (haram). This is a better way of defining Appointed Sustenance than by saying that it is that by which the animal is nourished, because such a definition lacks any relating of Appointed Sustenance to Allah, whereas He must be taken into consideration from the very meaning of the term. With the Mu'tazilites the forbidden thing is not Appointed Sustenance, because they explain it sometimes as something possessed which is eaten by the possessor, and sometimes as that by which one may be benefited and that can only be something lawful. But it follows then according to their first definition that what the beast eats is not Appointed Sustenance. And according to both definitions he who eats what is forbidden throughout his whole life is not sustained by Allah at all.

This difference of opinion rests upon the question of taking into consideration the relationships which Allah bears to Appointed Sustenance. [They reason as follows trying to show the fallacy of our position]: there is no provider of Appointed Sustenance save Allah alone; the creature deserves blame and punishment for eating forbidden things; that which is supported by Allah is not a vile thing, and so [they say that we should hold that] the one who does this is not deserving of blame and punishment. The refutation of this argument is that the creature has made a wrong contact with the causes of the action through his free choice.

Everyone receives in full his Appointed Sustenance whether from things permitted or forbidden/ for he obtains nourishment from both of them

and it is inconceivable that a man will not eat his own Appointed Sustenance or that another than he will eat his Appointed Sustenance/for a person must eat what Allah has ordained as nourishment for him, and it is impossible that another than he eat it, but if Appointed Sustenance means possession, then it is not impossible [that one's Appointed Sustenance may be the possession of another].

Allah leads astray (yudillu) whom He wills and guides aright (yahdi) whom He wills/ meaning that He does so by creating the acts of going astray (al-dalala) and being guided (al-ihtida') , for He alone is Creator. In conditioning [the leading astray and guiding aright] upon His will there is an allusion to the fact that the meaning of guidance is not "to explain the way of Reality," for the explanation of the way of Reality is something general for everyone; nor is leading astray an expression for "finding the creature astray" or his "being called astray," since to connect these things with the will of Allah would mean nothing. Indeed, guidance is figuratively related to the Prophet by way of assigning causation just as it is ascribed to the Qur'an and leading astray may be ascribed to Satan figuratively just as it is to idols (al-asnam) [yet it is Allah who leads astray and guides aright]. Moreover, expressions in the statements of the Early Theologians such as "With us guidance is the creation of being guided" and "Allah guided him but he was not guided" are figurative terms for "indication of the way" (al-dalala) and "the call to be guided."

But with the Mu'tazilites all of these usages are "a declaration of the right way." This position, though, is unsound because of the statement of Allah, [in] "Verily thou dost not guide him whom thou lovest" (Qur'an 28:56), and because of the statement of the Prophet, "O Allah, guide my people." Muhammad said this in spite of the fact that he had declared the way and called them to be rightly guided. It is well known that guidance (al-hidaya) with the Mu'tazilites means the indication (al-dalala) of the way, which indication actually reaches the goal; but with us guidance is the indication of a way which reaches the goal, whether it actually is arrived at and one is really guided or not.

and it is not incumbent on Allah to do that which is best for the creature/ otherwise He would not have created the poor Unbeliever who is tormented in this world and the next; nor would He have shown favor to His creatures and deserved thanks for guidance, and poured out all kinds of good things upon them, for these things would be the performance of a duty incumbent upon Him. And [furthermore were this not true] the favor of Allah to the

Prophet would not be above that of His favor to Abu Jahl- Allah curse him - since He should go to the limit in doing the best within His power for each of them. And [also were it not true] there would be no meaning to the question of a prophet's being preserved from error (al-isma), of succor [in time of trouble], and of the exposure of some to harm and the giving to some abundance of fruitfulness and ease. What Allah failed to do in the case of each one would be for each one something of a cause of corruption from which Allah ought to desist; nor would the power of Allah continue to bear any relation to the welfare of creatures, since He would have performed that which is incumbent on Him.

And I swear that the causes leading to corruption which are found in this principle I mean, that it is incumbent on Allah to do the best for his creatures rather, [one might say], in the most of the Mu'tazilite principles, are so clear that they cannot be hidden and are so many that they cannot be counted. This fact is because of their limited consideration of the various kinds of knowledge dealing with divine matters and because by temperament they are firmly intent on finding an analogy between the seen and the unseen. The extreme tenacity with which they hold to their position is because of their belief that for Allah to forsake that which is for the creature's best interest means niggardliness and foolishness [on His part].

The refutation of this is that since His generosity, His wisdom, His grace, and His knowledge of the outcome of events have been established by decisive proofs, so if there is any denial of good to the creature by the one who has the right to deny, this then is absolute justice and wisdom.

Then what, pray, is the meaning of something being incumbent on Allah, since it does not mean in this case that he who forsakes the duty incumbent on him deserves blame and punishment? This is plainly so. There is no need then for even supposing that something contrary to what is incumbent on Him proceeds from Him, since He is not enabled to forsake that which is incumbent on Him on the basis that this requires something impossible in the way of foolishness, or ignorance, or nonsense, or niggardliness, or something like that. This position of theirs rejects the principle of choice and is a leaning towards that type of philosophy the shame of which is quite evident.

Chapter 11

SOME ESCHATOLOGICAL REALITIES

The punishment of the grave for Unbelievers and for some of the disobedient Believers, and the bliss of the obedient in die grave by that which Allah knows and wills, and the questioning of Munkar and Nakir are established by proofs based on authority. And the Quickening of the Dead is a Reality, the Weighing is a Reality, the Book is a Reality, the Questioning is a Reality, the Tank is a Reality, and the Bridge is a Reality; the Garden is a Reality and the Fire is a Reality, and they both are created, existing and continuing; they shall not pass away, nor shall their inhabitants pass away.

The punishment ('adhab) of the grave for Unbelievers and for some of the disobedient Believers/ Al-Nasafi specified some of the Believers, for there are some of them whom Allah does not will to punish, so they will not be punished.

and the bliss (tan'im) of the obedient in the grave by that which Allah knows and wills/ This statement is better than that of the majority of books, which are confined to establishing the punishment of the grave rather than the bliss, on the ground that there are many more statutes (nusus) referring to it and that the people of the grave in general are Unbelievers and disobedient, so it is more fitting to mention the punishment.

and the questioning of Munkar and Nakir/They are two angels who enter the grave and ask the creature concerning his Lord, his religion, and his prophet. Al-Sayyid Abu Shujja said that children are questioned, and some say also that the prophets are questioned.

are established/ that is, every one of these things

by proofs based on authority (al-sam'iya)/ because they are possible things which the Veracious One has narrated concerning things spoken of by the statutes. Allah said, "The Fire, to which they will be exposed morning and evening, and the day when the Hour shall arise 'Bring in the people of Pharaoh (Fir'awn) for the severest torture'" (Qur'an 40:49), and "They were drowned and made to enter the Fire" (Qur'an 71:25). The Prophet said, "Avoid contact with urine, for the punishment of the grave in general comes from it." The Prophet also said that the statement of Allah, "Allah will establish those who believe with His established word in this world and the next" (Qur'an 14:32), was revealed in regard to the punishment of the grave; and that whenever [the occupant of] it is asked, "Who is thy Lord, what is thy religion, and who is thy prophet?" he should reply, "My Lord is Allah, my religion is Islam, and my prophet is Muhammad." The Prophet said, "Whenever a dead man is placed in his grave, two black angels with blue eyes come to him, one being called Munkar and the other Nakir" and so on to the end of the tradition. The Prophet said, "The grave is either one of the meadows of the Garden or one of the pits of the Fires." In general the traditions which have come down on this subject and on many of the states of the next world are mutawatir in meaning, although the individual traditions taken separately do not attain the rank of tawatur.

Some of the Mu'tazilites and the Rawafid denied the punishment of the grave because a dead man is a solid body (jamad) devoid of life and comprehension, so punishing him is impossible. The answer to this is that it is possible for Allah to create in all or in some of the parts a kind of life such as would be able to comprehend the pain of punishment or the enjoyment of bliss. This does not require that the spirit (al-ruh) be returned to the body nor that it move or be troubled or show any mark of punishment; for even the drowned man in water, or the one devoured [and] in the bellies of beasts, or the one [who hangs] crucified in the air is punished, although we do not see it. Whoever ponders the wonders of Allah in the kingdoms of this world (mulk) and of Heaven (malakut) and the marvels of His Power and His Might (jabarut) will not consider such things improbable, let alone impossible.

Know then that since the states (ahwal) of the grave are midway between this world and the next, al-Nasafi put this in a section apart and then went on to explain the Reality of the great Assembly (al-hashr) and the details connected with the matters of the next world. The proof of all these is that they are possible things about which the Veracious One has informed [us] and of which the Book and the Tradition speak, so they are established facts. He explained the Reality of each of them for the sake of verifying them, for emphasizing them, and in order that their importance may be realized.

And the Quickening of the Dead (al-ba'th)/ that is to say that Allah quickens the dead from the grave by gathering their original parts and restoring their spirits to them.

is a Reality/ because of the statements of Allah, "Then on the Day of Resurrection (yawm al-qiyama) you will be quickened" (Qu'ran 23:16), and, "Say, 'He who formed them at first will revive them'" (Qur'an 36:79). And there are many other decisive statutes which speak of the

Day when the bodies will be assembled.

The Philosophers denied the Quickening of the Dead on the basis that the restoration of the non-existent thing (al-ma'dum) with its substance is impossible. Although there is no proof worthy of consideration for their statement it does not harm the purpose [of the Quickening], for our meaning is that Allah gathers the original parts of man and restores the spirit to him, whether or not that is called the restoring of the nonexistent thing with its substance. In this way their supposition falls down, which is that if a man ate a man so that he became part of the one who ate him, then those parts must be restored in both of them, and that is impossible; or in one of them only, and thus the other is not restored with all his parts. This [supposition falls down] because the restored parts are the original parts continuing from the earliest of one's life until its end; and the parts eaten are superfluous in the eater and not original.

Someone may object that this statement admits that there is transmigration (al-tanasukh), for the second body is not the first because tradition relates of the people of the Garden that they are without hair on their bodies and beardless, and ornamented with kohl; and that the molar tooth of one of the people of jahannam (Hell) is like the mountain of Uhud. So from this it is seen that in every school of thought [the idea of] transmigration has a firm footing. But we reply that transmigration would only be necessary were the second body not a creation out of the original parts of the first body. If anything like that is called transmigration the dispute is only in the name; and there is no proof that it is impossible to restore the spirit to such a body; but the proofs rest on the fact of its reality, whether or not this is called transmigration.

the Weighing (al-wazn) is a Reality/ This is based on the statement of Allah, "The Weighing on that day is the Reality" (Qur'an 7:8). The Balance (al-mizan) is the expression used for that by which the amounts of the deeds are known. Reason falls short of comprehending the manner in which the Balance works. The Mu'tazilites deny the weighing because deeds are accidents and so, even if they were restored, they could not be weighed; and since they are known to Allah it is nonsense to weigh them.

The answer to them is that it is the books of deeds that are weighed according to what has come down in tradition, so there need be no difficulty. Since we admit that there are purposes in the acts caused by Allah, perchance there is some wisdom in the Weighing which we do not discover, and just because we have not discovered the wisdom of it, it does not necessarily make it to be nonsense.

the Book (al-kitab)/ in which are established the acts of obedience and disobedience belonging to creatures. The Believers receive their books in their right hands and the Unbelievers [theirs] in their left hands and behind their backs.

is a Reality/This is based on the saying of Allah, "We shall produce a book for him on the day of Resurrection, offered to him wide open" (Qur'an 17:14), and His saying, "Whosoever is presented with his book in his right hand, will be easily accounted with" (Qur'an 84:7). The author did not mention the Accounting (al-hisab) considering [the mention] of the Book as sufficient. The Mu'tazilites denied the Book, asserting that it was nonsense. The answer to them has already been given.

the Questioning (al-su'al) is a Reality/ This is based on the saying of Allah, "We shall certainly question them all" (Qur'an 15:92). There is also the statement of the Prophet, "Allah will bring the Believer near and He shall place over him His wing (kanaf) and cover him and then say, 'Dost thou know such and such a sin? Dost thou know such and such a sin?' Then he will answer, 'Yes, my Lord.' This goes on until He makes him confess his sins, and see himself lost; then Allah will say, 'I have veiled thy sins over thee in this world, and I will forgive them to thee this Day.' He will be given the Book of his good deeds. But the Unbelievers and the Hypocrites (al-mundfiqun) shall be proclaimed above the heads of all creatures, 'These are they who denied their Lord, is not the curse of Allah on all wrongdoers?'" (Qur'an 11:21).

the Tank (al-hawd) is a Reality/ This is based on the saying of Allah, "Verily we have given thee al-kawthar" ( Qur'an 108:1), and also on the saying of the Prophet, "My tank is a month's journey long, and its corners are symmetrical, its water is whiter than milk and more fragrant than musk, and its goblets outnumber the stars of the heavens. Whoever drinks from them never thirsts." There are numerous traditions about the Tank.

and the Bridge (al-sirat) is a Reality/ It is a causeway stretched over the middle of hell (jahannam), finer than a hair, sharper than a sword, over which the people of the Garden will pass, while the feet of the people of the Fire will slip on it. Most of the Mu'tazilites deny it on the grounds that it is impossible to cross such a bridge and that were it possible it would be a punishment for the Believers. The answer is that Allah is Powerful to make possible the crossing of the Bridge. And He makes the way easy for the Believers so that some go over as quickly as swift lightning and others as a gust of wind, while others go over like a steed, and so on according to the traditions on this subject.

the Garden (al-janna) is a Reality and the Fire (al-nar) is a Reality/ for the verses (al-ayat) and the traditions (al-aaddith) which have come down regarding these two matters are too plain to be hidden and too many to be numbered. And those who deny the Garden maintain that since its breadth is described as being the breadth of the heavens and the earth it is therefore an impossibility in the world of elements, and in the world of spheres the insertion of one world into another or into another world outside it necessitates the passing through an opening (al-kharq) and its joining together again (al-ilti'am), and that [they say] is unsound. We reply, "This is based on the corrupt foundation of your position," and we have already spoken of that in its proper place.

and they both/ that is, the Garden and the Fire

are created/ now

existing/ He said this for sake of repetition and emphasis. Most of the Mu'tazilites assert that they will only be created on the day of Recompense. To support our position there is the story of Adam and Eve and their being made to live in the Garden. There are also the verses which plainly show the preparation of the Garden and the Fire, such as, "prepared for the pious, prepared for the Unbelievers" (Qur'an 3:126, 127). [They are to be taken according to their evident meaning] since there is no necessity for deviating from what is the plain teaching [of the statutes]. But if this position is opposed by [the citation] of a statement of Allah such as, "This is the final abode we will prepare for those who do not desire an exalted place in the earth nor corruption" (Qur'an 28:83), we reply that it is possible for the tense of the verb to be present and continuous. If it were admitted [that the reference above is to other than the present continuous tense] the story of Adam remains unaffected by the one who opposes [this position]. They say that if the Garden and the Fire were in existence now, it would not be permissible to speak of the destruction (halak) of the food of the Garden, because of the statement of Allah, "Its food is everlasting (daim)" (Qur'an 13:35). They also say that the necessary [conclusion in that case that its food be not destroyed] is unsound because of the statement of Allah, "Everything perishes except His face" (Qur'an 28:88). But we reply that it is clearly impossible for the food of the Garden in its substance to last forever, but "everlasting" here means that if any of its food passes away something takes its place. This is not inconsistent with the destruction momentarily of some of it, although destruction does not require passing away (al-fana'), but merely passing beyond the limit of its being used. Even were it admitted [that everything actually perishes except the face of Allah] it is permissible that the meaning is "every possible thing," for it perishes within the limit of its essence. This means that possible existence when considered from the standpoint of necessary existence ranks as non-existence.

and continuing: they shall not pass away, nor shall their inhabitants pass away (yafna)/ That is to say, everlasting; no perpetual non-existence befalls them, because of the statement of Allah in regard to both parties [that is, those of the Garden and those of the Fire], "They abide forever in it" (Qur'an 4:60, 121, 167). But as for what has been said about the Garden and the Fire being destroyed even though for a moment in order to verify the statement of Allah that "Everything perishes except His face" (Qur'an 28:88): this meaning is not inconsistent with their abiding. You well know that there is nothing in the verse to indicate passing away.

Chapter 12

SINS

A, great sin does not remove from Belief the creature who believes, nor does it lead him into Unbelief. Allah does not forgive the one who joins another with Himself, but He pardons whomsoever He wills any sin, whether great or small, except this.

The punishment of a small sin is permissible, and also the pardon of a great sin, if it is not of the nature of considering lawful what is forbidden; for that is Unbelief. The intercession of the Messengers is established by narratives in the case of those who commit great sins.

And those of the Believers who commit great sins do not remain forever in the Fire.

A great sin (al-kabira)/ The traditions differ about this term. It is related by Ibn 'Umar- Allah be well pleased with both father and son- that the great sins are said to be nine; namely, polytheism (al-shirk bi 'llah), unlawful manslaughter, slandering a chaste woman by a charge of adultery, adultery, fleeing from war against Unbelievers, magic, devouring the property of an orphan, disobedience to Muslim parents, and contravening the ordinances concerning the sacred territory (al-ilhad fi'l-haram). Abu Hurayra added to these usury, and 'Ali added stealing and wine drinking. A great sin has been said to mean anything the corruption of which is like the corruption of the things already mentioned or more than it; or it is that concerning which the

Law threatens a punishment; also, every disobedience in which the creature persists is a great sin, and everything for which he asks pardon is a small sin (saghira). The author of al-Kifaya said that in reality the two are relative terms, which cannot be defined separately. Thus every disobedience, if it is compared to that which ranks above it, is small; and if to that which is below it, is great.

The absolutely great sin is Unbelief, since there is no offence greater than it. In general the meaning of "great sin" here includes other things besides Unbelief.

does not remove from Belief the creature who believes/ because assent, which is the real essence of Belief, continues. This is unlike the position of the Mu'tazilites in that they assert that whoever commits a great sin is neither a Believer nor an Unbeliever. This is the rank which they make between the two ranks [that of the Believer and that of the Unbeliever] on the basis, according to them, that works are a part of the real essence of Belief.

nor does it lead him/ that is, the creature who believes

into Unbelief/ This is unlike the Kharijites, for they took the position that one who commits a great sin or even a small sin is an Unbeliever and that there is no middle position between Belief and Unbelief.

We have some points to stress. The first, the statement of which comes later, is that the real essence of Belief is the assent of the heart (al-tasdiq al-qalbi). So then the Believer is not removed from being described by Belief through doing that which is inconsistent with it. And merely persevering in a great sin because appetite, or an outburst of anger, or indignation, or even laziness got the better of him is not inconsistent with Belief whenever it is joined with the fear of punishment, the hope of forgiveness, and the resolution to repent. But whenever it is by way of making lawful the unlawful (al-istihlal) or making light of it, it is Unbelief because it is a sign of denial (al-takdhib). There is no doubt that the Lawgiver made some disobedient acts an indication of denial. This is known from proofs based on the Law, as seen in such acts as prostration to an idol, throwing the Sacred Volume (al-mushaf) amidst filthy things, uttering words of Unbelief, and other things which are established by proofs to be Unbelief. And in this there is the solution of what has been stated, in that if Belief is an expression for assent and confession, the one who assents and confesses does not become an Unbeliever by committing any of the acts or utterances of Unbelief so long as denial or doubt on his part is not established.

The second point is that the verses and the traditions apply the term "Believer" to the disobedient, as seen in the sayings of Allah. "O ye who believe, retaliation for the slain is prescribed for you" (Qur'an 2:173). "O ye who believe, turn to Allah in sincere repentence" (Qur'an 66:8). "If two parties of the Believers are carrying on warfare against one another, etc."

(Qur'an 49:9). The verses on this subject are many.

The third point is the Agreement of the Muslim people (al-umma) from the time of the Prophet till now that worship (al-sala) be performed over any one of the People of the qibla [worshiping in the direction of Mecca] who dies unrepentant. And prayer (al-du'a) for them and petition for their forgiveness are made with full knowledge of their having committed great sins; although it is understood that this is not permissible in the case of one who is not a Believer.

The Mu'tazilites objected on two grounds. The first was that the Muslim people, after agreeing that he who has committed a great sin is an evil-doer (fasiq), differed as to whether he is a Believer, which is the position of the people of the Approved Way and the Community; or an Unbeliever, which is the position of the Kharijites; or a hypocrite (munafiq), which is the position of al-Hasan al-Basri. Therefore [say the Mu'tazilites] we hold to the point upon which there is agreement and forego the point in dispute, saying that he is an evil-doer, neither a Believer, nor an Unbeliever, nor a hypocrite. The answer to them is that this position is [only] saying anew that which contradicts the position on which the Fathers agreed, namely that there is no [middle] rank between the two ranks; so it is unsound.

The second [of the Mu'tazilite objections] is that he [who commits a great sin] is not a Believer. They based this on the statement of Allah, "Was the Believer like the evil-doer?" (Qur'an 32:18) where the Believer is contrasted with the evil-doer; and on the statement of the Prophet, "The adulterer, when he commits adultery does not commit adultery being a Believer,"  and also his statement, "He who is devoid of trustworthiness (amana) is devoid of Belief (iman)". They also say that anyone who commits a great sin is not an Unbeliever, because of the mutawatir tradition that the Muslim people did not kill him, nor did they carry out the judgments in his case regarding apostates, but they buried him in a Muslim cemetery. The answer to this is that the meaning of "evil-doer" in the verse referred to (Qur'an 32:18) is "Unbeliever" since Unbelief is one of the greatest of evil deeds. The tradition that has been handed down in this connection is stated in strong and emphatic language in order to counsel strongly against disobedience. This is by way of proof from the verses and traditions which indicate that the evil-doer is a Believer inasmuch as the Prophet said so to Abu Dharr to his great humiliation when he asked repeatedly in this connection, "And if he commits adultery and steals?"

But the Kharijites objected, citing the statutes which clearly say that the evil-doer is an Unbeliever, such as, "And those who do not judge according to what Allah has sent down, those are the Unbelievers" (Qur'an 5:48), and the verse, "And those who become Unbelievers after that, those are the evil-doers" (Qur'an 24:54), They cited also the statement of the Prophet,

"Whoever forsakes worship intentionally has become an Unbeliever." They also cite statutes which say that punishment applies to the Unbeliever such as the statements of Allah, "Punishment is for him who denied and turned his back" (Qur'an 20:50), and, "None shall burn in it except the most wretched, who denied and turned his back" (Qur'an 92:15-16), and, "Verily this day shame and evil shall be on the Unbelievers" (Qur'an 16:29). And there are other verses. The answer [to the Kharijites] is that the literal meaning is set aside by the statutes, which [definitely] say that he who commits a great sin is not an Unbeliever, and by the settled Agreement which is according to what has already been said. The Kharijites are secessionists from the settled position of Agreement, and therefore no recognition is to be made of them.

Allah does not forgive the one who joins another with Himself/ This is by the Agreement of [all] Muslims. However, they disagreed as to whether or not forgiveness of ishrak [that is, the joining of another to Him] is permissible on the basis of Reason. Some took the position that it is permissible on the basis of Reason, but from authoritative proof it is known not to be permissible; while some took the position that it is impossible on the basis of Reason since wisdom demands a distinction between the doer of wickedness and the doer of good. Since Unbelief is the extreme offense, it is impossible to permit the forgiveness of ishrak or to lift the ban from it at all, so it does not admit of being pardoned and cleared of the damage done. The

Unbeliever also has the conviction that this is a Reality and does not seek pardon and forgiveness; so it is unwise to pardon him. Also this is a conviction which, in contrast with the rest of the offenses, has to do with eternity (al-abad) so it demands a recompense that shall be to eternity.

but He pardons whomsoever He wills any sin, whether great or small, except this/ whether accompanied by repentance or not. This is unlike the position of the Mu'tazilites. In the statement of this judgment consideration is to be given to that type of verse which indicates that this has been established. The verses and traditions giving this meaning are many. The

Mu'tazilites applied these especially to small sins and to great sins accompanied by repentance. They held firmly to two points. First there are the verses and traditions which have come down regarding the threatening of the disobedient. And the reply [to the Mu'tazilites] is that these verses and traditions, on the supposition that they have a general application, indicate only that forgiveness may take place rather than that it necessarily does. Since there are many statutes that have to do with pardon, there is specified the sinner who is forgiven in general terms, the being threatened [with punishment].

Some assert that the non-fulfillment of a threat is a favor permissible to Allah. However, the Verifiers, who hold to the opposite of this, say, "How is this possible since it is a changing (tabdif) of Allah's word, and Allah has said, 'The word which comes from me changes not'?" (Qur'an

50:28).

In the second place the Mu'tazilites say that should the sinner know that he was not to be punished for his sin, that would only establish him in his sin and incite others to sin. This is inconsistent with the wisdom of [Allah in] sending Messengers. The answer to this is that the mere possibility of pardon does confirm the opinion [of some] that there is no punishment at all in addition to the [fact that we have] knowledge [that there is]. How [do they say this] when being threatened [with punishment] in general is accompanied by the declaration that punishment will very probably occur when related to each individual case? For this reason, the author considered it sufficient to give warning.

The punishment of a small sin is permissible/ whether or not the one who committed it avoided a great sin, because it comes under the category of the statement of Allah, "And He forgives less than this to whomsoever He wills" (Qur'an 4:51, 116), and, "He does not pass by a small sin nor a great one without counting them" (Qur'an 18:47). And counting is only by way of questioning and of giving recompense. There are other statements [in proof of this] in the verses and the traditions. Some of the Mu'tazilites took the position that if one avoided great sins it is not permissible to punish him. This does not mean that it is impossible on the basis of Reason, but that it is not permissible for it to happen, since in proofs based on authority there is ground to believe that it does not happen. There is the statement of Allah for this, "If ye avoid great sins (kaba'ir) which are forbidden you, we shall blot out your faults" (Qur'an 4:35). Answer is made that the great sin which is absolute is Unbelief because it is the perfect sin. The noun is plural

[kaba'ir, in the verse above] because of the different kinds of Unbelief, even though all are of one degree from the standpoint of judgment; or the statement is of individual sins subsisting in the individuals addressed. This is according to what has been fixed by the rule that putting a plural alongside a plural demands the separation of the units into units, just as we say, "The people (al-qawm) rode their beasts and wore their clothes."

and also the pardon (al-'afw) of a great sin/ He has already mentioned this but he repeated it that it might be understood that the neglect to punish sin may be termed "pardon" just as it may be termed "forgiveness" (almaghfira), and that the following statement might be connected to it.

if it is not of the nature of considering lawful what is forbidden; for that is Unbelief/ since in it there is a denial that is inconsistent with assent. In this way are interpreted the statutes which indicate that the disobedient are made to remain forever in the Fire and that they are deprived of the term "Belief."

The intercession of the Messengers is established by narratives in the case of those who commit great sins/ by the narratives widely spread abroad (al-mustafid). is This is unlike the position of the Mu'tazilites. It rests on what has already been stated, namely, that pardon and forgiveness are permissible without intercession, so how much more permissible they would be with it! But the Mu'tazilites held that when pardon is not permissible, neither is intercession. We have on this the statements of Allah, "Ask pardon for thy sin and for the Believers, both men and women" (Qur'an 47:21), and, "Then the intercession of the intercessors will not avail them" (Qur'an 74:49). This kind of statement indicates that intercession is established in general; otherwise there would be no meaning in denying the value in it for Unbelievers, when the purpose is to render vile their state and to verify as certain their misfortune; for in such a position there is a demand that they [who are Unbelievers] be stamped in some particular way rather than by something that is a general characteristic of them and others as well. This does not mean that connecting the judgment [regarding intercession for those who commit great sins] with the Unbeliever indicates that it is not connected with anyone else, so that answer might be made that this is raising an argument only against the one who takes the sense to be that Allah does not carry out His threat. There is also [as a proof of intercession for Muslims who have committed great sins] the statement of the Prophet, "My intercession is for those of my people who have committed great sins." This tradition is well known (mashhur); moreover, there are traditions which are mutawatir as to meaning on the subject of intercession.

The Mu'tazilites objected [to this conception of intercession], quoting such statements of Allah as, "Dread the day when in nothing a soul shall render satisfaction for a soul, nor shall any intercession be received for it" (Qur'an 2:45), and, "The wicked shall have no friend nor intercessor who shall be obeyed" (Qur'an 40:19). The answer [to their position] is that although we admit that these verses apply in general to persons, times and states, yet there must be a special application to Unbelievers here to make the proofs consistent (jam'an bayn al-adilla). And when the foundation for pardon and intercession became established in Islam by decisive proofs from the Book, the Sunna, and Agreement, the Mu'tazilites claimed that the small sins were pardoned absolutely and the great sins by repentance and through intercession to augment the reward [of Believers]. Both of these claims are unsound. The first is unsound, because neither he who is repentant nor he who has committed a small sin and abstained from a great sin deserves punishment according to them, so pardon means nothing. The statutes indicate in the second place that intercession has the meaning of asking pardon for an offense.

And those of the Believers who commit great sins do not remain forever in the Fire/although they die without repentance, by reason of the statement of Allah, "Whoever has done an atom's worth of good shall behold it" (Qur'an 99:8). And Belief itself is a good work, so it is impossible for the Believer to behold the reward of it before entering the Fire and then to enter the Fire to remain there forever. That is unsound by Agreement, so al-Nasafi specified the exit from the Fire. There are also other statements of Allah in support of this. "Allah promised to the Believers, both men and women, Gardens beneath which the rivers flow" (Qur'an 9:73). "Verily those who believe and do good works have the gardens of Paradise (al-firdaws) for a resting place" (Qur'an 18:107). Similar statutes indicate that the Believer is of the people of the Garden, as well as other things which have already been stated, such as that the creature is not removed from Belief because of disobedience and that remaining forever in the Fire is the severest of punishments. Since the Fire has been made the recompense for Unbelief, which is the greatest of offenses, were others than the Unbeliever so recompensed [and remain forever in the Fire] that would be more than their offense deserves and therefore an injustice to them.

The Mu'tazilites took the position that the one who is consigned to the Fire remains in it forever, for he is either an Unbeliever or the unrepentant one who has committed a great sin; since from what we have seen of their principles the person preserved from error (al-ma'sum), the repentant one, and the one who commits a small sin if he has avoided great sins are not of the people of the Fire. The Unbeliever remains forever in the Fire on the basis of Agreement and so also [they say] does the unrepentant who commits a great sin, for two reasons. The first is that he deserves such punishment as a genuine everlasting injury to him, and this punishment is inconsistent with his deserving a reward, which is a genuine, everlasting benefit.

The answer to this is to preclude the restriction of the meaning of "everlasting," yea rather to preclude the meaning of "deserves" [such punishment] since what they mean to say is that there "necessarily follows" [such punishment]. But reward is only an act of grace from Allah, and punishment an act of justice; if He wills He pardons, and if He wills He punishes for a time and then causes him to enter the Garden. The second reason [for the unrepentant who has committed a great sin remaining in the Fire] is that there are the statutes which indicate that he remains forever in the Fire, like the statements of Allah, "Whoever kills a Believer purposely, his reward is Jahannam; forever he remains in it" (Qur'an 4:95), and, "Whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger and transgresses His restrictive ordinances, him He makes enter the Fire; forever he remains in it" (Qur'an 4:18), and, "Whoever acquires an evil, and he whose sin environs him those are the dwellers of the Fire; forever they remain in it" (Qur'an 2:75). And the answer [to the Mu'tazilites] is that the one who kills a Believer because he is a Believer can only be an Unbeliever, and so also is anyone who transgresses all the restrictive ordinances and so also the one whom sin environs and surrounds from every side. Even were the Mu'tazilite position to be admitted, the term "abiding forever" is sometimes used to express an extended period, just as they say "perpetual imprisonment." Also were their position admitted [as a rational one] it nevertheless opposes the statutes, which indicate that abiding is not forever as already stated.

Chapter 13

BELIEF

Belief is assent to that which he brought from Allah and confession of it. As for works, they increase in and of themselves, but Belief neither increases nor decreases.

And Belief and Islam are one. And whenever assent and confession are found in the creature, it is right for him to say, "I am a Believer in reality," and it is not fitting that he should say, "I am a Believer, if Allah wills."

The happy one sometimes becomes miserable and the miserable one sometimes becomes happy; and the changing is in happiness and misery, not in making happy and making miserable, for these are both attributes of Allah and there is no alteration in Allah and His attributes.

Belief (al-iman)/linguistically is assent (al-tasdiq), that is to say, acknowledging (al-idh'an) the judgment of a narrator, accepting it, and considering it to be veracious. Iman is the noun on the measure of if'al from al-amn (safety, security) as though the real meaning of "he believed in him" were "he rendered him secure from denial and disagreement." The verb takes its object with the preposition li as when Allah relates, "And thou art not a Believer on us?" (Qur'an 12:17). This means "one who assents." Or it takes its object with the preposition bi as in the statement of the

Prophet, "Belief means that thou believe in Allah, etc.," that is, "that thou assent to."

The real essence of assent does not bear the relation to the heart that veracity does to the narrative or to the narrator without any acknowledgment or acceptance [of the object], but it is an acknowledgment and an acceptance of that, so that the term "surrender" (al-taslim) may be applied to it as the Imam al-Ghazzali explained. And in general it has the meaning which is expressed in Persian by the term girawidan. It has the meaning of assertion (al-tasdiq) as contrasted with conception, just as is said in the first principles of the science of logic (al-mizan),

"knowledge is either conception (tasawwur) or assertion (tasdiq)". The leader of the logicians,

Ibn Sina, made this clear. For though this meaning [of assertion] were applied to some Unbelievers, the term "Unbeliever" would be used with the idea that the person has some signs of denial and rejection. It is just as though we should suppose that someone assented to all that the Prophet brought and confessed it and practised it and yet girded himself with the zunnar by choice or bowed to an idol by choice; we should consider him an Unbeliever because the Prophet made such things a sign of denial and rejection.

The verifying of this position according to what I have mentioned simplifies for you the explanation of many of the difficulties which have come down regarding the question of Belief. If you would know the real essence of the idea of assent, then know that Belief according to the Law

is assent to that which he brought from Allah/that is, assent in general to the Prophet with the heart regarding all that his coming from Allah made known; and that it is sufficient to bring one out into the category of Belief. The degree of this kind of Belief is no lower than that of detailed Belief. The Polytheist (al-mushrik) who asserts the existence of the Maker and His attributes is only a Believer according to the uses of language, but not according to the Law, because he falls short of monotheism. Allah alludes to such a one in the statement, "And most of them do not believe in Allah, without being polytheists as well" (Qur'an 12:106).

and confession of it/that is, by the tongue. It is not permissible at all for one to fall short in the matter of assent, whereas it is permissible for one not to confess as when under compulsion. And if objection is made that assent may not [always] continue as [when one is] in sleep or in a state of unmindfulness, we reply that assent continues in the heart, the neglect [of Belief] only being a neglect of realizing it. Even were we to admit the objection [that assent does not always continue], the Lawgiver considers that the kind of Belief which has been verified is that against which there has not occurred any judgment to the contrary, so that the word "Believer" is applied to the one who believed in the past or present and in whom there appeared no sign of denial.

This position that al-Nasafi mentioned, namely, that Belief is assent and confession, is the position of some of the Learned (al-ulama) and it was also chosen by al-Imam Shams al-A'imma and Fakhr al-Islam- Allah have mercy on them both. The Multitude (al-jumhur) of the Verifiers took the position that assent is by the heart but that confession is the condition on which judgments [as to whether one is a Believer or not] are passed in this world (al-dunya), because, since assent is by the heart, it is a hidden thing which must have a sign. So then whoever assents with his heart and does not confess with his tongue is yet a Believer with Allah, even though he is not according to the judgments of this world; but whoever confesses with his tongue and does not assent with his heart like the hypocrite is just the opposite.

This is the position chosen by Abu Mansur [al-Maturudi].

The statutes support this position, for Allah said, "On the hearts of those He has written Belief" (Qur'an 58:22), and, "His heart being tranquil in Belief" (Qur'an 16:108), and, "Belief has not yet entered your hearts" (Qur'an 49:14). The Prophet said, "Establish, O Allah, my heart in Thy religion and obedience to Thee." He said to Usama, when Usama had killed one who said that there is no deity but Allah, "Didst thou not cleave his heart?"

And if you say that Belief is assent, yet the lexicographers know only assent by the tongue, and the Prophet and his Companions were content to have Believers utter the words of the Witnessing Formula (al-shahada) and judged one a Believer without asking for an explanation of what was in his heart; I answer that it is clear that what we express by assent is the work of the heart, so even if we should suppose that assent did not have this conventional usage, or had a usage other than the assent of the heart, none of the lexicographers and the people who know common usage would rule that whoever uttered the words, "I assented [to him]" was [of necessity] one who assents to the Prophet and believes in him. Therefore it is quite sound to deny Belief in the case of some who confess with the tongue. Allah said, "Some people say, 'We believe in Allah and the last day/ but they are not Believers" (Qur'an 2:7), and, "The desert Arabs say, 'We have believed/ Say thou, 'Ye have not believed, but rather say, We have become Muslims" (Qur'an 49:14).

But as for one who confesses with his tongue only, there is no dispute about his being called a Believer from the standpoint of the language, nor about the application to him in outward matters of the laws dealing with Belief. But the dispute is whether he is a Believer when it is a matter between him and Allah. The Prophet and those who came after him, just as they ruled that one was a Believer who uttered the Witnessing Formula, also ruled that a hypocrite was an Unbeliever. Thus the Prophet indicated that the action of the tongue is not sufficient for Belief. Also the Agreement of the Muslim community confirms the Belief of him who assented with his heart and purposed to confess with his tongue, but something like dumbness prevented him.

It is evident that the real essence of Belief is not merely the two words of the Witnessing Formula as the Karramites asserted. And since the Multitude of the Mutakallims and the Traditionalists (al-muhaddithun) and the Canon Lawyers (al-fuqaha) take the position that Belief is the assent of the inner heart (al-janan), confession by the tongue and the performance of the pillars (al-arkan) of Islam, the author alludes to the denial of this by saying,

As for works/ that is, the obedient acts

they increase in and of themselves, but Belief neither increases nor decreases/Here then are two matters [for consideration].

The first is that works do not enter into Belief, since we have already seen that the real essence of Belief is assent and because of certain things that have come down to us in the Book and the Sunna. (a) In the first place works are coupled with Belief as in the saying of Allah, "Verily those who believe and do good deeds" (Qur'an 2:23, 277, etc.), and yet it is quite certain that the conjunction of the two together demands a distinction between them so that the thing joined on does not enter into that to which it is joined. (b) Secondly, Belief was made a condition of the soundness of works as in the statement of Allah, "Whoever does good deeds, whether a male or a female, being a Believer" (Qur'an 4:123), and yet it is quite certain that the thing conditioned does not enter into the condition, since it is impossible to condition a thing on itself. (c) Thirdly, Belief is affirmed of one who even neglects some of the [required] works as in the saying of Allah, "If two factions of Believers are at war" (Qur'an 49:9). And yet as has already been said it is quite certain there is no real verification of a thing without that which is its fundamental element. It is clear then that these points only raise an argument against the one who makes obedience a fundamental element of the real essence of Belief, so that, as the Mu'tazilites held, he who omits works is not a Believer. But it is not an argument against those who hold that works are a fundamental element of perfect Belief, so that he who omits them is not outside the real meaning of Belief, as the school of al-Shafi'i holds. And the tenets of the Mu'tazilites and the replies to be made to them have been mentioned in what we have already said.

The second matter is that the real essence of Belief does not increase or decrease. It has already been said that it is the assent of the heart which reaches the point of decision and acknowledgment. In this no decrease or increase is conceivable, so whoever attains to the real essence of assent, whether he does obedient acts or commits disobedient ones, his assent continues in a state in which there is no change at all. The verses which indicate an increase of Belief may be interpreted in the way that Abu Hanifa mentioned, saying that after people had believed in general there came one obligation (fard) after another, and as they believed each special obligation [as it came] the consequence was that Belief increased just as Belief in each obligation necessitated; and that this [increase in Belief] was inconceivable except in the time of the Prophet. This is a matter for consideration, for obtaining knowledge of the details of the ordinances is possible in other than the Prophet's time. Belief is incumbent upon people in general in matters that are known in general, and in detail in matters that are known in detail, it being clear that detailed Belief is [something] additional nay rather, more perfect. What has already been said about general Belief not being lower in rank that detailed Belief has to do with its being described as the foundation of Belief. It has been suggested that as fixity and perseverance in Belief increase hour by hour, the consequence is that Belief increases as times increase since it is an accident which only continues by the continual renewing [of Beliefs] similar to it. But this calls for consideration, because the occurrence of something similar to a thing after it has been made nonexistent does not mean an increase at all, just as in the case of the blackness of a body, for example.

It has been suggested that the meaning [of increase in Belief] is the increase of the fruits of Belief and the shining forth in the heart of its light and brilliance, for it increases through works and decreases through disobedient acts. It is quite evident that he who holds that works are a part of Belief accepts the increase and decrease [of Belief]; consequently this problem of increase and decrease is a part of the [larger] problem of obedient acts as a part of Belief. Some of the Verifiers said, "We do not admit that the real essence of assent does not permit of increase and decrease, but it varies indeed as to power and weakness since the assent of the individuals of a people is not like that of the Prophet." For this reason Abraham said, "But let my heart be confident"(Qur'an 2:262).

There remains yet another subject for discussion, namely that some of the Qadarites held that Belief is cognition (al-ma'rifa). Our Learned Men agreed that this position is unsound because the People having Scriptures (ahl al-kitab) knew that Muhammad was a prophet, just as their descendants do, yet undoubtedly they were Unbelievers because of their failure to assent

[to Muhammad's being a prophet], and because there were among the Unbelievers those who knew the truth very well indeed and yet through stubbornness and pride denied it. Allah said of them, "They denied it though their souls knew them [that is, the signs] to be genuine" (Qur'an 27:14). So of necessity there is a distinct difference between the cognition of the judgments and deciding that they are true on the one hand, and the assent to them and conviction about them on the other. So it is sound to call the second kind Belief in distinction from the first.

Some of the Early Theologians mention the suggestion that assent is an expression for binding the heart to that which is known of the narratives given by the Narrator; and it is something acquired (kasbi), established by the choice of the one who assents. Therefore it is to be rewarded and considered the chief of religious duties (al-ibadat) rather than cognition which sometimes occurs without any acquisition, as when one's glance falls on some body and there results to him knowledge that it is a wall or a stone. This is what has been mentioned by some of the Verifiers who say that assent means that by your choice you ascribe veracity to the Narrator. Thus, if it were to occur in the heart without choice, it would not be assent, even though it were cognition. There is a problem about this, for assent is one of the divisions of knowledge. It is one of the qualities of the soul (al-kayfiyat al-nafsaniya), rather than one of the voluntary actions, for whenever we conceive the relationship between two things and doubt whether it is to be affirmed or denied, and then proof is adduced for establishing it, that which takes place in us is the acknowledgment and acceptance of this relationship. This is the meaning of assent, judgment, affirmation (ithbat), and realization (iqa').

Yes, it is true that these qualities are arrived at through choice, by coming into contact with the causes, the use of speculation, the removing of objections, and so on. In this way the imposition of responsibility for Belief occurs. This is, as it were, the meaning of its being acquired and of its being by choice. Cognition is not sufficient for obtaining assent, for it is sometimes devoid of assent. Most assuredly this absolute cognition which is acquired by choice must be assent. There is no objection to this, for in this way one attains the idea expressed by the Persian word girawidan, for Belief and Assent are nothing else but that. It is impossible for the obstinate, haughty Unbelievers to obtain that. And if their obtaining it were a possible supposition they would become Unbelievers through denial with their tongues, their perseverance in obstinacy and arrogance, and through such things as are signs of denial and rejection.

And Belief and Islam are one/for Islam is resignation (al-khudu) and submission (al-inqiyad), meaning the acceptance of judgments and acknowledgment. That is the real essence of assent, as we have seen. This is supported by the statement of Allah, "So we brought out the Believers of those who were in it and we only found one house of Muslims" (Qur'an 51:36). And in general it is not sound in the Law to judge one a Believer who is not a Muslim nor to judge one a Muslim who is not a Believer. And we mean nothing more than this by their being one.

The evident purpose of the statement of the Early Theologians was that they intended to make no distinction in meaning [between the two], so that one [term] is inseparable from the other, yet there is no absolute unity as that term is understood, as seen in what was mentioned in al-Kifaya, that is, that Belief is assent to what Allah has narrated of positive commands and prohibitions; and Islam is submission and resignation to the Deity, and that is not verified except by acceptance of the positive command and prohibition [of Allah]. So Belief is inseparable from Islam as to judgment and they are not distinct from one another. One may say to him who makes a distinction, "What is the judgment to be applied to one who believes but docs not become a Muslim, or who becomes a Muslim but does not believe?" If he affirms for one of them a judgment not established as applicable to the other, well and good; otherwise the unsoundness of his statement is clear.

The following statement of Allah may be cited as evidence that Islam is not necessarily Belief, "The desert Arabs say, 'We have believed' Say thou, 'Ye have not believed, but rather say, We have become Muslims'" (Qur'an 49:14). To this we would reply that the meaning of Islam which is considered as such in the Law is not to be found without Belief. The Islam referred to in the verse above is an outward submission devoid of an inward submission, just as in the case of the one who utters the words of the Witnessing Formula without assent, as seen in the section [above] on Belief.

Objection may be made that there seems to be an indication that Islam is works and not an assent of the heart in the saying of the Prophet, "Islam means that you bear witness that there is no deity but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, and that you perform worship (al-sala), bring the poor rate (al-zaka), fast the month of Ramadan, and make the pilgrimage to the House, if you are able to make the journey there." To this we reply that the meaning is the fruits and signs of Islam, just as the Prophet said to some people who came as a delegation to him, "Do you understand what Belief in Allah alone means?" They replied, "Allah and

His Messenger know better." He said, "It means witnessing that there is no deity but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, and [it means] the performance of worship, the bringing of the poor rate, the fast of Ramadan, and that you give a fifth of the booty." Or it is as the Prophet said, "Belief is seventy-some sects: the highest is to say that there is no deity but Allah, and the lowest is the removing of that which is harmful from the path."

And whenever assent and confession are found in the creature, it is right for him to say, "I am a Believer in reality"/because Belief in him has been verified.

and it is not fitting that he should say, "I am a Believer, if Allah wills "/If he says that because of doubt there is no avoiding the fact that it is Unbelief.

If one says it because of good breeding and in order to refer matters to the will of Allah, or because of doubt about the final consequence and outcome [of his life], not as to his present [Belief], or because of an expected blessing from mentioning Allah, or to clear himself of self-righteousness and of glorying in his state well, in any case it is preferable to omit it, since it may give the impression of doubt. Al-Nasafi said, "It is not fitting" rather than "it is not permissible," since were [the saying of] it due to something else than doubt there would be no reason to deny the permissibility of using the expression. How would that be possible when many of the Fathers, even of the Companions and their Followers, used this expression? This is not like your saying, "I am a youth, if Allah wills"; because being a youth is not an acquired action, nor is it to be conceived that one will continue [to be a youth] as a final consequence and outcome [of his life]; nor does self-righteousness and glorying result from it, but [saying "I am a Believer, if

Allah wills" in this way] is as though you said, "I am abstinent from worldly pleasures and devoted to the service of Allah, if He wills."

Some of the Verifiers held that the result for the creature was that real essence of assent by which he escapes from Unbelief; even though assent in itself admits of being strong or weak. It is only by the will of Allah that one attains to that perfect saving assent which is referred to in the saying of Allah, "Those in reality are the Believers. They have ranks with their Lord, forgiveness, and a generous sustenance" (Qur'an 8:4). From what has been reported from some of the Ash'arites we learn that it is right to say, "I am a Believer, if Allah wills," on the basis that the real account of Belief and Unbelief, and of happiness (al-sa'ada) and misery (al-shaqawa) is made at the end of life, so the happy Believer is the one who dies in Belief even though all his life was spent in Unbelief and disobedience; and the miserable Unbeliever is the one who dies in Unbelief we seek refuge in Allah from such although all his life was spent in assent and obedience. This is as Allah pointed out in the case of Iblis, "And he was one of the Unbelievers" (Qur'an 2:32, 38:74). There is also the statement of the Prophet, "The happy one is he who was happy in his mother's womb, and likewise the miserable is he who was miserable in his mother's womb."

Al-Nasafi in order to show the unsoundness of this statement [of some of the Ash'arites] said,

The happy one sometimes becomes miserable/in apostatizing after having believed we seek refuge in Allah from such.

and the miserable one sometimes becomes happy/by believing after having been an Unbeliever

and the changing is in happiness and misery, not in making happy and making miserable, for these are both attributes of Allah/since making happy is the bringing of happiness into being and making miserable is the bringing of misery into being.

and there is no alteration in Allah and His attributes/This is due to what has already been said about the Eternal not being the locus of originated things. The real fact of the matter is that there is no disagreement in the meaning, for if the meaning of Belief and happiness is merely the obtaining of the idea expressed in these, it is obtained in the present; and if the meaning is that thing from which salvation and fruitful works result, there is, according to the will of Allah, no certainty in obtaining it now. So whoever is certain of obtaining Belief and happiness now means the first definition, and whoever commits the matter to Allah means the second.

Chapter 14

THE MESSENGERS, ANGELS, AND BOOKS OF ALLAH

In the sending of Messengers there is wisdom, and Allah has sent Messengers of mankind to mankind announcing good tidings, and warning, and explaining to people what they need [to know] of the matters of this world and of the judgment. And He has aided them with evidentiary miracles which contradict the customary way of things.

The first of the prophets is Adam and the last is Muhammad. A statement of their number has been handed down in several traditions, but it is preferable not to limit their number in naming them, for Allah said, "Of some of them we have told thee their stories, and of others we have not" (Qur'an 40:78). And there is no security in a statement of their number against there being entered in some who are not among them, or of there being excluded some who are of them. All of them were narrators conveying information from Allah, veracious and sincere. The most excellent of the prophets is Muhammad.

The angels are the creatures of Allah and they do according to His command. They are not described as being male or female.

Allah has books which He has sent down to His prophets, and in them He has shown His positive commands and His prohibitions, His promise and His threat.

In the sending of Messengers (al-rusul)/ Rusul is the plural of rasul, which is on the measure of fa'ul from [the noun] risala (a message), and it means the sending of a creature between Allah and intelligent beings (dhaw'iyi 'l-albab) among His creation in order to remove thereby those defects by which their reasons have fallen short of the benefits of this world and the next. You have already understood the meaning of Messenger and prophet in a section at the beginning of the book.

there is wisdom (hikma)/ that is, a benefit and a praiseworthy consequence. In this there is an allusion to the fact that the sending of a Messenger is necessary, not meaning that it is incumbent on Allah, but meaning that wisdom demands it, since in it there are wise and beneficial things. The sending of a Messenger is not impossible as the Sumaniya and the Barahima assert, nor is it [merely] a possible thing, both alternatives of the possible being equal, as is the position of some of the Mutakallims.

Then al-Nasafi referred to the actual fact that Messengers had been sent, to the advantage derived therefrom, to the method of establishing the sending [of Messengers], and to the designation of some whose being sent has been established, by saying,

and Allah has sent Messengers of mankind (al-bashar) to mankind announcing good tidings (mubashshirin)/of the Garden and reward to the people of Belief and obedience.

and warning/the people of Unbelief and disobedience of the Fire and punishment, for these are among the things of which Reason has no way [of obtaining knowledge]. And if it did have a way, it would be by minute speculations which would not be easy except for individuals one by one.

and explaining to the people what they need [to know] of the matters of this world and of the judgment/for Allah created the Garden and the Fire, and He prepared in them reward and punishment. The details of the different states to be found in both of them and the way to attain the Garden and guard against the Fire are among the things in which Reason is not independent [of revelation from Allah]. He also created useful and harmful bodies and He did not give Reason and the senses complete independence for knowing them. And he also made some propositions that are possible, there being no way of [knowing for a] certainty which one of the two alternatives [is right]; and some propositions that are either necessary or impossible, but which are not clear to Reason until after endless speculation and complete investigation. So were a man to spend his time in [studying] them, he would deprive himself of most of their benefits. Therefore it was of the grace (fadl) of Allah and His mercy that He sent Messengers to demonstrate that, as He said, "We have not sent thee except in mercy to the worlds" (Qur'an 21:107).