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An appraisal of Faquir Muhammad Hunzai’s article entitled “The Concept of knowledge According to al-Kirmani.”

The aim of this paper will be to critically examine the content of the introduction of Faquir Hunzai’s article insofar as it concerns Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d.1111) and Ismaili epistemology. in other words, this means that analysis, explanation, and commentary will be provided wherever it is felt they are needed to articulate more accurately and extensively the position of al-Ghazali in relation to the Ismaili doctrine of ta’lim or authoritative instruction. The reason for this, we felt, is that what the introduction of Faquir Hunzai’s article contains regarding it misses the point that al-Ghazali was, in fact, trying to make. By doing that, it is hoped that al-Ghazali’s concept of knowledge, especially as regards Ismaili epistemology, will be made much clearer as, and we fully agree with Faquir Hunzai, “its prime importance lies in the fact that a clear understanding of a system of thought (in this case Sunni Islam) depends on a clear understanding of its concept of knowledge.[1]”

In the beginning of the introduction, Faquir Hunzai begins with some remarks about the importance of studying a given systems’ concept of knowledge for the proper understanding of that system in question as a whole. He then notes how the concept of knowledge “has a particular relationship in Ismailism as one of the appellations given to [them] is al-Ta’limiyya.[2]” in part two of his article (with which we are not concerned here), he goes on to try and explain the Ismaili concept of knowledge by considering some of the views of the prominent Ismaili dai hamid al-Din al-Kirmani (d. after 1021). In order to do this, he first situates the discussion by examining and outlining al-Ghazali’s classification of the various madhahib during his time. The reason for doing this, Faquir Hunzai thinks, is that the clear points of the other schools will allow for a clear assessment “of the Ismaili point of view in juxtaposition to the others.[3]” Now, everything the article contains up to this point needs no comment. However, what comes after does need a few remarks as it is felt that the position of al-Ghazali, whenever Faquir Hunzai mentions it, needs further explanation as to the reasons why, we believe, al-Ghazali held it.

The first passage that needs explanation in Faquir Hunzai’s article is his statement:

Quite often, Ismailism is described by its critics ... [as] an anti-rationalistic authoritarian movement. Al-Ghazali accuses them of [this] and says that the basis of their madhhab is the invalidation of the exercise of the intellect and opinion because of their invitation to the ta’lim of the infallible Imam.”[4]

Faquir Hunzai then expresses his disagreement with this view in what follows in the rest of the article. We will deal with that whenever it comes up. For now, let us say something about the above quoted passage. The reason, we maintain, that al-Ghazali accuses Ismailis of being anti-rationalistic is because, in Faquir Hunzai’s own words, “they reject the exercise of personal opinion in matters of religion.[5]” This is to say that in Ismaili doctrine, truth cannot be attained in matters of religion without the help of the supposed infallible Imam. But one wonders; what exactly are these matters of religion? Faquir Hunzai’s article does not make this clear in anyway.

In the Islamic tradition, there is a very precise classification of the various sciences. Certain sciences such as fiqh, kalam, falsafah and tasawwuf (mysticism) are all considered directly pertaining to religion. They all thus fall under ‘matters of religion’. Does Faquir Hunzai have these sciences in mind? Or does he means sciences such as mathematics and the other various natural sciences i.e. physics, biology, etc., which, although don’t bear directly on religious matters, nevertheless reflect certain religious truths? If it is the former, then al- Ghazali’s criticism that Ismailis are anti-rationalistic holds because the truths of the sciences are not available to the individual without the supposed infallible Imam. In other words, nothing can be known in them without the Ismaili Imam and it is therefore useless to try and reason without him. Or is it the latter (natural) sciences? If so, then the criticism holds for the same reason as in the former. In both ways, the Ismailis are anti-rationalistic because they don’t allow for the use of ratio in the sciences - whichever ones they are - that pertain to religion.[6]  

Faquir Hunzai then goes on to quote another important Ghazalian criticism of Ismaili doctrine.[7] We say important because it’s vital for understanding the exact nature of al-Ghazali’s position with respect to Ismailism. After quoting it, Faquir Hunzai concludes by saying:

“Thus the way rationalism or authoritarianism is attributed to [Ismailis] shows that reason and authority are mutually exclusive and contradictory to each other.[8]”

Faquir Hunzai then attempts to show the incorrectness of this view by quoting a passage from the work of another eminent Ismaili dai, al-Muyyad fi’l-Din Shirazi (d.1078) that seeks to demonstrate the compatibility between reason and authority in the Ismaili view. To the above passage and Faquir Hunzai’s quoting from al-Muyyad to show its incorrectness we say:

Al-Ghazali maintains that in Ismailism reason and authority are contradictory with regards only to the supposed infallible Imam and not the Prophet. In fact, al-Ghazali would not at all deny or object to what al-Muyyad said in explaining the relationship between the intellect and prophethood. He, after all, believes that “our infallible teacher is Muhammad – God’s blessing and peace be upon him.[9]” Rather, what he objects to is the Ismailis putting their ‘Imam’ on the same level as the Prophet and making obedience to him a prerequisite for attaining truth in matters of religion which, in effect, bars everyone unattached to the Ismaili Imam from attaining truth. So to quote al-Muyyad who makes obedience to the Prophet necessary for attaining truth to show that reason and authority are not incompatible is to misunderstand the thrust of al-Ghazali’s criticism, precisely because he does not deny that (with regards to the prophet). Again, he only denies that it with regards to the supposed infallible Imam of ismailism. Now, the reason as to why he maintains that the Ismailis invalidate reason and deems it incompatible with their doctrine of ta’lim is because, in their view, reasoning in religious matters, which means attaining truth without the infallible Imam is, as was said, prohibited and therefore incompatible with following his ta’lim.

It is worth emphasizing this point and important to keep it in mind. For al-Ghazali, reasoning in religious matters means arriving at the truth (haqq) of things without the supposed infallible Imam of Ismailism and not the infallible Prophet Muhammad(s). On the other hand, for Ismailism truth in religious matters can’t be attained without the supposed infallible Imam and it is in that sense, and for that reason, why it i.e. the exercise of reason, is futile (without the Imam) and incompatible with following his ta’lim or authority. This is the point al-Ghazali is really trying to get at. If, however, it is admitted that reason, not to say anything about higher faculties of knowledge such as dhawq, kashf, etc, can arrive at truths in religious matters without the supposed infallible Imam, then what is his use? His presence is rendered superfluous. It is in that sense that reason and authority, according to al-Ghazali, are incompatible in Ismaili thought.

Faquir Hunzai then states:

“The perfection of the intellect lies in following and obeying the authority, the latter being the actual and perfect Intellect and the former being the potential or imperfect intellect.[10]”

It might be asked here in a manner similar to al-Ghazali: who is this authority and perfect intellect? Is it the Prophet? If so, then al-Ghazali does not disagree as is clear from the above. Moreover, as al-Ghazali maintains in foreseeing a certain objection, the fact that the infallible prophet is not longer physically alive makes no difference since his teaching is perfect and

“once the teaching has been perfected, the death of the teacher works no harm [...].[11]” however, if the perfect teacher is the Ismaili Imam, then al-Ghazali’s criticisms above still stand.

At the end of page 129, Faquir Hunza comes back to al-Ghazali’s criticism he noted earlier and elaborates on it a bit. Regarding al-Ghazali’s point that the basis of the madhhab of the ta’limiyya is the invalidation of the exercise of the intellect and opinion, Faquir Hunzai first admits that “it is true that they reject the exercise of personal opinion in matters of religion,[12]” then, corroborating it with a number (two exactly) of Qur’anic verses, says:

 “However, as is clear from the above, to accuse [Ismailis] of not exercising the intellect does not accord with the way in which they view the intellect. It appears that al-Ghazali attempts to depict Ismailis as muqallids or servile conformists [...][13]”

Here we come back to a matter we promised to deal with earlier. We are curious to know: how exactly do they (Ismailis) view the function of the intellect? We feel that we need to repeat the above pressing questions: Can it function and attain truth in religious matters without the help of the supposed infallible Imam? If so, then there is not real need for him. If not, then whoever follows his authority will follow him blindly and will therefore be a muqallid. Furthermore, in which of the sciences is the Imam’s authority needed since exercising reason is rejected when it comes to religious matters? This question, as was mentioned earlier, is left unclear by Faquir Hunzai. Perhaps his authority is needed in the sciences that pertain directly to religion i.e. jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, and mysticism? If no, the supposed infallible imam is superfluous. If yes, then Ismailis are guilty of the charge of taqlid. Moreover, as a pertinent side question, why have the Ismaili dai’is themselves exercised reason in these matters as is shown by their disagreements with each other in their works?

Next Faquire Hunzai writes:

“Al-Ghazali information about Ismaili belief in an infallible Imam is basically true but in order to attack this, he added certain accretions, such as the notion of the hidden Imam, which bears no relation to the Ismaili doctrine of Imamate.[14]”

He then goes on to provide some of the arguments of the Ismaili dai’is for the necessity of imamate.

We say: We don’t think that al-Ghazali deliberately tried to attribute a Twelver Shi’i notion of a hidden Imam to Ismaili doctrine or misconstrued it in any way. At least it does seem that way as we shall show. On the contrary, al-Ghazali was well aware of the belief in an everpresent, continuous Imam in Ismailism. He makes this clear in a number of places in some of the works that he devoted to refuting Ismaili doctrines. To cite a few examples, al-Ghazali, in his Kitab al-Mustazhiri in the fourth chapter on the section of Imamate, writes:

“They [Ismailis] are indeed agreed that there must be, in every age, an Infallible Imam [...] to whom recourse is to be had […].[15]

And also:

 “They [Ismailis] are also agreed that he (i.e. the Imam) is the one who undertakes this matter [of interpretation], and that [Imamate in every age] goes on among their lineage uninterruptedly and forever […].[16]

These and many other passages from his works make it clear that al-Ghazali did not ascribe the Twelver doctrine of the hidden Imam to Ismailism. Nor did he think they were the same. In fact, he clearly knew of the difference between the concepts of Imamate in the two traditions. Now notwithstanding that in his terminology he uses the word gha’ib and not mastur to describe the hidden nature of the Ismaili Imam, it can nevertheless, we think, be safe to say that he did not intend by it to mean that the Ismaili Imam, like the Twelver Imam, is in some sort of occultation and is inaccessible to his community as Faquir Hunzai may think.[17] In other words, despite his incorrect terminology in describing the absence of the Ismaili Imam, al- Ghazali makes it very clear in his writings against the Ismailis that their supposed infallible imam must always be present in the world and that he has to be accessible to his proofs (hujaj). in light of all this, we think it can be alleged that when al-Ghazali says that the Ismaili Imam is hidden, what he in truth means is that the Imam is inaccessible to the majority of his followers directly, but is accessible only indirectly through his emissaries.[18] We have reason to suppose this, and in order to show it, let’s consider more carefully what al-Ghazali says about the matter in its context in his al-Munqidh. Al-Ghazali, after acknowledging the need for an infallible authoritative teacher, writes:

“But our infallible teacher is Muhammad – God’s blessing and peace be upon him! If they say: “He is dead”, we say: “And your teacher is absent!” And when they say: “Our teacher has indeed taught his emissaries and scattered them throughout the countries, he expects them to return to him to consult him if they disagree on some point or encounter some difficulty,” we say: “Our teacher has taught his emissaries and scattered them throughout the countries, and he has perfected this teaching, since God Most High said: ‘Today I have perfected for you your religion and have accorded you My favor.’ And once the teaching has been perfected, the death of the teacher works no harm, just as his absence works no harm[19]” (Emphasis mine).

The key sentence in the above passage is the one italicized. It shows that the supposed infallible Imam is accessible, albeit only to the elite members of his community, for consultation. Therefore, the supposed infallible Imam is ‘hidden’, not in the sense of gha’ib, but in the sense of being inaccessible to the majority of his initiates and members outside his community. Al-Ghazali’s point being, in all this, is that just as the Prophet is not physically accessible to every member of his community due to his death, his perfect teaching however, which he has taught his emissaries, is accessible to everyone in his community whether past, present or future. And since the Prophet’s ta’lim is perfect, eo ipso “[his death] works no harm.[20]” Likewise, although the supposed infallible Imam is hidden from the ordinary members of his community, his ta’lim however, is accessible to them through his elite members whom he has taught. And since his teaching is perfect as well, “his absence works no harm.[21]” At this point, we are curious to know in what way, then, has al-Ghazali added “certain accretions[22]” given what he, presumably, meant from the above considerations?[23]

The next passage in Faquir Hunzai’s article which deserves commentary is when, after noting al-Ghazali’s realization of the need for an infallible teacher, he says:

However, his own arguments ‘Our infallible teacher is Muhammad(s)’ or ‘Your teacher is hidden (gha’ib)’ do not seem to refute in any way the necessity of the Imam. The Ismaili doctrine of the necessity of the Imam is based on the belief that the nature of the human intellect is imperfect or potential and that it requires a perfect or actual Intellect to attain perfection or actuality. Further, al-Ghazali cannot in any sense justify that Muhammad(s) belongs only to him and his party, for the Ismailis too, as is clear from the above, claim that the perpetual necessity of an infallible Imam is to accomplish the Prophet’s mission, which due to the spatial and temporal hindrances and limitations of human intellect, it was not possible to complete in the life time of the Prophet.[24]”

The entire passage contains three essential points which we will layout and comment upon. they are the following; i) ‘Muhammad(s) being the infallible teacher’ and the ‘hiddeness of the imam’ does not refute the necessity of the latter; ii) the Ismaili doctrine of Imamate is based on the need of the potential intellect for the actual in order for the former to become itself actual; and iii) the supposed infallible Imam is needed in order to accomplish the Prophet’s mission

which it was not possible to complete in his life time due to spatio-temporal hindrances. The second and third points seem to explain Faquir Hunzai’s reasons for holding the first one.

We say: al-Ghazali’s arguments do in fact refute the necessity of the supposed infallible imam by rendering that necessity, and our need for it, completely superfluous and unnecessary. he simply contends that the teacher is the infallible Prophet and ipso facto his ta’lim is perfect. what need is there, then, for (another) infallible teacher? He anticipates the inevitable Ismaili response ‘the Prophet is dead’ (or no longer present) to the question by answering ‘and your imam is absent’. Al-Ghazali then goes on to observe that just as the supposed infallible Imam’s emissaries have access to him i.e. his teaching, the Prophet’s emissaries i.e. the ‘ulama, have access to his perfect ta’lim as well. In other words, although the ‘ulama don’t have physical access to the Prophet because he is no longer alive, they nonetheless have access to his perfect ta’lim. The same holds for true the supposed infallible Imam of Ismailism. That is to say, and putting aside the question of the Imam’s isma’ for now, he is also not available to all members of his community (just as the Prophet) but his teaching is, through his emissaries, available to them (just as with the Prophet). What advantage is there, then, in having the supposed infallible Imam? What need is there for him? He seems to serve no purpose that the Prophet

(and his ta’lim) does not already serve. Therefore, the supposed infallible Imam is gratuitous. This seems to us to be the point al-Ghazali is trying to make in the relevant passage from his al- munqidh. The answer to these questions will take us into dealing with Faquir Hunzai’s second point mentioned above.

Regarding point two, we say: there is no doubt at all about the premise that the potential needs the actual in order to itself become actual. Al-Ghazali does not reject it; he, after all, grants “the need for an authoritative teacher who must be infallible[25]” which, in the language of philosophy, means the need for an actual Intellect. However, as he goes on to say, the actual Intellect is the Prophet. It is the Prophet, or more precisely his perfect ta’lim, which brings men’s souls from potentiality into actuality. Again, if it is objected that ‘he is dead’, al- Ghazali replies by saying “[since the Prophet’s] teaching has been perfected, [his death] works no harm.[26]” An important question to consider at this juncture is: what is it exactly that actualizes the potential intellect? Is it the supposed infallible Imam or his ta’lim? If it’s the imam, then how does he go about doing it? Does he do it by some sort of a miracle, like the waving of his hand or the snap of his fingers? Or does he perfect the person gradually by his ta’lim? If it’s the former, we don’t believe a word of it as it creates numerous other problems that need to be solved and questions that need to be answered so that our rejection of it converges on a reductio ad absurdum. If it’s the latter, i.e. the person is perfected by the ta’lim of the Imam through following it, then it’s the same with the Prophet and there’s no difference. it might have just been answered that the Imam’s ta’lim perfects souls. However, if that is conceded, then, we ask again, what is the need for him (the Imam) if the Prophet’s perfect ta’lim can by itself accomplish that? We can simply consult and follow what the Qur’an and the prophet say to achieve intellectual perfection. They seem to suffice for the job and the supposed infallible Imam seems to be superfluous for it.

Finally, in response to Faquir Hunzai’s third point we comment by saying: it is not clear to us what Faquir Hunzai means by saying it was not possible for the Prophet to complete his prophetic mission of delivering God’s revelation in his time. Does he mean to say that the prophet did not complete his mission? If so, then what does he exactly mean and understand by ‘completion of prophetic mission’? Is it delivering the entirety of the revelation as contained in the Qur’an or does he mean by it the perfecting of souls? It can’t be the former as that is clearly false unless, of course, Faquir Hunzai believes the Qur’an to be incomplete. That is, however, an issue that can’t be discussed here. Conversely, if it’s the latter, then we ask how? Is it because of ‘spatio-temporal’ hindrances that would limit the already limited human intellect from becoming perfect? But what is exactly meant by that? Is it that imperfect human intellects after the Prophet won’t be perfected by the latter because of his limited earthly existence and subsequent inaccessibility? If so, we already explained the answer to that problem above with reference to the Prophet’s perfect ta’lim and its perfecting power to perfect men. Furthermore, we are curious about the question of how exactly does the supposed infallible Imam ‘accomplish’ the Prophet’s mission? Is it by perfecting imperfect human intellects after him? If so, then, as was made clear above, he i.e. the Imam is not needed for that as the Prophet’s perfect teaching alone is adequate.

The last and final passage from the introduction of Faquir Hunzai’s article which we feel needs a comment is when he asserts:

“If completion of religion is understood as the Prophet having completed the teaching of the Qur’an and the Sunna, then any attempt to solve problems using sources other than the Qur’an or Sunna would be futile and superfluous.[27]”

We comment by first asking: why is it futile and superfluous when both the Qur’an and sunna encourage the believer to use other sources? And exactly what kind of problems does Faquir Hunzai have mind? Is it problems of the transmitted sciences such as jurisprudence or the intellectual ones such as philosophy? If it’s fiqh, al-Ghazali answers by giving an example of using personal reasoning in judging about an unheard matter in the science of jurisprudence. If the case is not explicitly specified in the Qur’an or Sunna then, as al-Ghazali says, “we do as mu’adh did when the Apostle of God – peace be upon him! – dispatched him to Yemen, viz, we judge by the text [Qur’an and Sunna], if the [case in the texts] exists, and by personal effort in its absence.[28]” The Prophet in this hadith allowed Mu’adh to use his personal opinion whenever he came across an unspecified case, so why is it futile for us to do so? Moreover, the Qur’an itself in many verses allows the believer to use his faculties of knowledge to study and ponder the ayat of God. In addition, an important point that needs to be mentioned here is the fact that the Qur’an is said to contain all knowledge in principle but not in fact. It is known as the umm al-Kitab for that reason, that is, it is the prototype of all books and hence contains all knowledge. Essentially, therefore, all knowledge can be traced back to the Qur’anic text and found therein. And when a solution to a problem can’t be explicitly found in the text, the Qur’an allows for the use of the faculties i.e. other sources, in solving problems not treated by it plainly. However, even this solving of unheard problems is done in light of the Qur’anic text and sunna. Therefore, in a way, no ‘other sources’ outside the Qur’an and Sunna are really used by the Muslim in solving problems since the two texts ultimately inform his ‘supposed’ others sources as well. That is why it is said that the Qur’an is not only the source of metaphysical and religious knowledge in Islam but also of particular fields of knowledge as well such as, for example, the various natural sciences.

Now, and we bring our discussion to a close with these last words, we are curious to know at this point: what about the Ismaili using sources other than the supposed infallible Imam in solving problems? This comes back to the point al-Ghazali was trying to make about reason being incompatible or futile with following the Imam’s ta’lim. That is to say, what point is there in using one’s reason i.e. other source, when the answer to a question could just be asked of the supposed infallible Imam and he could then convey it indirectly through ta’lim (constituting taqlid)? Is it because he allows it? If so, that’s what we have said as well and Faquir Hunzai’s contention about the futility of using sources besides the Qur’an and Sunna is empty. On the other hand, if the supposed infallible Imam does not allow the use of reason, then not only is the accusation of taqlid justified, but it can also be additionally asked: why do Ismailis make use of it? Either way, the point in Faquir Hunzai’s above quoted passage is, on our view, unjustified and mistaken.

wa Allahu ‘alam

Bibliography

1. McCarthy, Richard Joseph. Freedom and fulfillment an annotated translation of Al-

Ghazali’s al-Munqidh min al-dalal and other relevant works of al-Ghazali. Boston: Twayne, 1980. Print.

2. Hunzai, Faquir Muhammad. "The Concept of Knowledge According to al-Kirmani." In reason and Inspiration in Islam: Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism in Muslim Thought. ed. Todd Lawson. London: I.B. Tauris in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2005, 127-41.